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ABSTRACT 
 
Previous research has indicated that depression and thinking style (rumination 
versus distraction) interact to influence cognitive processing. Depressed ruminators 
produce more categoric autobiographical memories (AM) (i.e., a summary of repeated 
memories), and also demonstrate poorer SPS performance than depressed distracters 
and matched controls. The quality of AM retrieval during SPS is also related to the 
effectiveness of SPS solutions such that categoric AM retrieval during SPS 
contributes to poorer SPS. Therefore, the first aim of this thesis was to extend 
previous work by further investigating how an induced rumination/distraction 
influences subsequent AM retrieval during SPS and SPS performance. The first two 
studies examined how thinking style influences SPS and AM retrieval during SPS in a 
dysphoric (study 1) versus clinically depressed sample (study 2). The results indicated 
that rumination has a detrimental effect on SPS in both dysphoric and clinically 
depressed samples, with more pronounced effects in the clinical group. Rumination 
also appeared to influence Am retrieval during SPS for the clinically depressed group 
but not the dysphoric group.  Moreover, in both samples, SPS performance was 
associated with the type of AM retrieval involved in the SPS process. As most studies 
investigating cognitive processes in depression have focused on Western people, a 
second aim of this thesis was to examine the association between thinking style, AM 
II 
retrieval and SPS performance in depression from a cross-cultural perspective. 
The first cross-cultural study (Study 3) looked at AM retrieval on the AMT cueing 
task and the second cross-cultural study (Study 4) investigated whether these 
associations between thinking style, SPS and AM retrieval would vary across different 
cultures.  Culture interacted with depression to influence AM retrieval on the AMT 
cueing task. However study 4 demonstrated that there seemed to be no interaction 
between culture, rumination and depression on SPS performance and AM retrieval 
during SPS.
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General Introduction on Depression 
 
1.1.1 Definition of Depression 
 
Depression itself has received considerable attention from both theoretical 
investigation and clinical practice (Gilbert, 2006; Reeder, 2003). The most 
representative features of depression consist of mood disturbance, cognitive 
dysfunction, physical discomfort, sadness, feeling of worthless, feelings of guilt, 
difficulty in making decisions, poor concentration, loss of energy, sleep 
disturbance, and loss of social interest (Davidson & Neale, 2001; APA, 1994). An 
occasional low mood can occur to everyone. However, the most extreme form of 
depression can lead to the complete disruption of social and daily functioning. 
Depression is also associated with suicidal ideation and suicide is a negative 
outcome associated with depression. 
 
Depressive symptoms can be co-morbid with many other mental disorders 
such as anxiety disorder, brain damage, mania, schizophrenia and dementia (APA, 
1994). As Prisciandaro and Roberts (2005) have demonstrated in their study, 
depression is a dimensional interpretation rather than a categoric phenomenon (i.e., 
existing on a continuum that varies in severity with normal human experience). 
However, the mechanism of depression may be different depending on whether 
depression is the primary or secondary diagnosis. 
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1.1.2 Cognitive Theories in Depression and the Explanation of Deficits in 
Depression 
 
Depression has been widely studied from different theoretical frameworks 
such as biology, psychoanalysis, cognitive and behavioural theory. Each 
framework has its unique assumptions and explanations as to how the disorder is 
occurring and the development of intervention strategies specific to the particular 
mental disorder. This thesis will examine cognitive biases associated with 
depression. Therefore, the cognitive theories will be reviewed. 
 
1.1.2.1 Beck’s Schema Theory (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) 
 
One of the most notable frameworks to explore depression is Beck’s schema 
theory. Beck (1967, 1976, 1979, 1987) proposed that depression is associated with 
dysfunctional schemata. According to Beck (1979), schemata are cognitive 
structures that shape an individual’s perceptions, interpretations and memories.  
The schemata are characterized as a set of attitudes, beliefs, thoughts and 
expectations. The core schemata associated with depression consist of negative 
evaluations of the self, the world and the future. Through the interaction between 
the negative cognition and the outer world, a biased schema is then strengthened 
and can lead to mood disturbance. 
 
Beck’s schema theory is one of the first and the most important in explaining 
depression. It makes a real contribution in the treatment of the emotional disorders 
3  
by suggesting some of the cognitive processes involved in the disorder.  
However, a clear definition of the meaning of schema is not presented in Beck’s 
theory. Moreover, the explicit cognitive processes involved in schematic 
processing have not been discussed although there is some reference to automatic 
processing. Beck et al. has proposed that depression is characterized by faulty 
information processing errors, namely: arbitrary inference, selective abstraction, 
overgeneralization and polarized thinking, and that these processing errors operate 
automatically. However, Beck does not elaborate on how the basic cognitive 
processes involved in schematic processing, such as selective attention, encoding, 
and retrieval, operate (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997, pp. 10-11). 
 
1.1.2.2 Williams, Watts, MacLeod, and Mathews’s Modelling Dissociations 
(1988, 1997) 
 
Williams et al. (1988, 1997) have focused on how cognitive biases are specific 
to specific emotional disorders. The theoretical base for their model comes from 
Graf and Mandler’s (1984) distinction between priming (integration) and 
elaboration of stimulus. Integration refers to automatic processing occurring at an 
early stage in information processing. During integration there is activation of 
multiple elements involved in the representation of a particular stimulus. In this 
stage the internal representation of this information is strengthened by this process 
and becomes more accessible. Elaboration, in contrast, refers to a later stage that 
is more resource-demanding and strategic. In this process, a new pathway is 
generated between the incoming information and related information that is 
already represented in memory. Therefore, new associative pathways are 
4  
generated and also the old pathways are strengthened through spreading activation 
between existing associations. The elaborated materials become more retrievable 
as they have greater associated links for that mental representation. Williams et al. 
argued that these two distinct processes are associated with different forms of 
mental disturbances. More precisely speaking, specific emotional disorders are 
characterized by greater disruption in particular cognitive processes. It has been 
assumed that anxiety is characterized by disruption at the integration stage; it is 
associated with increasing sensitivity to threatening information at an early 
perceptual stage of processing. In contrast, for depressed individuals, processing 
the depressive-relevant information involves creating mental representations that 
involve elaborating the link between existing information in personal memory and 
the information in the newly happening event. This elaboration process renders 
the negative mental representation more retrievable. This model provides a good 
explanation for mood congruent memory, which is defined as the tendency to 
retrieve information that is consistent with one’s current mood (Watkins, Mathews, 
Williamson, & Fuller, 1992). However, there is evidence that is inconsistent with 
the predictions of this theory. For example, Watkins (2002) as well as Watkins, 
Vache, Verney, Muller, and Mathews (1996) and have demonstrated a 
depression-related implicit memory bias that may result from semantic priming 
occurring at the integrative stage. In addition explicit memory biases for 
threat-relevant information have been found in some of the anxiety disorders such 
as panic disorder (Coles & Heimberg, 2002) and generalized anxiety disorder 
(Friedman, Thayer, & Borkovec, 2000). Furthermore, this model has difficulties 
accounting for how two different cognitions: hot cognition (i.e., a cognition where 
emotion is processed) and cold cognition (i.e., a cognition where emotion is not 
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processed) operate. The model of Williams et al. (1997) is a single level model 
and does not take into account the complex interaction between multiple 
processing subsystems. Williams et al. have suggested that a multiple level of 
representation model would explain better the complex interaction between 
cognition and emotion. In the following section, an introduction of the ICS model 
will be presented to outline the advantage of a multilevel framework for 
representing the emotional disorders. 
 
1.1.2.3 The Interactive Cognitive Subsystems Framework (ICS; Teasdale & 
Barnard, 1993) 
 
ICS is a multi-level framework that was designed to model the mental activity 
in respect of cognition by the interaction of nine distinct subsystems (Teasdale & 
Barnard, 1993). Each subsystem has its own code and coding system, working 
under a number of operating principles. Some of the subsystems are related to the 
sensory aspect of the experience, whereas others are involved in a further level of 
representation of the experience such as the meaning and implications. The 
information processing involves the activation and transformation of the patterns 
of information in one code to the pattern of information in another code (see 
Teasdale, 1999, pp. S61). Cognitive processing mainly results from the interaction 
of these subsystems working interdependently. 
 
According to ICS, there are two subsystems, which represent higher order 
meaning: the Propositional code and the Implicational code. These two 
subsystems are regarded as essential in most of the mental activities. They are 
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particularly responsible for the production of emotional experience and the further 
modification of it. The relationship of these two levels of subsystems mirrors the 
relationship between “letter of a sentence” and “meanings of a sentence” (cf. 
Teasdale, 1999). Only the basic semantic elements of the specific meaning is 
involved in the Propositional code. Information in this level is explicit and easy to 
understand. In contrast, Implicational code represents higher level of meanings, 
which are implicit, and a schematic model responsible for synthesizing. This is the 
level in which emotion is generated. The propositional meaning and implicational 
meaning are functioning reciprocally. For example, the propositional subsystem 
provides specific information (sometimes in combination with sensory input) to 
the implicational subsystem; the implicational subsystem offers contextual 
information to the propositional subsystem through the transformation of patterns. 
 
ICS offers some explanation for the impaired cognitive style in depression in 
terms of the depressive interlock. It is argued that depression is a consequence of 
the elaborated iterative cycles between the propositional subsystem and the 
implicational subsystem. In other words, the depressogenic schematic model was 
strengthened in the implicational subsystem receiving the feedback loop from the 
propositional subsystem. The active schematic model generates negative 
propositions such as “I am a failure” which in turn reinforce the schematic model 
from the feedback of implicational subsystem. This conceptualization is similar to 
Williams et al. in that the depression-related materials are highly elaborated in 
both the encoding and retrieving process. Hence, the depressogenic schematic 
model is strengthened and becomes dominant, which renders the 
depressed-related materials more accessible. 
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The ICS model provides an explanation for the complex interaction between 
cognition and emotion. Furthermore, it offers a conceptualization to distinguish 
the “hot cognition” and “cold cognition”, occurring in the implicational subsystem 
and the propositional subsystem respectively. 
 
1.2 Cognitive Deficits Associated with Depression 
 
It is well known that there are cognitive impairments in depression such as 
poor concentration, difficulties in making decisions and lack of motivation. In 
earlier years, research identified only a few cognitive impairments associated with 
depression (Miller, 1975). Most of the research looking at the cognitive 
impairment in depression focused mainly on speed of processing, memory, 
attention, and central executive functioning. More recent research has indicated 
that the cognitive impairments are more diffuse. In this section, a general review 
of these topics will be given, following by a more specific introduction to a 
recently identified bias, that of AM retrieval bias in depression. 
 
1.2.1 General Cognitive Impairments in Depression 
 
Most of the research looking at the association between psychomotor speed 
and depression found that depressed people showed significantly slower 
psychomotor reaction to cognitive tasks such as the simple reaction time (SRT) 
task (Austin, Mitchell, Wilhelm, Parker, Hickie, Brodaty, Chan, Eyers, Milic, & 
Hadzi-Pavlovic, 1999; Moffoot, O’Carroll, Bennie, Carroll, Dick, Ebmeier, & 
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Goodwin, 1994) or choice reaction time performance (Tarbuck & Paykel, 1995). 
They also showed slower performance on the digit symbol substuition task from 
the revised Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-R; Wechsler, 1981) (Ridout, 
Astell, Glen, Reid, & O’Carroll, 2003). However, it needs to be noted that both 
cognitive slowness and motor slowness contribute to this psychomotor 
retardation. 
 
There is also some research looking at the various aspects of attentional 
deficits in depression. Depressed people display impaired performance on the 
CANTAB, which is, conceptualized a measure of concentration and attention 
(Shah, O’Carroll, Rogers, Moffoot, & Ebmeier, 1999). They also demonstrate 
impaired vigilance and sustained attention (Christensen, Griffiths, Mackinnon, & 
Jocomb, 1997) as well as focused attention related to verbal recalls (Hertel & 
Rude, 1991). Moreover, depressed people are found to have difficulty in selective 
attention. For example, they display interference by the “off task” stimulus when 
they were asked to respond to the target “on task” stimulus (MacQueen, Tipper, 
Young, Joffee, & Levitt, 2000). 
 
The other field which received lots of interest and attention in investigating 
cognitive deficits in depression is that of “central executive functioning”. Central 
executive functioning refers to a set of higher level cognitive functions such as 
planning, reasoning, problem-solving which involve the organization, control and 
allocation of cognitive resources (Channon, 1996). Depressed people are found to 
be impaired in various aspects of cognitive tasks in which central executive 
functioning is involved. For example, they show poor performance on the 
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planning task such as the Towers of London Task from the CANTAB (Elliot, 
Baker, Rogers, O’Leary, Paykel, Firth, Dolan, & Sahakian, 1997; Purcell, Maruff, 
Kyrios, & Pantelis, 1997) and the multiple scheduling task (Channon & Green, 
1999). They also demonstrate difficulties on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task 
(WCST; Heaton, 1981). Plenty of research, therefore, has suggested pervasive 
impairments in central executive functioning in depression. 
 
1.2.2 AM and AM Deficit in Depression 
 
Memory is an area where considerable biases in depression have been 
observed. This section will carefully review general memory biases in depression 
before examing autobiographical memory (AM) deficits in particular. This section 
will be given extensive explanation, as AM is a major area of focus in this thesis.  
 
1.2.2.1 General Memory Deficit in Depression 
 
Plenty of research has demonstrated that memory deficits are associated with 
the presence of depression on a variety of tasks and that this deficit is modifiable 
through antidepressant or other therapies (see Burt, Zembar, & Niederehe, 1995 
for a review). However, the manifestation of the memory bias depends on the 
processing involved in the task; the features of the stimuli as well as the 
characteristics of the patient are significant. Consider first the effects of patients’ 
characteristics across studies. Bipolar patients have worse memory performance 
than unipolar patients. Depressed inpatients demonstrate more serious memory 
deficits than outpatients (Cohen, Weingartner, Smallberg, Pickar, & Murphy, 1982; 
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Niederehe, 1986; Raskin, 1986; Sweet, Newman, & Bell, 1992; Weingartner & 
Silberman, 1984). 
 
 Another important factor for these inconsistent findings is the different 
stimuli that are used across studies, such as verbal versus visual, positive versus 
negative (Burt et al., 1995). Burt et al.’s review demonstrated a consistent 
conclusion that a greater depression effects was caused by positive cues than by 
negative or neutral stimuli. However, research using visual or verbal stimuli in 
studying memory in depression revealed inconsistent findings. For example, in 
recall studies, some research demonstrated greater depression effects for verbal 
stimuli; others demonstrated greater depression effects for visual stimuli. In 
recognition studies, some research demonstrated greater depression effects for 
verbal stimuli but other did not find a significant difference between these two 
types of stimuli (see Burt et al. 1995 for a review). 
 
With respect to episodic memory and semantic memory, considerable studies 
have revealed a strong association between depression and episodic memory, 
mostly in the free recall tasks (Backman & Forsell, 1994; Ilsley, Moffoot, & 
O’Carroll, 1995). Source memory is defined as the ability to specify the 
contextual information (i.e., spatial-temporal information and semantic-perceptual 
details) about a memory (Drummey & Newcombe, 2002; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & 
Lindsay, 1993). Source memory was often found to be impaired in depressed 
people or patients with prefrontal lobe lesions (see Drummey & Newcombe, 2002 
for a review). In contrast, there is no clear evidence demonstrating that semantic 
memory impairments occur in depressed people. Implicit memory and short-term 
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memory also seem to be intact (Channon, Baker, & Robertson, 1993; Ilsley et al., 
1995). Channon et al. also argued that depressed people performed more poorly 
on working memory tasks where central executive functioning is involved, but 
they did not show a consistent impairment in all cognitive tasks involving central 
executive functioning. 
 
1.2.2.2 The Structure of Autobiographical Memory 
 
In this section, the definition of AM will be introduced. The structure and 
mechanism of AM will also be demonstrated. There have been consistent findings 
about deficient AM retrieval in depression and other mental disorders. This 
deficient retrieval mainly takes the form of overgeneral retrieval as well as the 
greater accessibility of negative information. The development of this overgeneral 
retrieval bias will be discussed in terms of description theory (Norman & Bobrow, 
1979; Williams & Hollan, 1981). Possible mechanisms of deficient AM retrieval 
underpinning this dysfunction in depression will also be introduced in terms of 
clinically and experimental findings. 
 
AM has received considerable attention and research over the decades. There 
has been plenty of work focusing on the nature and function of AM (Williams & 
Broadbent, 1986; Williams & Dritschel, 1988; Conway & Rubin, 1993; Williams, 
Ellis, Tyers, Healy, Rose, & MacLeod, 1996). Robinson (1992) defines AM as 
both autobiographical information about oneself (e.g., name, profession, home 
address, interest and any personal information identifying oneself from the others) 
as well as one’s memory concerning one’s past life-experiences (e.g., celebrating 
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my 20 year old birthday when I was in university). 
 
There is clear evidence that autobiographical recollections are structured in a 
hierarchical form, where information is stored at different levels of specificity 
within the memory system (Conway & Robin, 1993; Conway, Pleydell-Pearce, & 
Whitecross, 2001; Williams, 2004). In Conway and Robin (1993), an 
autobiographical knowledge base has been proposed to explain this hierarchical 
structure of memory in terms of three distinct levels. These are lifetime periods, 
general events and event-specific knowledge. Lifetime periods refer to a period of 
time in one’s life, for example, “When I was in university” or “When I lived in 
London”. General events refer to the life events that happen repetitively such as 
“playing squash on Fridays” or the extended events lasting several days, weeks or 
months. It is suggested that these general events offer more specific information 
than the lifetime periods. The third category is event-specific knowledge, which 
refers to highly specific time periods of seconds, minutes, or hours, e.g., “Going 
to the cinema with a friend on Sunday night”. Memory in this level is 
characterized by sensory information and can be retrieved in the form of images 
(Conway, 1995). 
 
Conway and Rubin (1993) have suggested that information at one level 
provides materials to access information within another level of the knowledge 
base; this is in line with Williams and Hollan (1981). It is also proposed that the 
retrieval of recollections works in a cyclical manner and is mediated by the central 
executive. This mechanism for retrieval searches the related information using a 
description created on the basis of the cues provided. Then an evaluation is made 
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to decide to terminate the search or to continue, depending on whether the output 
matches the cues provided. The description of memory will be elaborated in the 
process of searching with reference to the related knowledge schema in order to 
predict more features of the target output.  
 
1.2.2.3 Working Self and Goals 
 
Working memory refers to the ability to co-ordinate mental operations during 
cognitive activities by utilizing past experiences stored within the memory system 
(Hitch, 2005). One concept, which is closed related to working memory, is the 
working self, highly similar to the self-schemas proposed by Markus and Ruvolo 
(1989). Markus (1977) indicated that there is a set of self-schemas that consists of 
a set of memory representations of conceptions of the self, through which 
cognition and action are modulated. However, Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) 
indicated that the concept of “working self” is constrained or grounded in AM in 
terms of the ranges and types of the goals that an individual holds. Working self 
directs the process of constructing AM and is also responsible for the specific 
memory encoding and retrieval. There is well established evidence that memory 
processes (i.e., encoding and retrieval) are associated with goal attainment. For 
example, Markus (1977) found that people with a marked dependent-independent 
schema showed a memory preference of experiences when they have behaved in a 
dependent or independent ways. The self-memory effects were further examined 
by McAdams (1982, 1985; McAdams, Diamond, de Aubin, & Mansfield, 1997). 
McAdams (1982) categorized participants into either a high intimacy motivation 
group or a high power motivation group by using the Thematic Apperception Test 
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(TAT; Murray, 1938, 1943). He found that people in the high intimacy group 
retrieved peak experiences with a preponderance of the intimacy theme in a 
subsequent memory recall test, while people in the high motivation group 
revealed more peak experiences of the power theme. The results suggested that 
the goal structure of the working self makes the experiences and recollections 
more accessible and more related to the current goals. Conway and Holmes (2004) 
investigated free call memories in older adults from each decade of their life. 
They found that the memory theme recalled in a specific decade was associated to 
the psychosocial theme that corresponded to that age stage. Taken together, 
previous research has shown that knowledge about the goal and the working self 
influence the autobiographical memory process in terms of both encoding and 
retrieval. However, this goal-directed cognitive process might not necessarily 
operate through conscious awareness. For example, Thorne (1995) found that the 
content of free recall across life span corresponded to the “developmental truth” 
(i.e., the memories from childhood refer to experiences of needing help, approval 
and love from parents; the memories from late adolescence are centered on the 
theme of assertiveness as well as reciprocal love and help). However, the 
participants were unaware of the personal goals in their free recall memories. 
Hence, the goal and working self play an essential role in the autobiographical 
memory construction but in a nonconscious way.  
 
Recent work by Klein, Cosmides, Costabile, and Mei (2002), based on 
literature review and evidence from a case study, also suggested that the 
knowledge about the self consists of two functionally isolable components: 
episodic self-knowledge and semantic self-knowledge. Episodic self-knowledge 
15  
refers to the representations of personal experience, which happen in a particular 
time and space. In contrast, semantic self-knowledge refers to trait self-knowledge, 
the descriptions about one’s own personality. In Klein et al. (2002), they 
investigated memory for self-knowledge in a participant R.J. with autistic 
symptoms, compared to a normal control. They found an episodic-semantic 
dissociation, such that his episodic self-memory was damaged but the semantic 
self-knowledge was intact. 
 
Semantic self-knowledge also appears to be different from the other domains 
of semantic knowledge such as knowledge of category membership or facts about 
public events. Klein et al. have proposed that the self is constructed and 
influenced by specific semantic memory process, which is distinguished from 
other domains of semantic knowledge. It was indicated that the semantic memory 
is responsible for the processing of culturally shared information (cf. Klein et al., 
2002). A case study investigating semantic memory deficits in patient D.B. (Klein, 
Rozendal, & Cosmides, 2002) revealed that his semantic self-knowledge was 
accurate but he possessed deficits in other domains of semantic knowledge. The 
results supported that the argument that there are different subsystems within 
semantic memory, which function independently. One of these subsystems is 
specifically responsible for the storage and retrieval of knowledge about oneself.  
 
Klein’s work provided some insights into the research of memory. The 
memory about one’s experiences and the memory about one’s personality traits 
are functionally independent. Personal semantic knowledge is also isolable from 
the other semantic knowledge. The results suggested that human mind has a 
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specific learning subsystem, which is responsible for self-related knowledge. 
 
1.2.2.4 Depression and AM Retrieval 
 
Depression influences the retrieval of AM in several ways. First, there is a 
bias in the retrieval of different valenced memories in terms of speed of retrieval 
and the proportion of negative and positive memories retrieved (Clark & Teasdale, 
1982; Lloyd & Lishman, 1975). Secondly, there are biases in the retrieve of AM 
that vary in their level of specificity. Healthy people are able to search within this 
hierarchy of memory structures fluently. When they are requested to retrieve a 
specific memory, they start with the higher level where the general memories are 
stored. Then they move to the lower level to access a specific memory in response 
to task demands. However, in depressed people the searching stays at the higher 
level and fails to reach the lower level to generate a specific memory (Williams, 
Teasdale, Segal, & Soulsby, 2000). The latter will be discussed in more details in 
the following paragraph. 
 
Research found that depressed people tend to produce more general memories 
when they are asked to retrieve a specific memory about themselves in response 
to a cue word. Employing the 10 cue words that Robinson (1976) had used, 
Williams and Broadbent (1986) first systematically examined this memory 
retrieval bias by using the word-cuing task among overdosed and depressed 
patients, hospital control patients, and normal controls. They found that the 
suicidal patients were less likely to respond with a specific memory when first 
given a cue, and required more prompting to produce a specific memory than the 
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other two groups. A possibility that the overgeneral responding was due to 
cognitive sluggishness as a result of the after-effects of experiencing a drug 
overdose was ruled out by using a Semantic memory task, which is sensitive to 
drug effects (Baddeley, Emslie, & Nimmo-Smith, 1992). Both the suicidal group 
and the hospital control group were found to be equally cognitively sluggish 
relative to healthy controls. Yet only the suicidal group was significantly more 
general in their memory retrieval. Thus, this result from the Semantic memory 
task was different from the results of the AM retrieval task. The normal group and 
hospital control group demonstrated a pattern of specific AM retrieval, whereas 
the overdose group showed a pattern of overgenerality. The recent nature of the 
crisis itself might have affected memory processes (Williams et al., 1996). 
 
One theoretical issue is the reliability of this overgeneral memory 
phenomenon. This effect was first found with overdose patients. Subsequent 
research has shown the effect to be present in people with a diagnosis of primary 
major depression (Moore, Watts, & Williams, 1988; Williams & Scott, 1988; 
Puffet, Jehin-Marchot, Timsit-Berthier, & Timsit, 1991). Thus, overgeneral 
memory bias is a robust phenomenon in both suicidal and depressed groups. 
 
This overgeneral memory retrieval has also been observed in other groups of 
patients who suffer from various mental disturbances. McNally, Lasko, Macklin, 
and Pitman (1995) as well as McNally, Litz, Prassas, Shin, and Weathers (1994) 
investigated AM retrieval in patients suffering from Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD). They used a modified version of the AMT by employing both 
positive (e.g., comradeship) and trauma-related words. Either a combat-related or 
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a neutral film was played to the participants prior to the memory task. The results 
demonstrated that PTSD patients showed a general memory retrieval style as 
depressed patients. Coleman and Conway (1991) examined the AM retrieval in 
schizophrenic patients and depressed patients. They found that, in accordance 
with the results found in depressed patients, schizophrenic patients demonstrated 
general memory retrieval, and this tendency was associated with the negative 
symptom of schizophrenia rather than the positive symptoms. 
 
Interestingly, overgenerality is not associated with all mental disturbances. 
Two other studies that have examined the specificity of AM retrieval in anxious 
people (Burke & Mathews, 1992; Richard & Whittaker, 1990) have not found the 
same memory retrieval bias. Little evidence for overgenerality was found even in 
the group of clinically anxious patients although a mood congruent effect on the 
latency effect to retrieve the events was found. However, in a recent work by 
Wenzel and Jordan (2005), there were no differences found between anxious, 
angry and healthy controls in terms of retrieval latency, coding of specificity and 
affective tone. However, both angry and anxious participants rated their memories 
as more unpleasant and had distorted appraisal to their personal memories. 
 
Williams and Dritschel (1992) have recognized that overgeneral memory 
occurs in two forms: extended memory and categoric memory. They investigated 
AM retrieval in response to both positive and negative cue words. Most of the 
errors fell into one of the two categories. However, although these two 
superordinate memories are both intermediate descriptions, they are functionally 
independent from each other. As it was further examined in the study by Williams 
19  
and Dritschel (1988), both the suicidal patients and controls provided an almost 
equally proportion of extended memories (7% versus 7.5%). However, the 
suicidal patients did provide more categoric memories than controls (18% versus 
8%). The results demonstrated that it’s the categoric memory that is associated 
with the emotional disturbance. The original description failed to explain why 
only the categoric memory was retrieved if the overgeneral memory was the result 
of a truncated searching. Williams (1996) suggested that an inhibition of 
intermediate categoric memory description is necessary for successful specific 
memory retrieval as it allows more contextual information to come into the 
memory process. Reduced working memory capacity is responsible for this 
truncated searching process. He also argued that categoric memory retrieval is 
associated with the low central executive functioning capacity. 
 
More recently, the association between overgeneral AM and other facets of 
memories in major depression was investigated. In Raes, Hermans, Williams, 
Demyttenaere, Sabbe, Pieters and Eelen (2005), the major depressed patients 
received several cognitive tasks such as the AMT cueing task, Forward Digit Span 
and Letter-Number Sequencing (subscales in WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1997), Verbal 
fluency tasks, and Auditory Verbal Learning Test (Rey, 1964). The results 
revealed that reduced specificity of AM was associated with poor working 
memory (i.e., central executive functioning) and poor resource memory. In line 
with Ramponi, Barnard, and Nimmo-Smith (2004), this overgeneral AM deficit 
was not a general memory deficit and might be “one facet of a wider deficit in 
recollecting specific properties of past events” (Ramponi et al., 2004, pp. 657). 
They also argued that one possible explanation for this memory deficit was 
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rumination thinking, which has a significant negative correlation with AM 
specificity and resource memory performance. It was speculated that ruminative 
thinking is mainly a verbally based engagement that hinders the hierarchical 
search in the memory system so that it stays at an intermediate level where only 
an overgeneral AM will be retrieved (Ramponi et al., 2004; Williams, 2004). 
 
There are some controversies about whether overgenerality is a 
state-dependent phenomenon. Some research indicated that it still exists when the 
depression has remitted (Williams & Dritschel, 1988). Thus overgenerality seems 
to be a cognitive style, which renders remitted depressed patients more vulnerable 
for further depressive episodes. Brittlebank, Scott, Williams, and Ferrier (1993) in 
a longitudinal study found that even patients in remission remained impaired in 
their ability to retrieve specific memories compared with the level found in 
hospital and normal controls. Moreover, Mackinger, Pachinger, Leibetseder and 
Fartacek (2000) also found an overgeneral retrieval style on the AMT in currently 
nondepressed women with lifetime prevalence of major depression when 
compared to the women without lifetime prevalence of major depression. 
However, more recent research looking at the effect of Mindfulness-based 
cognitive therapy (MBCT; Teasdale, Segal, & Williams, 1995) in depressed 
patients has demonstrated that this deficient memory retrieval style is modifiable. 
MBCT is a practice designed to help the individual to focus his attention on the 
“here and now” experience, using a focus on the breath as an anchor. This 
attention control training combines the stress-reduction and relaxation training 
proposed by Kabat-Zinn (1990), which can help patients to reduce chronic pain 
and anxiety symptoms (see Williams et al., 2000 for a review). By teaching the 
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patients to focus their attention on their current experience in a nonjudgmental 
way, MBCT encourages patients to pay attention to specific information more 
efficiently. As a result, specific retrieval is more likely to occur. Williams et al. 
suggested that MBCT has important clinical implications as it helps to reduce the 
overgeneral memory, which is a deficit in depression. It was also shown that the 
effect of MBCT in treating depressed people is a function of depressive chronicity. 
Teasdale, Segal, Williams, Ridgeway, Soulsby, and Lau (2000) found that only the 
depressed patients who had experienced three or more depressive episodes 
responded well to the MBCT. They argued that the MBCT is effective only when 
the ruminative-thinking cycles reactivated by dysphoric mood becomes 
autonomous. According to this suggestion, depression is less likely to be provoked 
by external events but is more likely to be mediated by the ruminative thinking 
style. Therefore, the MBCT has a pronounced effect in treating the relapse of 
depression in chronic depressed among those in whom the depressogenic 
ruminative thinking has already become autonomous. 
 
Another theoretical issue is the development of this overgeneral memory. 
Descriptions theory (Norman & Bobrow, 1979; Williams & Hollan, 1981) has 
been used as an explanatory framework to account for this overgeneral retrieval 
phenomenon. According to this theory, people are only encoding part of the 
information from the outside environment. To encode or retrieve any information, 
a partial description is formed that provides an entry point of the memory, and the 
description acts as an index for the memory packet (cf. Williams et al., 1996). 
Williams and Dritschel (1988) assumed that depressed patients were accessing an 
intermediate description, but stopping short of a specific example; and it was this 
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truncated search, which was responsible for overgeneral memory response. 
However, the descriptions theory itself seems too general to explain the 
overgeneral retrieval phenomenon. The issue is why do people retrieve categoric 
memories: why do they have more difficulties in retrieval when the categoric 
intermediate description is involved? When a specific memory is required to 
achieve a successful strategy, the relatively automatic categoric description 
memory process needs to be inhibited at the same time. According to previous 
studies (see Williams et al., 1996 for a review), this ability develops during the 
third and the fourth year of life. This control ability might be affected by chronic 
stress during childhood. Children in this stage begin to talk to their parents about 
particular events that have happened, rather than the general features of events. 
However, if the child is experiencing traumatic events or is under stress during 
this time, he or she might tend to retrieve the memory in a more generic way as a 
defense strategy in coping with the negative overwhelmingly emotional impact. 
However, if this overgeneral retrieval style has been persistently adopted, it will 
lead to mnemonic interlock in which the memory system might not retrieve 
specific memory. This is because the intermediate memory descriptions that 
usually help in the retrieval of specific events only succeed in cueing further 
generic descriptions (Williams et al., 1996). 
 
Indeed, Kuyken and Brewin (1995) have investigated the AM function in 
depression and reports of early abuse. They found that patients who reported 
childhood sexual abuse produced more general memories to both positive and 
negative cues. This is consistent with one hypothesis in which negative events 
occurring in childhood might lead to the adoption of a general style of encoding 
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and retrieval as a means of minimizing the negative effect. Moreover, Hermans, 
Defranc, Raes, Williams, and Eelen (2005) investigated the association between 
reduced AM specificity and avoidant coping in a student sample. They found that 
the number of specific memories on the AMT is negatively correlated with the 
extent of avoidant coping style. This study provides some evidence that the 
reduced memory specificity plays a role in affect regulation. By retrieving general 
memories, individuals avoid the negative impact of the unpleasant experiences. 
 
1.2.2.5 Consequences of Overgeneral AM Retrieval in Depression 
 
There is evidence that the overgeneral memory retrieval style associated with 
depression may lead to several consequences, such as poorer social problem 
solving performance and negative expectations towards the future. The 
relationship between overgeneral memory and social problem solving was 
demonstrated in Pollock and Williams’ study (2001). These authors reported a 
positive correlation between the number of specific AM retrieved and the 
performance on hypothetical social problem task (MEPS; the Means-Ends 
Problem-Solving Procedures, Platt & Spivack, 1975a). Their results demonstrated 
that people who retrieved more specific memory tended to produce more 
instrumental means for solving the hypothetical social problems and produce 
more effective solutions. More evidence suggesting a relationship between 
autobiographical memory recall and SPS performance will be discussed in greater 
detail later (see Section 1.4.3). 
 
Williams et al. (1996) examined whether the specificity with which people 
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retrieve episodes from their past determines the specificity with which they 
imagine the future. They found that suicidal patients did have difficulty picturing 
the future in a specific way compared to matched controls, a difficulty that 
affected their responses to positive, negative, and neutral cues. The degree of 
difficulty in generating specific images of the future was found to be correlated 
with the extent to which participants failed to retrieve specific AMs from the past. 
In another two experiments, they used experimental induction of different 
retrieval styles. Participants who had been instructed to retrieve specific events 
from their past were more likely to generate more specific images of the future 
than were participants who had been instructed to retrieve generic memories. This 
association can be explained by “descriptions theory”. Williams et al. (1996) 
suggested that people use the same intermediate descriptions in generating images 
of possible future events. The construction of specific models of the future 
appears to rely on accessing specific events representations from memory. In the 
absence of specific information from AM, the participant is more dependent on 
these general descriptions as the database for generating the images of the futures. 
This deficit in imaging the future may result in difficulty in solving everyday 
social problems, a difficulty faced by depressed patients. More work has to be 
done by looking at the relationship between the overgeneral memory bias and the 
ability to image their future. 
 
1.3 Rumination/Distraction and its Association with Depression 
 
1.3.1 Self-focused Attention in Depression 
 
25  
The role of attention in depression has been widely studied in past decades 
(Hamilton & Ingram, 2001; Hollon & Kendall, 1980; Ingram, 1990; 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; Teasdale & Barnard, 
1993). Although the terminology may differ (automatic thoughts, self-statement, 
rumination, depressive interlock, etc), they all indicate a heightened private 
self-awareness, or named self-focused is associated with depression (Smith & 
Greenberg, 1981; Ingram & Smith, 1984; Smith, Ingram, & Roth 1985). 
Self-focused attention has been defined as an awareness of internally generated 
information that stands in contrast to an awareness of externally generated 
information derived through sensory receptors (cf. Ingram, 1990). In Pyszczynski 
and Greenberg (1987), a diathesis-stress model was suggested such that self-focus 
increases negative affect by activating the (negative) self-schema in depressed 
people after a loss or failure when compared to nondepressed individuals. 
Self-focus or self-regulation theory emphasizes either the discrepancy of the goal 
that one would like to achieve and current behaviours, or the discrepancies 
between the real self and ideal self (Carver & Scheier, 1981; Pyszczynski & 
Greenberg, 1987; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Although focusing on this failure to 
achieve desired goals can lead to depressed mood, Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) 
argued that even if a personal failure is not involved, the depressed mood could 
still be maintained by the ruminative negative thought. Correlational studies have 
revealed that rumination predicted depressed mood even after the negative 
self-evaluation was taken into account (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993). 
 
1.3.2 Rumination/Distraction as a Thinking Style 
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Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) proposed a response style theory to explain the 
occurrence and maintenance of depression. This theory stipulates that there are 
two major components that act in antagonistic ways to respond to depressed mood.  
The first component is rumination. Ruminative responses can be defined as 
behaviour and thoughts that focus one’s attention on one’s depressive symptoms 
and on the implication of these symptoms. Ruminative responses may include 
isolating oneself to think about one’s symptoms (e.g., thinking about how tired 
one feels), possible causes of the depression (e.g., asking oneself “Why do I get 
depressed when other people don’t?”), and the possible consequences of 
depression (e.g., thinking “I’m not going to be able to finish my work if I keep 
feeling this way”; cf. Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987, 1990). Distraction is the second 
component. Distracting responses refer to thoughts and behaviours that take the 
individual’s mind off his or her low mood and promote engagement in pleasant or 
neutral activities. Examples include observing the objects in one’s surroundings, 
engaging in an activity with friends to distract oneself from one’s mood, or 
working on a hobby that takes concentration (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, pp. 569). 
Rumination in this context thus refers to a passive response to depressed mood, 
which should be distinguished from adaptive emotion-focused coping responses 
(Luminet, 2004). 
 
This responses style theory has been supported by both laboratory studies 
(Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990) and correlational studies (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1991; Lyubomirsky, Caldwell & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). In Morrow and 
Nolen-Hoeksema’s study (1990), it was found that participants made to engage in 
an active, distracting task for 10 minutes showed complete relief from an induced 
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depressed mood, whereas those made to engage in a passive, ruminative task 
showed no relief from their depressed mood. Subsequent research has shown that 
rumination has detrimental effects on either maintaining or prolonging the 
severity of depressed level in people with low mood (Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, 
& Fredrickson, 1993; Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker & Larson, 1994; Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2000; Watkins, Teasdale, & Williams, 2000). Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) argued that 
people who engaged in ruminative responses when depressed tend to remain 
depressed and may become more severely depressed than people who try to 
distract themselves from their depressed symptoms. Furthermore, women’s 
tendency to have a more ruminative response style than men may help to explain 
why they are more likely to be depressed and to report longer period of 
depression. 
 
 Additional research has investigated the relationship between some 
social-cognitive variables, e.g., AM retrieval and SPS ability, and the responses 
style theory of dysphoria/depression. Lyubomirsky et al. (1998) found that when 
dysphoric students were induced to ruminate, they came up with negative 
memories from their past (e.g., “Everyone passed the test except me”; “My girl 
cheated on me in Santa Barbara”; “Parents forced me to choose between them 
after their divorce”) and felt that negative events were more frequent in their lives 
than positive ones. However, rumination alone, in the absence of dysphoria, was 
not associated with remembering negative life events. Watkins, Teasdale and 
Williams (2000) tested whether the cognitive manipulation of rumination versus 
distraction could influence memory retrieval in clinically depressed patients. In 
contrast to Lyubomirsky et al. (1998), Watkins at al. (2000) looked at the 
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specificity of the retrieved memory. They found that distraction significantly 
reduced overgeneral autobiographical memory, whereas the rumination induction 
maintained overgeneral memory at a preinduction level. 
 
Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1995) examined the relationship between 
depression, rumination and problem-solving. They concluded from some 
correlational studies that people who are prone to ruminate when dysphoric show 
more dispositional pessimism and less of a tendency to engage in active 
problem-solving in stressful times, which has been supported by laboratory and 
field studies (cf. Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). The effect of negative mood on 
memory and information processing is one reason why ruminative responses 
might influence problem-solving (Ingram & Smith, 1984; Hertel, 1998). 
Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1995) argued that, by the activation of the 
network of negative memories, ruminative responses may lead to negatively 
biased interpretations and pessimistic causal explanations for events in one’s life. 
In their study, it was discovered that rumination might impair problem solving 
ability among dysphoric people through its negative effect on thinking. For 
example, depressed ruminators might be more likely to appraise their problems as 
significant threats to well-being, to believe that there are few solutions, to have 
self-doubts about their ability to solve them, or to give up hope on them 
completely. Lyubomirsky, Tucker, Caldwell, and Berg (1999) explored why the 
ruminators are poor problem solvers. The results showed that dysphoric 
ruminative thought is characterized by a focus on personal problems combined 
with a negative tone, self criticism, and self-blame for problems as well as 
reduced self-confidence, optimism, and perceived control. Furthermore, they 
29  
revealed a direct relationship between the negatively biased content of ruminative 
thoughts and reduced willingness to solve one’s problems. 
 
Lyubomirsky et al. (1998) found that rumination enhances the recall of 
negative events in dysphoric participants, and makes the dysphoric participants 
rate positive experiences as occurring less frequently in their life. Rumination was 
also found to be associated with the dysfunctional AM retrieval in the form of 
categoric AM retrieval. In contrast, distraction significantly reduces the 
dysfunctional AM retrieval of categoric AMs in depressed people (Watkins et al., 
2000). Rumination was also found to influence the interpretation of hypothetical 
problematic situations; dysphoric people who ruminated endorsed more negative, 
biased interpretations of these situations than their distracting counterparts 
(Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995). In a subsequent experiment within the 
same study, they also produced less effective solutions to hypothetical social 
problems. Watkins and Baracaia (2002) also demonstrated that manipulating 
thinking strategy during the SPS process also influenced SPS performance. They 
found that state-orientated ruminative questions (e.g., focusing on why you have a 
problem) significantly impaired SPS performance in the recovered depressed 
group; whereas the process-focused ruminative questions (e.g., focusing on how 
you decided to solve problem) improved SPS performance. More recently, 
Donaldson and Lam (2004) revealed an association between rumination, negative 
mood, and SPS. Depressed patients with higher levels of trait rumination reported 
poorer mood and generated less effective solutions on the MEPS. Moreover, 
manipulating state rumination using an induction procedure also resulted in poorer 
mood as well as impaired SPS performance. The most novel finding from their 
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study was that the distraction manipulation improved mood and problem solving 
in patients who were not trait ruminators. The findings imply, therefore, that trait 
rumination can interfere with the effects of a distractor manipulation. 
 
It needs to be pointed out that the term “response style” originally used by 
Nolen-Hoeksema (1991), was replaced by “thinking style” in this thesis. The 
reason for this change is that a manipulation of rumination versus distraction was 
used in the experiments of this thesis. This was designed to influence the thinking 
style in the participants: thus, a thinking style is regarded to be more appropriate 
than a response style, though the content of manipulation remains the same. 
 
There are consistent findings suggesting that rumination is maladaptive and 
perpetuates depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993; 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). However, more recently, there has been some research 
starting to look at the distinct forms of self-focused attention, which can be either 
adaptive or adaptive functions in depression (Barnard, Watkins, & Ramponi, 2006; 
Trapnell & Campbell, 1999; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003; 
Watkins & Teasdale, 2004). This theory is firstly derived from the Interacting 
Cognitive Subsystems (ICS) framework by Teasdale and Barnard (1993). Teasdale 
(1999) argued that, in terms of the ICS framework, there are two levels of 
meaning, the propositional level and the implicational level. The propositional 
level is represented by the specific and explicit meaning, which can be conveyed 
in a sentence, whereas the implicational level is represented by higher order 
implicit meanings and recurring patterns and themes. The implicational level is 
regarded as the only level on which the emotion results. These two subsystems are 
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central to mental activities such as maintaining emotional states or sustaining 
emotional processing. Watkins and Teasdale (2004) extended this framework by 
investigating adaptive and maladaptive self-focus in depression. Experiential 
self-focus is regarded as adaptive in the regulation of emotion. It also corresponds 
to the concept of mindfulness proposed in MBCT (cf. Williams et al., 2000). Both 
mindfulness and experiential self-focus emphasis the ability to direct one’s 
attention to internal states and feelings. In their study the mode of self-focus, 
experiential versus analytical, was manipulated and AM retrieval measured pre- 
and post the manipulation. The results demonstrated that experiential self-focus 
significantly reduced overgeneral AM retrieval compared to analytical self-focus. 
In a different study, Watkins (2004) used two distinct instructions, a 
conceptual-evaluative mode of self-focus or an experiential mode of self-focus, 
whilst the participants were instructed to write about an experience of failure. In 
the conceptual-evaluative condition, participants were instructed to write about 
the causes, meanings and reasons for an induced failure experience, such as 
“Write about why you feel the way you do after the test; write about what reasons 
might have caused you to perform as you did”. In contrast, participants in the 
experiential condition were required to write about the direct feelings that 
occurred moment by moment while approaching and solving the problem as well 
as at the present time. An example would be “Write about how you feel - describe 
your feelings moment-by-moment during the test and right now; write about how 
you approached the problems and your thinking process as you tried to find the 
answers” (Watkins, 2004, pp. 1043). He found that, in contrast to the experiential 
self-focus processing, the conceptual-evaluative self-focus processing was 
associated with a worse mood and more intrusions about failed performance. 
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In summary, the results of recent research have shown that rumination is 
associated with the course of depression, whereas distraction leads to significant 
relief from the depressed mood. It has also been shown that when depression is 
present, the manipulation of distraction can reduce the production of categoric 
AMs and also make social-problem solving more effective. In addition, more 
recently, rumination has also been demonstrated to have distinctive modes that 
serve different functions. These functions can either prolong the detrimental 
effects caused by depression or enhance the mood and cognitive performance in 
depression. 
 
1.4 Social Problem Solving and its Association with Depression 
 
1.4.1 Social Problem Solving Theory 
 
In the literature, there are various ways to define and conceptualize social a 
problem-solving. However, there is a consensus that social problem-solving refers 
to the process of solving problems that are encountered as a result of daily living 
(D’Zurilla & Maydeu-Olivares, 1995). Firstly, the term “social” can be employed 
to refer to any problem-solving that influences our adaptive functioning (see 
D’Zurilla, Nezu, & Maydeu-Olivares, 2004). It would therefore incorporate the 
solution of intrapersonal problems (e.g., emotional problems faced by an 
individual) as well as interpersonal problems (e.g., conflicts between individuals). 
Next, the term “problem” has been identified by D’Zurilla and Goldfried (1971) 
as a life situation that necessitates a response for adaptive functioning but that 
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response is not available to the person due to the existence of obstacles. The term 
“solutions” refers to “a response or set of responses which alters the situation, or 
one’s emotional reaction to it, or both so that it is no longer problematic to the 
individual and at the same time maximizes other positive consequences and 
minimizes other negative ones” (D’Zurilla & Goldfried, 1971, pp. 108-109). 
 
When the definitions to each term are considered together, successful social 
problem solving can be conceptualized as the ability to interpret real-life problem 
situations within the schema of past experience, to generate effective solutions 
and to carry out the actions. Adaptive functioning to meet personal and 
environmental demands is then a product of this problem-solving process. 
 
1.4.1.1 Concepts and Dimensions of Social Problem Solving Model 
 
A stage model of social problem-solving has originally been proposed by 
D’Zurilla and Goldfried (1971) 1 and then recently expanded and revised by 
D’Zurilla, Nezu and Maydeu-Olivares (2004). In the revised model there are three 
major components, which are (1) problem solving, (2) problem, and (3) solution. 
As noted by the researchers, it is important to distinguish between the problem 
solving and solution implementation. 
 
First of all, problem solving refers to the cognitive-behavioural process of 
identifying the problematic situation and generating several possible alternatives 
                                                
1
 A stage model proposed by D’Zurilla and Goldfried (1971) consists of five stages: (1) general 
orientation, (2) problem definition and formulation, (3) the generation of alternatives, (4) decision 
making and (5) solution implementation and verification. 
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to that specific situation. This process is aimed at either changing the problematic 
situation itself or ameliorating the emotional stress, or both. Secondly, a problem 
(or problematic situation) refers to any real life situation in which a response is 
needed in order to change it to a more adaptive level. However, no solutions are 
immediately available as a more conscious and effortful activity is required to 
deal with the difficulties in the problematic situation. Thirdly and lastly, the 
solution refers to a coping response, which is specific to that problematic situation. 
A successful solution will decrease the negative impact brought by the problem 
and increase the maximum positive influence to both sides in an interpersonal 
problem situation (cf. D’Zurilla, Nezu, & Maydeu-Olivares, 2004). 
 
Problem-solving and solution implementation are two different processes in 
social problem solving when viewed from both a theoretical perspective and from 
the results of experimental studies. Different skills are required to accomplish 
these two processes. Problem-solving refers to the process of finding a solution to 
a problem situation whereas solution implementation refers to carrying out an 
action to solve the problem. Marx, Williams, and Claridge (1992) have argued that 
depressed patients and anxious patients may have difficulties at different stages of 
the problem-solving process. Depressed patients have difficulties in the earlier 
stage of generating effective solutions whereas anxious patients are able to find 
effective solutions to the problematic situation but fail to perform the necessary 
behaviour to solve the problem. 
 
Derived from the stage model of D’Zurilla and Goldfried (1971), 
problem-solving ability involves two different components: (1) problem 
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orientation and (2) problem-solving skill (later as “problem-solving proper”, 
D’Zurilla & Nezu, 1999; and then “problem-solving style”, D’Zurilla, Nezu & 
Maydeu-Olivares, 2002). As it has been described by D’Zurilla et al. (2004), 
problem orientation is a metacognitive process, in which a set of 
cognitive-emotional schemas reflect one’s appraisals, beliefs and feelings about 
everyday life problems as well as one’s own problem solving ability. 
Problem-solving skills therefore refer to the cognitive or behavioural activities 
aiming at solving the problematic situation. Four major skills are involved in the 
problem-solving skill, which are: (1) problem definition and formulation, (2) 
generation of alternatives, (3) decision making, and (4) solution implementation 
and verification. Problem definition and formulation involve collecting the 
information about a problem situation in order to understand its constitution and 
to set goals for solving the problem. Generation of alternatives refers to the 
production of as many solutions as possible in order to maximize the likelihood of 
generating an effective solution. Decision making refers to the evaluation of the 
advantages and disadvantages of each solution and the subsequent selection of the 
most effective solution from a series of alternative solutions. Solution 
implementation and verification refers to the actions carried out to solve the 
problematic situation.  
 
1.4.2 Common Measurements of Social Problem Solving Ability 
 
The definition of social problem-solving has been introduced in the above 
section. Moreover, a model of social problem solving has also been presented to 
highlight the conceptual structure of social problem solving. Now the three most 
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commonly used measurements with regard to SPS will be introduced in the 
following sections. The first measure (see Section 1.4.2.1 the Means-Ends 
Problem-Solving Procedures) was used in Study 1, 2 and 3 in this thesis. 
Therefore, the theoretical background and psychometric properties of the MEPS 
will be extensively reviewed. 
 
1.4.2.1 Means-Ends Problem-Solving Procedures (MEPS; Platt & Spivack, 
1975a) 
 
The MEPS is a hypothetical social problem task that involves means-ends 
thinking. Means-ends thinking refers to the process of identifying the individual 
steps required to move from a given problematic situation to a positive outcome. 
As described by the authors there are three components: (1) the ability to 
conceptualize the steps or “the relevant means” which are necessary to achieve the 
goal, (2) the ability to anticipate the potential difficulties during the 
problem-solving process, (3) the ability to appreciate that a successful 
problem-solving process takes time (D’Zurilla & Maydeu-Olivares, 1995, pp. 
442). The MEPS can be administered either by using an interview or a 
pencil-and-paper format. The participants are presented with 10 hypothetical 
social problem situations, where the happy endings, the goals to be achieved, are 
also provided. Participants are asked to make up the middle part of the story to 
link the problem situation to the goal. Problem-solving performance can be 
assessed in terms of outcomes measures and process measures. Overall, the MEPS 
is regarded as an outcome measure because of its focus on examining the quality 
of specific solutions to a particular problem (D’Zurilla & Maydeu-Olivares, 1995). 
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Process measures, in contrast, assess the general cognitive and behavioural 
processing involved in generating effective solutions to problems situations 
(D’Zurilla & Maydeu-Olivares, 1995). However, there is also evidence that 
process measures are used with the MEPS. Schotte and Clum (1987) developed a 
modified MEPS that measures process variables such as the ability to produce 
alternative solutions and the ability to anticipate the consequences of solving a 
problem in a particular way. In their study, the results revealed that suicidal 
patients had less alternative solutions and reported more potential negative 
consequences than nonsuicidal patients. 
 
The most common outcome measure associated with the MEPS is the number 
of relevant mean steps reported in constructing a solution to the problem. The 
number of relevant means is a quantitative measure of performance. Butler and 
Meichenbaum (1981) have suggested that assessing the quality of the MEPS 
solutions may be a more viable approach in identifying subtle differences between 
patients and controls. According to criteria established by D’Zurilla and Goldfried 
(1971), effectiveness refers to “a problem solving strategy that both maximizes 
the positive and minimizes negative short- and long-term consequences, both 
personally and socially” (see Marx et al., 1992, pp. 80). 
 
 The MEPS has been criticized in several respects. First the MEPS lacks 
ecological validity. Specifically, some of the problem situations are regarded as 
being unrealistic in terms of personal experience, such as stealing a diamond. As a 
result the four problem situations with the greatest ecological validity have 
typically been used in research (e.g., being treated unfairly by a teacher/boss, 
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having a disagreement with parents/a partner). Finally the MEPS really assesses 
the ability to construct a plan to solve a hypothetical problem devoid of the 
normal emotional processing associated with solving social problems. Hence, it is 
argued that it is a measure of imaginative thinking as opposed to problem-solving. 
  
1.4.2.2 Problem-Solving Inventory (PSI; Heppner, 1988) 
 
The Problem-Solving Inventory is a 35-item Likert-type scale. It has been 
described as a measure of self-appraised problem solving ability (Heppner, 1988; 
Heppner, Neal, & Larson, 1984) or a measure of a person’s problem-solving style 
(Sherry, Keitel, & Tracey, 1984). The PSI is derived from D’Zurilla and 
Goldfried’s original five-stage problem-solving model. There are five components 
in that model: one general orientation component (problem orientation) and four 
specific problem-solving skills (problem definition and formulation, generation of 
alternatives, decision making, and verification). However, a principal component 
factor analysis has identified that the PSI consists of three subscales. They are 
“Problem-solving Confidence”, which refers to self assurance while engaging in 
problem-solving activities; “Personal Control”, which determines the extent of 
control one feels they have over emotions and behaviors while solving problems; 
and “Approach-avoidance Style”, which refers to a general tendency to either 
approach or avoid problem-solving activities (Heppner & Peterson, 1982). 
 
However, it should be pointed out that these constructs of the PSI are not 
theoretically based. Maydeu-Olivares and D’Zurilla (1997) conducted a content 
analysis of PSI and identified two meaningful constructs: problem-solving 
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self-efficacy and problem-solving skills. From this the Problem-Solving 
Self-Efficacy (PSSE) scale and Problem-Solving Skills (PSS) scale were 
developed (Maydeu-Olivares & D’Zurilla, 1997). 
 
1.4.2.3 Social Problem-Solving Inventory-Revised (SPSI-R; D’Zurilla, Nezu 
and Maydeu-Olivares, 2002) 
 
The Social Problem-Solving Inventory-Revised is a 52-item Likert-type 
inventory consisting of 5 subscales. These subscales assess problem-solving style 
and the ability to generate solutions and consist of the following: (1) the Positive 
Problem Orientation (PPO) scale, (2) the Negative Problem Orientation (NPO) 
scale, (3) the Rational Problem Solving (RPS) scale, (4) the 
Impulsivity/Carelessness Style (ICS) scale, and (5) the Avoidance Style (AS) scale. 
It has been indicated that higher scores on PPO and RPS scales, and lower scores 
on NPO, ICS, and AS scales, are associated with good problem-solving ability 
according to its theoretical assumptions. The RPS scale consists of 4 subscales 
measuring social problem solving skills, which mirror the last four stages of the 
social problem solving stage model (i.e., the Problem Definition and Formulation 
scale, the Generation of Alternative Solutions subscale, the Decision Making 
subscale, and the Solution Implementation and Verification subscale). 
 
1.4.3 Social Problem Solving Deficit in Depression 
  
There is clear evidence that poor SPS is a feature of depression. Much of this 
research has employed the MEPS to assess social problem-solving performance. 
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Gotlib and Asarnow (1979) found that depressed university students produced less 
relevant means on the MEPS than nondepressed students. Marx and Schulze 
(1991) found that depressed college students generated less effective solutions 
than their nondepressed counterparts. Marx et al. (1992) examined the association 
between SPS ability in patients with a diagnosis of major depressive disorder and 
patients with a diagnosis of anxiety disorder as well as a normal control group. 
Problem-solving ability was assessed with (1) the MEPS task, (2) the assessment 
of solutions to a personal problem generated by the participants themselves, and 
(3) the Problem-Solving Questionnaire (PSQ), a translation of the German 
Problemlosefragebogen (Konig, Otto, Holling, & Liepmann, 1980). Results 
showed that, as predicted, depressed participants suffered from a deficit in SPS on 
all three measures. The majority of these deficits were also displayed by the 
anxiety disorder patients group rather than being specific to a diagnosis of 
depression. However, on one key outcome measure, effectiveness of solutions on 
the MEPS, the depressed participants performed significantly poorer than both the 
normal group and the patients with a diagnosis of anxiety disorder. 
 
The results also suggest that depressed and anxious patients may have 
difficulties at different stages of the problem-solving process, providing some 
support for the stage model of social problem-solving (Marx et al, 1992).  For 
example, the depressed patients had difficulties in generating effective solutions to 
hypothetical problems where an earlier cognitive stage is involved.  In contrast, 
the anxious patients showed impairment in implementing solutions, a later stage 
of problem-solving. Thus, Marx et al. (1992) provides clear evidence that an 
impaired cognitive style in producing effective SPS strategies is a feature of 
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depression. A final finding of interest was that depressed people also displayed 
more negative attitudes towards problems than their nonclinical controls. 
Specifically, the depressed patients manifested a more negative problem 
orientation and more disinclination to apply unconventional solutions to problems.   
 
 Other research examining the effects of depression on social problem-solving 
has investigated whether rumination and the ability to retrieve autobiographical 
memories are possible mechanisms involved in the social problem-solving 
process. Again most of this research has employed the MEPS. Consider first the 
research looking at rumination. Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1995) 
investigated the effects of self-focused rumination on interpersonal 
problem-solving in dysphoric participants using the MEPS. The results indicated 
that dysphoric participants who ruminated generated less effective solutions on 
the MEPS than the dysphoric participants receiving a distraction manipulation and 
the non-depressed ruminators and distracters. In addition, the dysphoric 
ruminators were also more pessimistic towards their problem situations, such as 
offering more negative explanations to the social problems they had, than the 
other groups. Finally the dysphoric ruminators experienced greater negative mood 
than the dysphoric distracters. Considered together, the results demonstrated that 
rumination impairs SPS through the effect of negative mood in a dysphoric 
sample. 
 
Another possible mechanism through which depression influences SPS is 
thinking style (rumination versus distraction). In contrast to the abstract self-focus 
which involves an abstract, conceptual and more general mode of thinking style 
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processing, the concrete self-focus encourages a processing style that focuses on a 
more concrete, direct and specific mode (Stöber, 1998; Teasdale, 1999; Watkins & 
Mould, 2005). It has been suggested that concrete self-focus is associated with 
improved social problem-solving performance, in contrast to abstract 
self-focusing. Watkins and Moulds (2005) further tested this hypothesis by 
looking at the influence of abstract versus concrete self-focus on problem-solving 
in depressed people. In an abstract self-focus condition, participants were given an 
instruction such as “Think about the way you feel inside”. In the concrete 
condition, participants were asked to “Focus your attention on your experience of 
the way you feel inside”. The items were adapted from the Nolen-Hoeksema and 
Morrow’s (1993) rumination task. As predicted, the concrete self-focus 
manipulation helped depressed people in solving the MEPS. 
 
  Thus research has demonstrated some preliminary finds that ruminative 
self-focus can be either helpful or detrimental depending on the nature of the 
self-focus. Originally derived from the concept of mindfulness, the experiential 
self-focus has proven to be associated with improvement in AM retrieval as well 
as social problem solving. More work is required to test this newly developed 
theory and to develop some treatment strategies based on this assumption. 
 
 The ability to retrieve AMs may be another mechanism underlying poor SPS 
performance in depression. Poor SPS performance on the MEPS has been found 
to be associated with the difficulty in retrieving specific AM in parasuicide 
patients (Evans, Williams, O’Loughlin, & Howells, 1992). Pollock and Williams 
(2001) investigated interpersonal problem-solving ability on the MEPS and AM 
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retrieval in suicide attempters. They found that, in contrast to the nonsuicidal 
psychiatric controls and normal controls, the suicide attempters were more 
overgeneral in their AM retrieval style and they also showed greater deficits in 
their interpersonal problem-solving ability. Moreover, the results demonstrated 
that effective interpersonal problem-solving performance in suicide attempters 
was associated with the ability to retrieve specific AM. Goddard, Dritschel, and 
Burton (1996, 1997, 1998, 2001) extended research looking at the relationship 
between AM retrieval and SPS by examining how AM retrieval during SPS, as 
well as AM retrieval on the AMT cueing task, may contribute to the quality of 
solutions produced in terms of the generation of relevant means and the 
effectiveness scores. Results supported the general hypothesis that SPS skill is a 
function of both AM retrieval as measured by the AMT cueing task and by the 
types of AMs retrieved during SPS in a clinically depressed sample. More 
specifically, the ability to retrieve specific AMs on the AMT cueing task was 
again found to be positively correlated with the successful SPS performance. 
Moreover, with respect to the AM retrieval during SPS, a strong association 
between categoric AM retrieval during SPS and poor SPS performance was 
demonstrated. Goddard et al. (1996) have argued that the categoric AM retrieval 
style facilitates ruminative thinking in depressed individuals in both positive and 
negative ways. When negative, this ruminative thinking style encourages poor 
problem-orientation towards problems. In contrast, a positive ruminative thinking 
style diminishes the desire to find new insight, perhaps in the form of 
unconventional solutions. Moreover, this ruminative thinking style limits the 
cognitive resources needed to successfully define and evaluative problems as well 
as to generate effective solutions due to a maladaptive preoccupation with the 
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past. 
 
A subsequent study by Goddard et al. (2001) examined whether priming 
depressed individuals and matched controls to retrieve specific AMs prior to 
performing SPS would result in enhanced SPS performance. Priming increased 
the specific AM retrieval in both groups but did not improve their SPS 
performance. However, the priming did facilitate the ability of depressed people 
to retrieve memories that they subsequently rated as helpful. 
 
Other research examining the association between depression and SPS has 
examined attitudes towards problem solving using self-report measures and found 
deficits. For example, there is some evidence suggesting that depressed people 
demonstrate a more negative problem orientation towards social problems (Chang 
& D’Zurilla, 1996; D’Zurilla, Chang, Nottingham, & Faccini, 1998; Dixon, 2000; 
Dixon, Heppner, Burnett, Anderson, & Wood, 1993) than their non-depressed 
counterparts. D’Zurilla et al. (1998) also examined the relationship between social 
problem-solving abilities (measured by the SPSI-R) and hopelessness, depression, 
and suicidal risk in college students and psychiatric inpatients. They found a 
significant positive association between depression level (as measured by the BDI) 
and NPO (the Negative Problem Orientation), the ICS (the 
Impulsivity/Carelessness Style), and the AS (the Avoidance Style) in both a 
college students sample and a depressed patients sample. In these samples, a 
significant negative association was also found between the depressed level and 
the PRO (the Positive Problem Orientation) (see Section 1.4.2.3 for the 
introduction of SPSI-R). 
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1.5 Association between Thinking Style and the AM Retrieval as well as SPS 
  
Literature has been reviewed clearly suggesting that rumination influences 
both AM retrieval on the AMT cueing task and SPS performance in both 
dysphoric and depressed samples (Lyubomirsky et al., 1998; Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1991; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002; Watkins et al., 2000). However, there has been 
very little research examing the interaction of these variables with the exception 
of Raes et al. (2005). 
 
 Raes et al. (2005) investigated the association between performance on the 
AMT, ruminative responses (measured by the RRS; the Ruminative Response 
Scale, Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Raes, Hermans, & Eelen, 2003 and the 
RSS; the Rumination on Sadness Scale, Conway, Csank, Holm, & Blake, 2000; 
Raes et al. 2003) and MEPS performance in depressed patients. The results 
revealed that AM specificity negatively correlated with problem-solving 
effectiveness. Regression analyses also demonstrated that the relationship between 
rumination and ineffective problem solving is mediated by decreased AM 
specificity. They argued that reduced AM specificity affects the association 
between rumination and SPS effectiveness. However, this was proven in a 
correlational study. No causal inference can be drawn from this preliminary 
finding. The above results partly support the association between thinking style, 
AM retrieval and SPS ability. However, it is still unclear how rumination affects 
SPS as well as AM retrieval during SPS. More work is needed to clarify this 
causal relationship. 
46  
 
1.6 The Aim and Hypothesis of this Study 
 
There is well established evidence that thinking style (rumination versus 
distraction) has a significant influence on cognitive processing when either 
dysphoric or depressed mood is present. Depressed individuals who ruminate 
produce more categoric AM retrievals and they show more impairment in SPS 
performance; whereas a distraction manipulation improves SPS performance as 
well as AM retrieval (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Lyubomirsky et al., 
1999; Watkins et al., 2000; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001). What remains unclear is 
how a rumination/distraction manipulation, administered just prior to SPS, 
influences AM retrieval during SPS. There is evidence that the quality of AM 
retrieval during SPS is related to the effectiveness of SPS solutions. Goddard et al. 
(1996) gave clinically depressed participants the MEPS and measured AM 
retrieval during SPS. They established that poorer SPS was linked to categoric 
AM retrieval during SPS. One aim of this thesis is, therefore, to investigate the 
impact of thinking style on both SPS and AM retrieval during SPS. Both 
dysphoric and depressed groups will be recruited to examine how the effect of 
thinking style interacts with the severity of depressed mood to influence SPS as 
well as AM retrieval during SPS. 
 
Additionally, most of the studies investigating the association between 
depression, thinking style (rumination/distraction), AM retrieval and SPS have 
used a Western sample. Although there have been some studies looking at the 
culture differences in terms of AM retrieval and SPS (Chang, 1998; Wang, 2001), 
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these studies only examined AM recollections using questionnaires and SPS using 
self-report measures. These studies have also mainly focused on Asian Americans 
and people in China. Given that there are different manifestations within various 
cultures in terms of individualism versus collectivism perspectives (Eid & Diener, 
2001), which could influence both AM and SPS processes, it is important to look 
at the influence of thinking style (rumination/distraction) on the AM retrieval and 
SPS from a cross-cultural perspective. That is, Western cultures are characterized 
as being more individualistic; Eastern cultures have a more collective perspective 
that focuses on the role of the individual within a society (Markus & Kitayama, 
1991). 
 
Therefore, a secondary aim is to examine the association between thinking 
style, AM retrieval and SPS performance from a cross-cultural perspective. 
Cross-cultural comparisons will be carried out to see, first, if the culture 
differences exist in AM retrieval on the AMT cueing task and secondly, to 
investigate if these associations between thinking style, SPS and AM retrieval still 
remain the same across different cultures. 
 
The measures and methodologies used in the studies throughout the thesis will 
be described in Chapter 2. In this chapter, the clinically relevant measures will be 
introduced. The criteria for including and excluding the clinically depressed 
patients will also be specified. As has been mentioned above, cross-cultural 
comparisons will be conducted in two countries using the native language for that 
country. The cross-cultural consideration will be discussed in this chapter as well. 
Chapter 3 will examine the association between thinking style, SPS and AM 
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retrieval during SPS in a dysphoric university students sample. Chapter 4 will 
further examine these associations in a clinically depressed patients sample. 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 will be cross-cultural studies. Chapter 5 will examine 
AM retrieval on the AMT cueing task in clinically depressed patients from both 
U.K. and Taiwan. A second study will examine how thinking style influences SPS 
performance and AM retrieval during SPS cross-culturally. An identical study to 
Study 2 (in Chapter 4) will be conducted in a Taiwanese sample and the results 
will be investigated across these two samples from U.K. and Taiwan. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
MEASURES AND METHODOLOGIES 
 
In this chapter, the measures and common methodologies employed in the 
experiments throughout the thesis will be introduced. The description of measures 
will include clinically relevant measures used to assess mood, the thinking style 
manipulation (rumination/distraction manipulation), the Autobiographical 
Memory cueing task (AMT) and a hypothetical social problem-solving task, the 
Means-Ends Problem-Solving task (the MEPS). Then the inclusion and exclusion 
criterion for the dysphoric, the clinically depressed and the healthy control groups 
will also be described. As this thesis is interested in examining cross-cultural 
differences in AM and SPS, the final part of this chapter will describe how 
measures are modified to make them cross-culturally equivalent. 
 
2.1 Clinical Relevant Measures (Self-Report Measures of Mood) 
 
2.1.1 Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & 
Erlbaugh, 1961) 
 
The BDI (Beck et al., 1961) is a 21-item self-reported inventory measuring the 
degree of depressed symptoms occurring over the past two weeks (see Appendix 
1). The 21-item inventory focuses on various aspects of depressed symptoms, 
which include subjective mood state, feelings of self-esteem, propensity to initiate 
action, motivation for completing tasks, as well as the quality of sleep and 
appetite. For each item, participants are asked to choose one of four responses that 
50  
best represent how they have been feeling during the last week. A higher score on 
the BDI reflects a higher level of dysphoria. On the basis of past 
recommendations (Beck, 1967), students with BDI scores of 15 or above were 
recruited for the dysphoric group and students scoring below 5 were recruited for 
the nondysphoric group. The BDI is the most widely used self-report measure 
with good reliability and validity (Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988; Hammen, 1997). 
The BDI has now been replaced by a newer form of the BDI, the BDI-II (Beck, 
Steer, & Brown, 1996). There is substantial evidence that the BDI correlates quite 
strongly with most other self-report measures of depression as well as ratings of 
depression severity (Beck, Rial, & Rickles, 1974). 
 
2.1.2 Self-report Mood Questionnaires 
 
 A mood questionnaire was used to obtain a temporary measure of mood in 
all Study 1, 2, & 4 in this thesis (see Appendix 2), where a thinking style 
manipulation was administered. The mood questionnaire required participants to 
rate their mood on four dimensions (sad/not sad, unhappy/not unhappy, 
miserable/not miserable and cheerful/not cheerful) using 9-point Likert-type 
scales (e.g., 1 = not at all cheerful; 9 = extremely cheerful). The last dimension 
(cheerful/not cheerful) was reverse scored. The mood questionnaire also contained 
a number of filler scales (e.g., measuring levels of creativity, curiosity, 
bashfulness, recklessness, etc) to help disguise the study’s focus on mood. 
Participants completed the mood questionnaire at three different time points: the 
beginning of the experiment and immediately after each of the thinking style 
manipulation (i.e., either rumination or distraction). Ratings concerning the 
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current mood were summed to arrive at a single measure of depressed mood for 
each time point. Changes in temporary mood over time were used to evaluate 
whether the manipulations employed in the experiment were effective. This 
method has been employed by Lyubomirsky et al. (1999) to evaluate the 
effectiveness of thinking style manipulations. 
 
2.2 Thinking Style Manipulation (Rumination versus Distraction) 
 
The thinking style manipulation task (rumination versus distraction) is 
designed to influence participants’ thinking style by requiring them to focus their 
mind and “think about” a series of 45 items (Lyubomirsky et al., 1998) (see 
Appendices 4 & 5). The task administered in the experiments of this thesis was a 
modified version of the thinking style manipulation by Watkins (2000) based on 
used by Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1993). The modifications consisted of 
making the items more appropriate for British participants (see Watkins et al., 
2000, pp. 913). Consistent with Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1991) original conception of 
a ruminative response, the ruminative condition instructs participants to focus 
their attention on thoughts that are emotion-focused, symptom-focused, and 
self-focused, although they are not told especially to think about negative 
emotions and negative personal attributes. For example, participants are asked to 
think about “ your current level of energy”, “why your body feels this way”, 
“trying to understand your feelings”, “your character and who you strive to be”, 
and “why you turned out this way”. In contrast, participants in the distraction 
condition are required to focus their attention on the thoughts that are externally 
focused and not related to symptoms, emotions, and the self. For example, they 
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are asked to think about “clouds forming in the sky”, “the expression on the face 
of the Mona Lisa,” and “the shiny surface of a trumpet.” In previous work using 
this response-manipulation task, participants spent exactly 8 minutes focusing on 
45 items. In the present studies (i.e., Study 1, 2 and 4 in this thesis), we decided to 
administer the manipulation in two blocks because we were concerned that the 
effect of the manipulation might fade whilst participants are trying to solve all 
four problems. Thus, one half of the rumination/distraction manipulation (23 
items) was administered before the first two social problems were presented for 
the participants to solve. The remaining half of the rumination/distraction 
manipulation task (22 items) was then administered before the remaining two 
social problems were presented. Participants spent 4 minutes on the 
rumination/distraction manipulation in each block. 
 
2.3 Dependent Variables 
 
2.3.1 Autobiographical Memory Cueing Task (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 
1986) 
 
The autobiographical memory cueing task (AMT; see Appendix 3) is a widely 
used method for studying AMs (Williams & Broadbent, 1986; Williams & 
Dritschel, 1988; Goddard et al., 1996; Williams, Barnhofer, Crane, & Beck, 2005). 
This task provides a direct assessment of an individual’s ability to retrieve specific 
AMs. In this task, a series of cue words are presented individually and the 
participant is asked to retrieve a specific memory, as quickly as possible, in 
response to each cue word. A specific AM was explained to the participants in 
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terms of being a personally experienced event that happened on a particular day 
and place. In most investigations employing this task with depressed or dysphoric 
participants, emotionally valence words are used as cues. In this series of 
experiments, we employed the same five positive words (i.e., happy, safe, 
interested, successful, and surprised) and five negative words (i.e., sorry, angry, 
clumsy, hurt, and lonely) as used by Evans et al. (1992) and Goddard et al. (1996). 
Words were presented orally and visually (using an index card) to the participants 
in the same order listed above, with positive and negative words alternating. 
Participants were given a maximum of 60 seconds to retrieve a memory to each 
cue word. If a response was not given in that time, a score of 60 seconds was 
recorded and the next word was given. If the participant gave a categoric AM (e.g., 
playing football on Monday afternoons) within that time period, they were 
prompted to recall a specific instance. When a categoric AM was given within the 
60 seconds and prompts were then administered for retrieving a specific AM. 
Responses on the AMT cueing task could take one of four forms: a specific 
AM, a categoric AM, an extended AM and an omission. A specific AM refers to a 
memory for a personally experienced event occurring at a particular time and 
place and lasting less than one day (e.g.,  “going to a cinema with Jenny last 
Friday night”). A categoric AM refers to a personally experienced event that 
happens repetitively (e.g., “attending a computer course on Wednesday 
afternoons”). 
 
An extended AM refers to a personally experienced event that occurred at a 
particular time and place yet lasted more than one day (e.g., “my first year at 
university in St Andrews”). Finally, omissions refer to any failures to retrieve a 
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memory. All the AM responses were coded by the author. A second rater who was 
blind to the membership of the participants coded a random sample of AM 
responses from each study using the AMT to establish inter-rater reliability. 
Before the task, all participants completed a practice trial with feedbacks to ensure 
that they understand the instruction and the requirement of the task. During the 
task, prompts were given if the first response was not a specific memory. Number 
of specific memories was calculated from the 10 possible responses to the cue 
words. 
 
2.3.2 Means-Ends Problem-Solving Procedures (MEPS; Platt & Spivack, 
1975a) 
 
The MEPS is a hypothetical SPS task that has been widely used with clinically 
depressed and dysphoric samples (e.g., Marx et al., 1992; Goddard et al., 1996; 
Watkins and Baracaia, 2002). 
 
 The original version of the MEPS consists of 10 vignettes that first present a 
problem situation and then describes a successful resolution to the problem 
situation (Platt & Spivack, 1975a). The task for the participant is to describe the 
actions needed to move from the problem to its successful resolution. Problems 
revolve around social themes such as experiencing conflict with friends, getting 
along with one’s boss, successfully stealing a diamond. The following is an 
example of a MEPS problem: 
“You notice that your friends seem to be avoiding you. You 
want to have friends and to be liked. The story ends when 
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your friends like you again. You begin where you first 
notice your friends avoiding you.” 
Platt and Spivack (1975b) showed that it is not necessary to administer all 10 
vignettes. In the studies of this thesis, we used four vignettes that covered the 
following areas: problem with a boss (for clinically depressed group)/teacher (for 
dysphoric student group), friends avoiding you, moving to a new neighborhood, 
and dispute with a partner (for clinically depressed group)/parents (for dysphoric 
student group) (see Appendix 6). These themes have been used in previous work 
by Goddard et al. (1996, 2001). An example problem was presented before 
beginning the actual experiment to make sure that participants understood the 
instructions completely. Following each MEPS task, the participants were asked 
to describe any memories that were retrieved whilst trying to solve each social 
problem. 
 
Responses were marked on the following three criteria: (1) relevant means 
(that is, the number of relevant individual steps used to solve the problem [Platt & 
Spivack, 1975]) ;(2) effectiveness of the solution; (3) the number and type of AMs 
retrieved spontaneously during SPS. The relevant means measure refers to the 
number of relevant individual steps used to solve the problem. The effectiveness 
measure is marked on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not at all effective) to 7 
(very effective) for each problem. Scores are summed across the four problems to 
give each respondent a total effectiveness score and a total means score. Finally 
two raters categorized the memories spontaneously reported during SPS in terms 
of their level of specificity (e.g., specific, extended, categoric or solutions 
generated according to general knowledge). 
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Previous research has demonstrated good inter-rater reliability (.84 for 
relevant means and .87 for effectiveness) for the two solution measures on the 
MEPS (Goddard et al., 1996). 
 
2.4 The Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria for the Depressed Participants 
 
2.4.1 The Diagnosis of Depression 
 
2.4.1.1 Diagnostic and Statistic Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th Edition 
(DSM-IV; APA, 1994) 
 
Patients were interviewed by psychiatrists using the Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM-IV Axis I disorders (APA, 1994).  The Axis I disorders 
consist of those most commonly seen in clinical practice such as major depressive 
disorder and panic disorder. In order to be eligible for participation in the studies 
reported in this thesis, patients had to meet the diagnostic criteria for Major 
Depressive Disorder. The criteria consist of depressed mood, loss of interest or 
pleasure from activities that used to be enjoyed, sleep and appetite disturbance, 
psychomotor agitation or retardation, fatigue or loss of energy, feelings of 
worthlessness and inappropriate guilt, difficulty in making decisions and 
concentration and recurrent suicidal ideation (APA, 1994). In order to receive a 
diagnosis of major depressive disorder at least 3 symptoms must be experienced 
for at least two weeks in the past month. With respect to this multiaxial 
organization, DSM-IV is believed to offer a particularly useful and comprehensive 
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description of the patient’s mental disorders (Davidson & Neale, 2000, pp. 60-75). 
It is widely used by psychiatrists, clinical psychologists and other professionals in 
psychiatric settings not only as a diagnostic tool but also as a guide for 
communicating about mental conditions.  
 
In the studies throughout the chapters in this thesis, all of the patients who 
meet the diagnostic criteria of Major Depressive Disorder according to DSM-IV 
will be included in the experiment if they do not meet any exclusion criterions. 
 
2.4.1.2 Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HRSD; Hamilton, 1960, 1967) 
 
The Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HRSD; Hamilton, 1960, 1967) is 
one of the first rating scales designed to quantify the severity of depressive 
symptoms and is a highly reliable and valid tool for assessing the presence and 
severity of depression. It is regarded as an index of severity for depressive 
symptoms and is most widely used in clinical settings. It consists of twenty-one 
items. Seventeen items are actually scored to evaluate patients’ depressed mood, 
cognitive and vegetative symptoms of depression as well as the comorbidity of 
anxiety. Nine of these items are scored 0-4 (0 = absent; 1 = doubtful or slight; 2 = 
mild; 3 = moderate; 4 = severe) and a further 8 items are scored 0-2 (0 = absent; 1 
= doubtful or slight; 2 = clearly present). Items 18-21 are not regarded as 
measuring the intensity of depression; thus they are commonly omitted. The total 
time to complete is the HRSD is 30 minutes. The patients in the present study 
were interviewed by psychiatrists using the HRSD before being referred to the 
experimenter. Eligibility for the depressed groups in the present experiments 
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included receiving a diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder on a structured 
clinical interview using DSM-IV criteria and having a HRSD score over 14. 
Research has suggested that a cut-off of 14 or above is a fair indication of the 
presence of depressed mood (Katz, Shaw, Vallis, & Kaiser, 1995). The scoring 
level of HRSD is: 10-13, mild; 14-17, mild to moderate; above 17, moderate to 
severe. 
 
2.4.2 The Exclusion Criteria 
 
Any patients, whose depression is due to organic factors, e.g., brain damage, 
will be excluded from the experiment. The patients who are diagnosed with 
manic-depressive disorder will also be excluded as previous research (Murphy, 
Sahakian, Rubinsztein, Michael, Rogers, Robbins, & Paykel, 1999; Ridout, 2004) 
has indicated they have a different cognitive profile from that of patients with 
Major Depressive Disorders. Patients with any previous psychotic symptoms such 
as visual/auditory hallucination and delusions will also be excluded from 
experiments. 
 
2.4.3 The Healthy Control Group 
 
The healthy control participants were recruited from advertisements posted 
around the town centre. The Structured Clinical Interview of DSM-IV (the SCID; 
Spitzer, Williams, Gibbon, & First, 1996) was administered to ensure that the 
controls had no history of major depressive disorder and that they did not 
currently meet the criteria for a diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder. 
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2.4.4 Intellectual Function 
 
The total years of education was taken as an index of intellectual functioning 
for both the depressed and nondepressed control participants. Participants were 
matched on this criterion. 
 
2.5 Cross-cultural Considerations 
 
2.5.1 The Diagnosis of Depression 
 
The Taiwanese clinically depressed patients were recruited from the 
Department of Psychiatry, the Chung-Shang Medical University Hospital. All the 
patients were interviewed by psychiatrists using the SCID to ensure all of them 
met the diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder according to the DSM-IV criteria. 
Then patients were referred to the experimenter. The exclusion criteria consisted 
of those described in Section 2.4.2. 
 
2.5.2 The Cultural Equivalent Procedures 
 
Translation and back-translation were carried out to ensure that the two 
versions of experimental materials of each language were literally and 
semantically equivalent. The following measures were involved: the self-reported 
mood rating questionnaires, the AMT cueing task, the MEPS, and the thinking 
style manipulation (rumination and distraction manipulation). 
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The mood questionnaires were translated into a Mandarin-Chinese version and 
back-translation was administered to ensure that these two mood-measuring 
materials were identical in their semantic meanings. 
 
To develop the Mandarin-Chinese version of the AMT, the Academia Sinica 
Bilingual Ontological Wordnet was employed. This programme provides an exact 
translation of the word meanings from Chinese to English as well as from English 
to Chinese, while also matching on word frequency.  
 
In order to ensure equivalence in semantic meaning. Both the MEPS tasks as 
well as the thinking style manipulations were translated into Mandarin-Chinese by 
a native Chinese-speaking student from the Department of English. With respect 
to the thinking style manipulation, some of the items were adjusted in order to 
take into consideration cultural differences for the Taiwanese participants. For 
example, “the way Stonehenge looks at sunset” was replaced by “the way Chiang 
Kai-shek Memorial Hall looks at sunset”. A back-translation was performed by a 
Chinese-English bilingual student in Psychology and a clinical psychologist in 
Taiwan. The back-translation was compared to the original version by two native 
English-speaking psychology PhD students on a 7-pointed Likert-type scale (1 = 
totally incorrect, 7 = completely correct). The back-translation was rated a 6 by 
one person and a 7 by the other on the four measures of the MEPS. Both students 
rated a 6 for the back translation of the 45 items of rumination/distraction thinking 
style manipulation. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
STUDY 1 
 
THE EFFECT OF RUMINATION/DISTRACTION ON SPS AND 
AM RETRIEVAL DURING SPS IN DYSPHORIC STUDENTS 
 
3.1 Literature Review 
 
There is well-established evidence that depressed individuals exhibit more 
deficiencies in SPS than nondepressed individuals (Marx et al., 1992; Goddard et 
al., 1996). They produce fewer relevant means and generate less effective 
solutions when asked to solve hypothetical social problems. Depression is also 
associated with the tendency to retrieve autobiographical events in a more global, 
categoric format. That is, when deliberately required to retrieve specific memories 
of events occurring at a particular time and place, depressed individuals produce 
more categoric memory errors than controls by retrieving categories of events 
rather than unique instances (e.g., Watkins & Teasdale, 2001). There seems to be a 
link between these two types of cognitive deficits. That is, the SPS deficit shown 
by depressed people seems to be associated with enhanced retrieval of overgeneral 
categoric AMs during the process of SPS (Goddard et al., 1996). Goddard et al. 
(1996) showed that the quality of AM retrieval during SPS is related to the 
effectiveness of SPS solutions. In particular the categoric AM retrieval is strongly 
associated with the ability to generate relevant means as well as to produce 
effective solutions in depressed people (Goddard et al., 1996). 
 
Recent studies of depression have suggested that a ruminative versus 
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distractive thinking style might be an underling mechanism responsible for both 
AM retrieval deficits (Lyubomirsky et al., 1998) and poor SPS performance 
(Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995) observed in participants suffering from 
depression. Rumination is defined as “thoughts and behaviours that focus one’s 
attention on one’s depressive symptoms and the implications of these depressive 
symptoms”. Whereas distraction refers to “take one’s mind off one’s low mood 
and engage in pleasant or neutral activities” (see Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, pp. 569). 
With respect to AM retrieval, Lyubomirsky et al. (1998) found that when 
dysphoric students were induced to ruminate, they came up with negative AMs  
(e.g., “Everyone passed the test except me”; “My girl cheated on me in Santa 
Barbara”; “Parents forced me to choose between them after their divorce”) and 
felt that negative events were more frequent in their lives than positive ones. 
However, rumination alone, in the absence of dysphoria, was not associated with 
remembering negative life events (Lyubomirsky et al., 1998). 
 
Watkins et al. (2000) tested whether the cognitive manipulation of rumination 
could influence AM retrieval in a dysphoric group. In contrast to Lyubomirsky et 
al. (1998), Watkins at al. (2000) looked at the specificity of the AM retrieved. 
They found that in a condition where participants were distracted, the number of 
overgeneral AM retrieval in their responses was significantly reduced. However, 
in the rumination induction the overgeneral AM retrieval was maintained at a 
preinduction level. 
 
Rumination has also been linked to SPS. Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema 
(1995) argued that by activating the network of negative memories, ruminative 
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responses may lead to negatively biased interpretations and pessimistic 
attributions for events in one’s life. This study then showed that rumination might 
impair problem solving ability among dysphoric people through its negative effect 
on thinking. For example, the dysphoric ruminators might be more likely to 
appraise their problems as significant threats to well being, to believe that there 
are few solutions, to have no confidence about their ability to solve them, or to 
give them up completely. Lyubomirsky et al. (1999) explored why the dysphoric 
ruminators are poor problem solvers by examining the association between their 
mood states and SPS performance on a self-explanatory problem solutions task 2 
after undergoing the rumination and distraction manipulation. The results showed 
that dysphoric ruminative thought is characterized by a focus on personal 
problems combined with a negative tone, self perpetuating for problems as well as 
reduced self-confidence, optimism, and perceived control (Lyubomirsky et al., 
1999). Furthermore they revealed a direct relationship between the negative 
content of ruminative thoughts and reduced motivation to solve one’s problems. 
 
In sum, retrieval of categoric AM while engaging in SPS is associated with 
poorer SPS performance (Goddard et al., 1996). Moreover, recent studies of 
depression have suggested that relative to distraction, rumination leads to poorer 
SPS (e.g., Lyubomirsky et al., 1999) and more categoric AM retrieval (e.g., 
Watkins et al., 2000). The present study aims to extend previous findings by 
investigating within the same study if rumination versus distraction has 
differential effects on both SPS and AM retrieval during SPS. It was expected that 
                                                
2
 In this task participants were asked to list three current major problems. They were also being 
asked to rate how likely they would be able to solve this problem and the severity of the problem 
on 7-point Likert-type scale. Then they were asked to list the solutions to these problems and rated 
how confident they were in solving these problems (c.f. Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1999, pp. 1044). 
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(1) the dysphoric ruminators will perform more poorly on SPS than the dysphoric 
distracters, the nondysphoric ruminators and the nondysphoric distracters; (2) the 
dysphoric ruminators will retrieve more categoric memories during SPS than the 
dysphoric distracters, the nondysphoric ruminators and the nondysphoric 
distracters; and (3) the dysphoric group will demonstrate fewer specific AMs and 
more categoric AMs on the AMT cueing task at the baseline level. 
 
3.2 Method 
 
3.2.1 Design 
 
The design was a 2 (dysphoric status: nondysphoric vs. dysphoric) × 2 
(thinking style: rumination vs. distraction) between subjects design. The number 
of relevant means and the effectiveness of SPS, as well as the AM retrieved during 
the SPS served as the dependent measurements. 
 
3.2.2 Participants 
 
The data analysis was based on sixty undergraduate and postgraduate students 
from the University of St. Andrews. The age range was from 18 years old to 26 
years old (M = 20.87 years old and SD = 1.70 years old, respectively) for the 
whole sample. 
 
Participants were recruited from the University of St. Andrews by online 
advertisements and posters around the university campus. Participants received  
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₤ 4 payment for their taking part in after the experiment. Thirty-three participants 
met the criterion for dysphoria (BDI score equal to 15 or above) and thirty-three 
participants met the criterion for nondysphoria (BDI score equal to 5 or below). 
Subsequently three participants were dropped from each group because either (1) 
they did not adhere to the task instruction, or (2) their initial mood rating was not 
consistent with their BDI score. Half of the remaining dysphoric (six men and 
twenty four women) and nondysphoric participants (ten men and twenty women) 
were randomly assigned to either the rumination or distraction conditions.  
 
3.2.3 Materials 
 
3.2.3.1 Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1961) 
 
A description of the BDI (Beck et al., 1961) has been introduced in Section 
2.1.1, Chapter 2. It was used in this experiment as an index to allocate participants 
into either the dysphoric or the nondysphoric group (see Appendix 1). For each 
item, participants were asked to mark one of four responses that most represented 
how they had been feeling during the last two weeks. On the basis of past 
recommendations (Beck, 1967), participants with BDI scores of 15 or above were 
recruited for the dysphoric group and participants scoring below 5 were recruited 
for the nondysphoric group.  
 
3.2.3.2 Mood Questionnaires 
 
Participants completed three identical packets of mood questionnaires during 
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the experiment (see Appendix 2). Each packet contained questionnaires that asked 
participants to rate their current mood state, on 9-point Likert-type scales (e.g., 1 
= not at all cheerful; 9 = extremely cheerful). Mood questionnaires were first 
administered at the beginning of the experiment and immediately after the 
manipulation (i.e., rumination or distraction manipulation). Ratings concerning 
the current mood were summed to arrive at a single measure of depressed mood at 
each assessment. The four dimensions of mood ratings were “cheerful” versus 
“not cheerful”, “sad” versus “not sad”, “unhappy” versus “not unhappy”, and 
“miserable versus “not miserable”. The mood questionnaire also contained a 
number of filler scales (e.g., measuring levels of creativity, curiosity, bashfulness, 
recklessness, etc.) to help disguise the study’s focus on mood.  
 
3.2.3.3 Autobiographical Memory Cueing Task (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 
1986) 
 
In this task, participants are asked to retrieve a specific memory as quickly as 
possible, in response to each cue word (see Appendix 3). The specific memory 
was explained to the participants in terms of a past event that happened on a 
particular day and place. In this experiment, we used the same five positive words 
(i.e., happy, safe, interested, successful, and surprised) and five negative words 
(i.e., sorry, angry, clumsy, hurt, and lonely) as used by Evans et al. (1992) and 
Goddard et al. (1996). Words were presented orally and visually (using an index 
card) to the participants in the same order listed above, with positive and negative 
words alternating. Participants were given a maximum of 60 seconds to retrieve a 
memory to each cue word. If a response was given in that time, a score of 60 
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seconds was recorded and the next word was given. If the participant gave a 
general memory, they were prompted to recall a particular time.  
 
3.2.3.4 Thinking Style Manipulation (Rumination versus Distraction) 
 
The rumination/distraction manipulation tasks are designed to influence 
participants’ thinking style by requiring them to focus their attention and “think 
about” a series of 45 items (Lyubomirsky et al., 1998). This task was adapted by 
Ed Watkins from the tasks used by Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1993), with 
items adjusted for British participants (see Appendices 4 & 5). Following 
Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1991) definition of ruminative responses, the ruminative 
condition instructs participants to focus their attention on thoughts that are 
emotion focused, symptom focused, and self-focused, although they are not told 
especially to think about negative emotions and negative personal attributes. For 
example, participants are asked to think about “ your current level of energy”, 
“why your body feels this way”, “trying to understand your feelings”, “your 
character and who you strive to be”, and “why you turned out this way”. In 
contrast, participants in the distraction condition focus their attention on the 
thoughts that are externally focused and not related to symptoms, emotions, and 
the self. For example, they are asked to think about “clouds forming in the sky”, 
“the expression on the face of the Mona Lisa” and “the shiny surface of a 
trumpet” (see Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). 
 
In previous work using this rumination/distraction manipulation task, 
participants spent exactly 8 minutes focusing on the items. In the present study, 
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the manipulation was administered due to a concern that the effect of the 
manipulation might fade whilst participants are trying to solve all four problems. 
Thus one half of the rumination (or distraction) manipulation (23 items) was 
administered before the first two SPS tasks were presented. The remaining half of 
the manipulation (22 items) was then administered before the final two SPS tasks 
were presented. Thus the participants spent 4 minutes on the manipulation in each 
block. The items were printed on a card, which was handed to the participants one 
at a time. During each manipulation, participants were instructed to focus their 
mind on each item and think about each idea.  
 
3.2.3.5 Means-Ends Problem-Solving Procedures (MEPS; Platt & Spivack, 
1975a)  
 
The MEPS is a hypothetical SPS task that has been widely used with clinically 
depressed and dysphoric samples (e.g., Goddard et al., 1996; Watkins & Baracaia, 
2002). 
 
 The MEPS consists of 10 vignettes that first describe a problem situation and 
then the resolution of that problem situation (Platt & Spivack, 1975a). Problems 
revolve around social themes such as experiencing conflict with friends.  The 
following is am example of a MEPS problem: 
 
“You notice that your friends seem to be avoiding you. 
You want to have friends and to be liked. The story 
ends when your friends like you again. You begin 
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where you first notice your friends avoiding you.” 
 
 Participants are required to describe the actions needed to be taken so that 
the conclusion may be reached effectively. Platt and Spivack (1975b) showed that 
it is not necessary to administer all 10 vignettes. In this study four vignettes were 
used covering the following areas: problem with a teacher, friends avoiding you, 
moving to a new neighborhood, and dispute with parents (see Appendix 6). An 
example was presented before beginning the actual experiment to make sure that 
participants understood the instructions completely. Following each MEPS task, 
the participants were asked to describe any memories that were retrieved whilst 
trying to solve each social problem. 
 
Responses were marked on the following three criteria: (1) relevant means 
(that is, the number of relevant individual steps used to solve the problem [Platt & 
Spivack, 1975]), (2) effectiveness of the solution, and (3) the number and type of 
AMs retrieved spontaneously during SPS. The relevant means measure refers to 
the number of relevant individual steps used to solve the problem The 
effectiveness measure is marked on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not at all 
effective) to 7 (very effective) for each problem. Scores are summed across the 
four problems to give each respondent a total effectiveness score and a total 
means score. Finally two raters categorized the memories spontaneously reported 
during SPS in terms of their level of specificity (e.g., specific or categoric). 
 
Previous research has demonstrated good inter-rater reliability (.84 for 
relevant means and .87 for effectiveness) for these two measures on the MEPS 
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(Goddard et al., 1996). 
 
3.2.4 Procedure 
 
This experiment received ethical approval from the Research Committee in 
the School of Psychology, University of St. Andrews. 
 
Informed consents were sought from all before starting the experiment. 
Participants were informed that the study was examining the relationship between 
the processes of imagination, dreaming, level of consciousness and cognition. 
This provided a cover story designed to minimize possible demand characteristics. 
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were given a self-report mood 
questionnaire to assess their baseline mood state. The questionnaire asked 
participants to rate their current mood state on four dimensions (sad versus not sad, 
unhappy versus not unhappy, miserable versus not miserable, cheerful versus not 
cheerful; the last one was reverse scored) using 9-point Likert-type scales (e.g., 1 
= not at all sad; 9 = extremely sad). The scores on these four dimensions were 
accumulated to represent their current mood state. A higher score on the mood 
questionnaire represented a poorer mood. 
 
Then the BDI was administered to obtain a measure of the mood state during 
the past two weeks (including the day of testing). After completing the BDI, 
participants were given a word-generating task where they were asked to write 
down as many words as possible, which begins with an “S”. The purpose of this 
task was to eliminate the possible negative mood induced by completing the BDI.  
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A questionnaire about imaging colours, and a questionnaire on dreaming were 
then given to participants. This questionnaire was included as filler tasks to 
prevent participants from guessing the purpose of the study or the link between 
the response manipulation task and SPS tasks.  
 
Next, in the autobiographical memory test, the participants were asked to 
retrieve a specific memory in response to each 10 (5 positive and 5 negative) 
emotional cue words, which are orally presented with positive and negative words 
alternating. The participants’ responses were audiotaped and categorized 
according to the following criteria: specific memory, extended general memory, 
and categoric general memory. The definition for these memories and how this 
task was executed are explained in Chapter 2. Participants were given 60 seconds 
to produce a response. If they failed to produce a response within 60 seconds, the 
next cue was presented. During the task, prompts were given if the first response 
was not a specific memory. 
 
Then the first block of either the rumination or the distraction manipulation 
was then administered. A second self-report mood questionnaire was then 
administered which was followed by two social problems from the MEPS. 
Participants were instructed to describe the ideal strategy for solving each of the 
hypothetical problems. After giving their strategy, participants were asked to 
report on any memories, which came to mind whilst they were trying to solve the 
MEPS problems. The second block of either the rumination or the distraction 
manipulation was then administered and the self-report mood-rating questionnaire 
was repeated followed by two more MEPS problems. The order of presentation 
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for the four MEPS problems was randomized across participants. 
 
The MEPS solutions and AMs recalled were scored according to the following 
criteria. Each MEPS solution was marked for number of relevant means and rated 
for effectiveness using a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = not at all effective, 7 = very 
effective; cf. Marx et al., 1992). Scores were summed across the four problems. 
The inter-rater reliability for the means and effectiveness scores on the MEPS 
were .82 (for means) and .85 (for effectiveness) respectively, based on 22 
participants. AMs reported during the MEPS were classified based on criterion 
used by Williams and Dritschel (1992). A specific memory was defined as a 
memory for an event that occurred at a particular time and place and lasting less 
than one day.  A categoric memory was defined as a memory for a collection of 
repeated experiences (e.g., going out with friends on Friday evenings). An 
extended memory was defined as a memory for an event lasting more than one 
day. The absence of any memory retrieval during the MEPS was also noted. Two 
independent raters categorized the memories, one of which was blind to group 
membership. The inter-rater reliability was found to be .92 using Cohen’s k 
(Cohen, 1968). 
 
According to previous research, the mood of the dysphoric/depressed 
individuals   becomes worse after receiving the rumination manipulation. To 
address this ethical consideration, a number of distraction items were given to the 
dysphoric/depressed ruminators at the end of the experiments involving the 
rumination manipulation. These distraction items should have eliminated the 
negative effect on mood caused by the rumination manipulation. 
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At the end of the experiment, participants were debriefed. 
 
3.3 Results 
 
3.3.1 Manipulation Check 
 
Table 3.1 Mean and SD of Levels of Mood of Each Group (Dysphoric Status × 
Thinking Style) 
 Nondysphoric  Dysphoric 
 
Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
 Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
Mood 1 
M 
(SD) 
 
 
7.27 
(2.89) 
 
6.87 
(2.29) 
  
20.20 
(3.53) 
 
20.87 
(3.60) 
Mood 2 
M 
(SD) 
 
 
9.60 
(4.07) 
 
6.53 
(2.17) 
  
23.27 
(4.48) 
 
18.20 
(4.26) 
Mood 3 
M 
(SD) 
 
 
9.00 
(3.61) 
 
6.33 
(1.67) 
  
23.33 
(3.74) 
 
18.00 
(4.88) 
Mood 1: At the beginning of the experiment 
Mood 2: After the first time manipulation 
Mood 3: After the second time manipulation 
 
To assess the effects of the rumination versus distraction manipulation, the 
manipulation check was used reported by Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema 
(1993). Mood change was measured by comparing participants’ score on the 
self-reported mood rating questionnaires. The mood changes were computed for 
each mood rating score at three different time points: at the beginning of the 
experiment, after the first time manipulation, and after the second time 
manipulation (see Table 3.1). A Pearson’s correlation was also conducted to 
examine the association between participants’ BDI score and their self-report 
mood measures and a satisfactory positive correlation was found (r = .84, p < .01). 
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Group differences in the baseline mood were assessed in a 2 (dysphoric status: 
nondysphoric vs. dysphoric) × 2 (thinking style: rumination vs. distraction) 
ANOVA with baseline dysphoria, measured by Likert-type scale ratings, as the 
dependent variable. There was a main effect of dysphoric status such that 
dysphoric students had higher levels of dysphoria at the outset of the experiment 
(M = 20.53, SD = 3.52) than nondysphoric students (M = 7.07, SD = 2.57) (F(1, 
56) = 278.59, p < .01). There were no significant differences in baseline dysphoria 
between the rumination and distraction conditions (F(1, 56) < 1, p > .05). The 
interaction between dysphoric status and thinking style was also not significant 
(F(1, 56) < 1, p > .05). 
 
A 2 (dysphoric status: nondysphoric vs. dysphoric) × 2 (thinking style: 
rumination vs. distraction) ANCOVA (analysis of covariance, with baseline mood 
as the covariate) was conducted to assess the effects of the rumination or 
distraction manipulation on post manipulation dysphoria. The results 
demonstrated a main effect of thinking style (F(1, 56) = 32.86, p < .01). However, 
the main effect of dysphoric status was not significant (F(1, 56) < 1, p = .49). This 
significant main effect was qualified by a significant interaction of dysphoric 
status and thinking style (F(1, 56) = 3.94, p = .05). Simple effect analyses showed 
that the dysphoric ruminators showed significantly greater dysphoria than the 
nondysphoric ruminators (t(28) = 13.67, p < .01), the nondysphoric distracters 
(t(28) = 17.73, p < .01), and the dysphoric distracters (t(28) = 5.07, p < .01). 
 
In case the effects of the rumination or distraction manipulation might not 
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persist over time, either the rumination or the distraction manipulation was 
repeated after completing the first two SPS tasks. The results revealed that after 
the second manipulation, the mood rating (Mood 3) remained very similar to the 
rating made after the first manipulation (Mood 2) for all four groups (all t(14) < 
1.30, p > .05). 
 
3.3.2 AM Retrieval on the AMT Cueing Task in Nondysphoric and Dysphoric 
Groups 
 
Two separate 2 (dysphoric status: nondysphoric vs. dysphoric) × 2 (thinking 
style: rumination vs. distraction) ANOVAs were conducted on the numbers of 
specific and categoric memories retrieved on the AMT cueing task (see Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2 Total Number of AM Retrieval on the AMT (Dysphoric Status × 
Thinking Style) 
 Nondysphoric  Dysphoric 
 
Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
 Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
 Specific Memory 
M 
(SD) 
 
 
9.27 
(1.03) 
 
 
9.20 
(1.01) 
 
 
8.27 
(1.05) 
 
8.53 
(0.83) 
Categoric Memory 
M 
(SD) 
 
 
0.40 
(0.63) 
 
0.20 
(0.41) 
  
1.13 
(0.99) 
 
0.87 
(0.74) 
 
The first analysis examined the numbers of specific AMs retrieved on the 
AMT cueing task. The results revealed that there was a significant main effect of 
dysphoric status such that the dysphoric participants  (M = 8.4, SD = 0.93) 
retrieved significantly fewer specific AMs on the AMT cueing task than the 
nondysphoric participants (M = 9.23, SD = 1.01)(F(1, 56) = 10.802, p < .001). 
However, there was no significant main effect of thinking style (F(1, 56) = .156, p 
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> .05), and no significant dysphoric status × thinking style interaction (F(1, 56) 
= .432, p > .05). 
 
With regard to the number of categoric AMs, there was a main effect of 
dysphoric status such that the dysphoric participants (M = 1.00, SD = 0.87) 
retrieved significantly more categoric AMs on the AMT cueing task than the 
nondysphoric participants (M = 0.30, SD = 0.54) (F(1, 56) = 13.968, p < .001). 
However, there was no significant main effect of thinking style (F(1, 56) = 1.552, 
p > .05), and no significant dysphoric status × thinking style interaction (F(1, 56) 
= .032, p > .05). 
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Figure 3.1 AM Retrieval on the AMT (Dysphoric Status  × Thinking Style) 
 
3.3.3 The Effects of Rumination/Distraction on SPS Performance in terms of 
Means and Effectiveness 
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With regard to SPS performance (see Table 3.3), a 2 (dysphoric status: 
nondysphoric vs. dysphoric) × 2 (thinking style: rumination vs. distraction) 
ANOVA was conducted on the total number of relevant means generated on the 
MEPS between the four groups. The nondysphoric participants (M = 23.00, SD = 
4.33) produced more relevant means than the dysphoric participants (M = 21.3, 
SD = 2.34) did (F(1, 56) = 3.481, p = .07), and this difference was approaching 
significance. Neither the main effects of thinking style (F(1, 56) = .001, p > .05), 
nor the dysphoric status by thinking style interaction (F(1, 56) = 0.387, p > .05), 
were significant. 
 
With regard to effectiveness, both the main effect of dysphoric status (F(1, 56) 
= 10.7,  p < .01) and thinking style (F(1, 56) = 5.53, p < .05) were significant. 
However, these main effects were qualified by a significant interaction (F(1, 56) = 
11.38, p < .01). Simple effects analyses showed this effect to be due to the 
dysphoric ruminators performing significantly less effectively than the dysphoric 
distracters (t(28) = 4.59, p < .01), the nondysphoric ruminators (t(28) = 4.88, p 
< .01) and the nondysphoric distracters (t(28) = 4.88, p < .01). 
 
Table 3.3 SPS in terms of Means and Effectiveness  (Dysphoric Status  × 
Thinking Style) 
 Nondysphoric  Dysphoric 
 
Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
 Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
Relevant Means 
M 
(SD) 
 
23.27 
(4.93) 
 
22.73 
(3.79) 
  
21.00 
(2.93) 
 
21.60 
(1.59) 
 Effectiveness 
M 
(SD) 
 
 
22.07 
(3.08) 
 
21.40 
(2.47) 
 
 
17.73 
(1.53) 
 
21.47 
(2.75) 
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3.3.4 AM Retrieval during SPS 
 
Two separate 2 (dysphoric status: nondysphoric vs. dysphoric) × 2 (thinking 
style: rumination vs. distraction) ANOVAs were conducted on the numbers of 
specific and categoric AMs retrieved while executing the MEPS task (see Table 
3.4). 
 
The first analysis examined the numbers of specific AMs. The results revealed 
that there was a significant main effect of dysphoric status such that the dysphoric 
participants (M = 0.67, SD = 0.92) retrieved significantly less specific memories 
during SPS than the nondysphoric participants (M = 1.47, SD = 1.04) (F(1, 56) = 
9.600, p < .005). There was no significant thinking style main effect (F(1, 56) = 
0.067, p > .05) and no significant dysphoric status × thinking style interaction 
(F(1, 56) = 0.067, p > .05). 
 
With regard to the number of categoric AMs, there was also a main effect of 
dysphoric status such that the dysphoric participants (M = 1.17, SD = 1.39) 
retrieved significantly more categoric AMs during the MEPS task than the 
nondysphoric participants (M = 0.23, SD = 0.43) (F(1, 56) = 12.733, p < .001). 
However, there was no significant thinking style main effect (F(1, 56) = 1.624, p 
> .05) and no significant dysphoric status × thinking style interaction (F(1, 56) = 
2.339, p > .05) were found. In view of the predictions that the dysphoric 
ruminators would show more categoric AM retrieval than the other three groups, 
planned-contrast comparisons were conducted to test this hypothesis. The results 
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showed that the dysphoric ruminators retrieved significantly more categoric AMs 
than the nondysphoric ruminators (t(28) = 2.908, p < .05) and the nondysphoric 
distracters (t(28) = 2.747, p < .01), but not the dysphoric distracters (t(28 )= 1.47, 
p > .05). 
 
Table 3.4 AM Retrieved during SPS  (Dysphoric Status  × Thinking Style) 
 Nondysphoric  Dysphoric 
 
Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
 Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
Specific Memory 
M 
(SD) 
 
 
1.47 
(1.13) 
 
1.47 
(0.99) 
  
0.60 
(0.99) 
 
0.73 
(0.88) 
 Categoric Memory 
M 
(SD) 
 
 
0.20 
(0.41) 
 
 
0.27 
(0.46) 
 
 
 
1.53 
(1.73) 
 
 
0.80 
(0.86) 
 
 
3.3.5 Association between SPS and the AM Retrieval during SPS 
 
Firstly, a correlation between SPS performance (in terms of means and 
effectiveness) and the AM retrieval during SPS were examined in the total sample 
of sixty participants. A significant positive correlation was found between the 
MEPS effectiveness score and the specific AM retrieval during SPS (r = .221, p 
< .01, 1-tailed). There was also a significantly negative correlation between the 
MEPS effectiveness score and the categoric AM retrieval during SPS (r = -.401, p 
< .01, 1-tailed). However, there was no significant correlation found between the 
MEPS means scores and the AM retrieval during SPS. 
 
When examining the association between SPS performance and AM retrieval 
during SPS, there was a significant negative correlation between the MEPS means 
score and the number of categoric AMs retrieved during SPS in the dysphoric 
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distracters, r = -.531, p < .05 (1-tailed) (see Table 3.5). 
 
Table 3.5 Correlation between SPS and the AM Retrieval during SPS  
(Dysphoric Status  × Thinking Style) 
 Nondysphoric  Dysphoric 
 
Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
 Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
 Specific Memory 
MEPS Means score 
MEPS Effectiveness score 
 
 
.117 
.217 
 
 
.169 
.006 
 
 
 
-.074 
-.123 
 
 
.122 
.114 
 
Categoric Memory 
MEPS Means score 
MEPS Effectiveness score 
 
 
-.133 
-.235 
 
 
-.450 
-.227 
 
  
.028 
-.131 
 
 
-.530* 
-.501 
 
 
3.4 Discussion 
 
The main aim of this study is to see whether inducing a particular thinking 
style (rumination versus distraction) prior to SPS would influence (1) the quality 
of solutions on the SPS task (the MEPS), and (2) types of AMs retrieved during 
SPS. A further aim was to see if the types of AMs retrieved during SPS related to 
the quality of solutions produced and if this relationship was mediated by the 
thinking style manipulation. 
 
It was found that manipulating thinking style prior to SPS had some effects on 
SPS that were consistent with previous research. On one measure of the MEPS 
performance, effectiveness, the dysphoric participants who ruminated produced 
significantly less effective solutions to the MEPS problems than the other three 
groups. Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1995) also used a similar rumination 
versus distraction manipulation with dysphoric and nondysphoric participants 
prior to the MEPS and found that the dysphoric ruminating participants produced 
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less effective solutions than the other three groups. 
 
However, on the second measure of the MEPS performance, the number of 
relevant means, no significant differences were observed although the dysphoric 
ruminators’ mean number of relevant means was fewer than the number for the 
other three groups. Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1995) used a related but 
different second measure of the MEPS performance, the percentage of model 
solutions, to increase the objectiveness of the ratings of problem-solving 
performance. They initially presented the interpersonal problem situations to 8 
independent judges and instructed them to list the steps or solutions involved in 
what they believed to be a “model” response to each situation. Thus, for each 
situation, there was a set of model solutions. For example, the model solutions for 
the situation involving a friend’s avoiding included: (1) going to see the friend in 
person, (2) approaching the issue in a tactful way, and (3) saying something to 
reaffirm the friendship. Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1995) calculated the 
percentage of all solutions offered by participants that were model solutions, and 
found that the dysphoric-ruminating students performed more poorly than the 
other three groups. In the present study, the number of relevant means was 
employed as this measure was used in other works (e.g., Marx et al., 1992; 
Goddard et al., 1996) on SPS in depression. Consistent with Marx et al.’s findings, 
Goddard et al. found that depressed respondents performed more poorly on the 
MEPS, generating solutions that were less effective and contained fewer relevant 
means. Future work needs to be done by measuring the percentage of model 
solutions to examine the performance in dysphoric and nondysphoric participants 
respectively to see if this measure is more sensitive to a rumination manipulation. 
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For the AM retrieved during SPS, it was hypothesized that there would be an 
interaction between thinking style manipulation and depressed status on the types 
of AMs retrieved during SPS. Specifically it was predicted that the dysphoric 
ruminating participants would retrieve significantly fewer specific AMs during 
SPS and significantly more categoric AMs than the other three groups. Some of 
the predictions were confirmed. The dysphoric ruminators did retrieve 
significantly more categoric AMs compared to the nondysphoric ruminators and 
nondysphoric distracters. Moreover, the dysphoric ruminators retrieved more 
categoric AMs than the dysphoric distracters, although this difference was not 
significant. This lack of significance is not consistent with Watkins et al. (2000) 
who found that in a clinical depressed sample, distraction significantly reduced 
overgeneral categoric AMs, whereas the rumination induction maintained 
overgeneral categoric AMs at a preinduction level. 
 
Methodological factors may account for the failure to replicate the effects of 
rumination on the AM retrieval during SPS. Unlike the present study, Watkins et 
al. (2000) used clinical depressed patients where the rumination manipulation was 
likely to have stronger effects on their memory processes. It could also be that in 
previous work using this thinking style manipulation task, participants spent 
exactly 8 minutes focusing on the items (e.g., Lyubomirsky et al., 1998). In the 
present study, the manipulation was administered in two blocks due to concerns 
that the effect of the manipulation might be faded out whilst participants are trying 
to solve all four SPS problems. Thus the participants spent 4 minutes on half of 
the thinking style manipulation in each block. Although the manipulation checks 
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indicated that the manipulation was effective in producing mood changes between 
the groups, the levels of dysphoria reported by the dysphoric distraction group did 
not reach those of the nondysphoric group. This suggested more power is needed 
to pick up differences. 
 
Finally, Watkins et al. (2000) also used a direct memory task, the AMT cueing 
task, whereas the present study employed an indirect memory task, spontaneous 
memory retrieval during SPS. As it has been indicated in the previous study 
(Goddard et al., 1998) that distinct cognitive loads are involved in these two 
different memory tasks. Moreover, the potential memory cues inherent in the 
MEPS are much richer than the single-word cues of the memory cueing technique. 
Furthermore, on the AMT cueing task, participants are directed in terms of the 
quality of memories they are required to retrieve (i.e., specific AMs) during SPS, 
retrieval is spontaneous and not an explicit task requirement. Therefore, the ability 
to retrieve specific AMs, as measured by the AMT cueing task, does not 
necessarily imply that respondents should retrieve this type of memory during 
SPS, on which no retrieval instruction is administered. 
 
A further aim was to see if there was a relationship between SPS performance 
and types of AMs retrieved during SPS. Only one significant correlation was 
found such that the dysphoric distracters their categoric AMs was negatively 
correlated with their MEPS means scores. Moreover, the results demonstrated an 
interesting pattern. Previous research (Goddard et al., 1996) showed that specific 
AM retrieval during SPS was associated with better SPS performance and 
categoric AM retrieval was associated with poorer SPS performance. This pattern 
84  
was observed for the distraction samples (both dysphoric and nondysphoric) but 
not for the rumination samples in the present study. In fact for the dysphoric 
ruminators greater specific AM retrieval was associated with poorer MEPS 
performance. 
 
Another reason might be that it is better to manipulate participants’ cognitive 
style when they are thinking about an interpersonal problem. Watkins and 
Baracaia (2002) tested the hypothesis that impaired SPS in depression is a 
consequence of state-oriented rumination, which can be ameliorated by improving 
awareness of mental processes. They found that the process-focused questions 
significantly improved SPS in depressed patients, compared to no-questions and 
state-oriented questions, which did not differ from each other. These results were 
consistent with recent theories (Teasdale et al., 1995) and treatment developments 
(Mindfulness-based Cognitive Therapy; MBCT, Teasdale et al., 2000), which 
suggested that increased awareness of mental processes could shift people away 
from ruminative thinking, thereby, reducing depression relapse. Here are some 
examples of the processed-focused questions: “How am I deciding on a way to 
solve this problem?” “What am I thinking about in terms of starting to solve this 
problem?” Given that these samples are encouraging the participants to think 
about the possible solutions to the specific problem, which in turn helps the 
participants to generate more relevant means and effective solutions. This strategy 
might work better than the distraction manipulation, which is designed to enhance 
the mood but not directly improving the mental awareness. 
 
The AMT cueing task was also included in the present study to see if the 
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dysphoric participants would show more deficient AM retrieval than the 
nondysphoric participants at the baseline level of the AM specificity. Consistent 
with previous findings (e.g., Marx et al., 1992; Goddard et al., 1996), dysphoric 
participants performed more poorly than nondysphoric participants on the AMT 
cueing task; dysphoric participants offered more inappropriate categoric AMs and 
retrieved fewer specific AMs than nondysphoric participants. 
 
In conclusion, the results suggest that in a dysphoric sample rumination 
impairs both SPS performance and AM retrieval during SPS, although the effect is 
less robust for AM retrieval during SPS. One implication of these results is that 
rumination may not only affect SPS through increased retrieval of categoric AMs 
but may also influence negative mood and therefore affect other processes like the 
spontaneous initiation of useful strategies and motivation (e.g., Hertel & Hardin, 
1990). In the present study, a correlational design has been adopted to clarify the 
relationship between SPS performance and AM retrieval during SPS. More 
in-depth analysis is now required to examine the causal relationship between 
rumination and poor SPS performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
86  
CHAPTER 4 
 
 
STUDY 2 
 
THE EFFECT OF RUIMNATION/DISTRACTION ON SPS AND 
AM RETRIEVAL DURING SPS IN CLINICAL DEPRESSION 
 
4.1 Literature Review 
 
As was reviewed in Chapter 3, there is some evidence that rumination 
interacts with depressed mood to influence SPS performance (Lyubomirsky & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002) as well as AM retrieval 
(Lyubomirsky et al., 1998; Watkins et al., 2000). However there is only one study 
(Kao, Dritschel, & Astell, 2006), Study 1 in this thesis (see Chapter 3), which 
examined how rumination interacts with depression to influence both SPS 
performance and AM retrieval during SPS. Study 1 using dysphoric participants, 
replicated previous findings (Goddard et al., 1996; Lyubomirsky & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002) concerning SPS performance 
but not AM retrieval during SPS. In terms of SPS, an interaction was found 
between dysphoric status and thinking style such that the dysphoric ruminators 
produced significantly less effective solutions on the MEPS than the dysphoric 
distracters, the nondysphoric ruminators and the nondysphoric distracters. With 
respect to AM retrieval during SPS, the dysphoric ruminators did not differ from 
the dysphoric distracters on the numbers of categoric AMs retrieved during SPS 
although they retrieved significantly more categoric AMs than the nondysphoric 
distracters as well as the nondysphoric ruminators. No interaction between 
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dysphoric status and thinking style was observed for both specific and categoric 
AM retrievals during SPS. When the association between SPS performance and 
AM retrieval during SPS was examined in the total sample of sixty participants, 
only one SPS performance measure, the MEPS effectiveness score, was 
significantly negatively correlated with categoric AMs retrieved during SPS; and 
significantly positively correlated with specific AMs retrieved during SPS. 
 
This lack of a significant of rumination on AM retrieval during SPS is not 
consistent with previous studies by Watkins et al. (2000) as well as Watkins and 
Teasdale (2001), who found that in a clinically depressed group, distraction 
significantly reduced the retrieval of overgeneral categoric AM, whereas the 
rumination induction maintained the retrieval of overgeneral categoric AM at a 
preinduction level. There are a number of possible reasons for this failure to 
replicate. Watkins et al. used a direct memory task, the AMT cueing task, whereas 
Study 1 employed an indirect memory task, spontaneous AM retrieval during SPS. 
There is evidence from a dual task paradigm that the processing demands 
associated with the two types of AM retrieval task are different (Goddard et al., 
1998). Another difference between the two studies (i.e., the present study and 
Watkins et al.) is that Watkins et al. examined a clinically depressed sample 
whereas Study 1 used a dysphoric sample. It is possible that rumination may have 
stronger effects on memory processes in a clinical depressed sample. 
 
It appears that no previous study has directly compared the effects of 
ruminative thinking on cognitive processing between the dysphoric and the 
clinically depressed participants within a single study. However, the differential 
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activation hypothesis (Teasdale, 1988) provides some evidence that dysphoric and 
depressed individuals might be significantly distinctive from each other in their 
cognitive processing such as the type of negative thinking pattern manifested. 
Teasdale suggested that there is an association between negative thinking and 
depressed mood. This association is maintained through a reciprocal loop such 
that negative mood leads to negative thinking and vice versa. The severity of 
depression is determined by the type of negative thinking pattern that an 
individual has. Thus it is reasonable to assume that the negative thinking patterns 
may be manifested to different degrees and styles such that the depressed 
individuals may make more global negative attributions and have a more negative 
self-referent style than dysphoric individuals do. This dysfunctional thinking 
pattern can be activated and strengthened by repeatedly occurring negative events, 
which have a detrimental influence on the mood. Therefore, this detrimental 
process becomes more and more autonomous with the increasing episodes of 
depression (Lau & McMain, 2005; Lau, Segal, & Williams, 2004; Williams, 
Barnhofer, Crane, and Beck, 2005). One possibility, therefore, is that in dysphoria, 
rumination may affect SPS by influencing negative mood and therefore affecting 
other processes like the spontaneous initiation of useful strategies and motivation 
(e.g., Hertel & Hardin, 1990). However, in a clinically depressed sample, a 
different pattern might occur whereby rumination may affect SPS by increasing 
categoric AM retrieval during SPS and reducing specific AM retrieval. This 
enhanced categoric AM retrieval would in turn perpetuate SPS performance. 
Study 2 was therefore designed to assess this question. The AMT cueing task will 
again be used to establish a baseline measure of AM as a function of depression. 
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The specific predictions are that compared to a nondepressed group, (1) the 
depressed people will retrieve more categoric AMs on the AMT cueing task, (2) 
the depressed ruminators will have poorer SPS performance in terms of the 
relevant means and effectiveness than the depressed distracters, the nondepressed 
ruminators and nondepressed distracters, (3) the depressed ruminators will 
retrieve more categoric AMs during SPS and less specific AMs during SPS than 
the other three groups. 
 
4.2 Method 
 
4.2.1 Design 
 
The design was a 2 (depressed status: nondepressed vs. depressed) × 2 
(thinking style: rumination vs. distraction) between subjects design. The number 
of relevant means and the effectiveness in SPS, as well as AM retrieval during 
SPS served as the dependent measurements. 
 
4.2.2 Participants 
 
The clinically depressed group was recruited from either the Affective 
Disorder Clinic in Ninewells hospital or from the Health Centre in St. Andrews. 
Thirty clinically depressed patients who meet the criteria of Major Depressive 
Disorder according to DSM-IV were referred by the psychiatrists and doctors to 
take part in the experiment. Patients whose depression was due to organic factors, 
e.g., brain damage, and patients with any previous psychotic symptoms were 
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excluded from the experiment. The patients who were diagnosed with 
manic-depressive disorder were also excluded as previous research has indicated 
that they have different cognitive profile from the Major Depressive Disorder 
patients (Ridout, 2004). Patients with any previous psychotic symptoms will be 
excluded from experiments as well. They were tested individually in an interview 
room in the hospital or within the School of Psychology, University of St. 
Andrews. Thirty healthy controls were recruited via the advertisement around St. 
Andrews area. They were interviewed by the experimenter by using the SCID to 
make sure that they were not meeting the diagnostic criteria of Major Depressive 
Disorder. Participants received a ₤4 payment for their taking part in after the 
experiment. Their background information can be seen in the Section 4.2.2.1 to 
4.2.2.3 (Table 4.1 to Table 4.3). 
 
4.2.2.1 Age 
 
Table 4.1 Mean Years of Age 
 Nondepressed  Depressed 
 
Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
 Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
 
M 
(SD) 
 
 
37.33 
(9.52) 
 
41.33 
(7.31) 
  
38.00 
(7.99) 
 
40.93 
(6.75) 
 
A 2 (depressed status: nondepressed vs. depressed) × 2 (thinking style: 
rumination vs. distraction) ANOVA on age was conducted to determine if the 
groups differed in age. There were no significant main effects for either depressed 
status (F(1, 56) = 0.03, p > .05) or thinking style (F(1, 56) = 2.40, p > .05). The 
interaction between depressed status and thinking style was not significant (F(1, 
56) = 0.14, p > .05) (see Table 4.1). 
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4.2.2.2 Years of Education 
Table 4.2 Years of Education 
 Nondepressed  Depressed 
 
Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
 Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
 
M 
(SD) 
 
 
12.07 
(3.31) 
 
10.67 
(3.81) 
  
11.00 
(2.78) 
 
10.93 
(5.02) 
 
A 2 (depressed status: nondepressed vs. depressed) × 2 (thinking style: 
rumination vs. distraction) ANOVA was conducted to determine if the groups 
differed in mean years of education. There were no significant main effects for 
either depressed status (F(1, 56) = 0.16, p > .05 or thinking style (F(1, 56) = 0.55, 
p > .05). The interaction between depressed status and thinking style was not 
significant (F(1, 56) = 0.46, p > .05) (see Table 4.2). 
 
4.2.2.3 BDI Scores 
Table 4.3 BDI Score 
 Nondepressed  Depressed 
 
Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
 Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
 
M 
(SD) 
 
 
2.33 
(1.18) 
 
2.73 
(1.58) 
  
30.33 
(4.27) 
 
30.80 
(4.20) 
 
A 2 (depressed status: nondepressed vs. depressed) × 2 (thinking style: 
rumination vs. distraction) ANOVA was conducted to determine if the groups 
differed in BDI scores. Only a significant depressed status main effect was found 
(F(1, 56) = 1187.282, p < .001). Neither a main effect for thinking style (F(1, 56) 
= 0.284, p > .05) nor an interaction effect between depressed status and thinking 
style (F(1, 56) = 0.002, p > .05) was found (see Table 4.3).  
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4.2.3 Materials 
 
4.2.3.1 Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1961) 
 
The characters of the BDI (Beck et al., 1961) have been introduced in Chapter 
2. It was used in this experiment as an index to represent the participants’ recent 
mood state because of its well-approved psychometric characteristics (Beck, Steer, 
& Garbin, 1988). For each item, participants were asked to mark one of four 
responses that most represented how they had been feeling during the last two 
weeks (see Appendix 1).  
 
4.2.3.2 Mood Questionnaires 
 
Participants completed three identical packets of mood questionnaires during 
the experiment (see Appendix 2). Each packet contained questionnaires that asked 
participants to rate their current mood state, on 9-point Likert-type scales (e.g., 1 
= not at all cheerful; 9 = extremely cheerful). Mood questionnaires were first 
administered at the beginning of the experiment and immediately after the 
response-manipulation (i.e., rumination or distraction manipulation). Ratings 
concerning the current mood were summed to arrive at a single measure of 
depressed mood at each assessment. The four dimensions of mood ratings were 
cheerful/not cheerful (reverse scored), sad/not sad, unhappy/not unhappy, and 
miserable/not miserable. The mood questionnaire also contained a number of filler 
scales (e.g., measuring levels of creativity, curiosity, bashfulness, recklessness, 
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etc.) to help disguise the study’s focus on mood.  
 
4.2.3.3 Autobiographical Memory Cueing Task (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 
1986)  
 
In this task, participants were asked to retrieve a specific memory, as quickly 
as possible, in response to each cue word (see Appendix 3). The specific memory 
was explained to the participants in terms of a past event that happened on a 
particular day and place. In this experiment, we used the same five positive words 
(i.e., happy, safe, interested, successful, and surprised) and five negative words 
(i.e., sorry, angry, clumsy, hurt, and lonely) as used by Evans et al. (1992) and 
Goddard et al. (1996). Words were presented to the participants orally and visually 
(using an index card) in the same order listed above, with positive and negative 
words alternating. Participants were given a maximum of 60 seconds to retrieve a 
memory to each cue word. If no response was given in that time, a score of 60 
seconds was recorded and the next word was given. If the participant gave a 
general memory, they were prompted to recall a particular time. 
 
4.2.3.4 Thinking Style Manipulation (Rumination versus Distraction) 
 
The original response-manipulation tasks were designed to influence the 
content of participants’ thoughts by requiring them to focus their attention and 
“think about” a series of 45 items (Lyubomirsky et al., 1998). This task was 
adapted by Watkins (2000) from the tasks used by Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow 
(1993), with items adjusted for British participants (see Appendices 4 & 5). 
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Following Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1991) definition of ruminative responses, the 
ruminative condition instructs participants to focus their attention on thoughts that 
are emotion focused, symptom focused, and self-focused, although they are not 
told especially to think about negative emotions and negative personal attributes. 
For example, participants are asked to think about “ your current level of energy”, 
“why your body feels this way”, “trying to understand your feelings”, “your 
character and who you strive to be”, and “why you turned out this way”. In 
contrast, participants in the distraction condition focus their attention on the 
thoughts that are externally focused and not related to symptoms, emotions, and 
the self. For example, they are asked to think about “clouds forming in the sky”, 
“the expression on the face of the Mona Lisa,” and “the shiny surface of a 
trumpet.” 
 
In previous work using this response-manipulation task, participants spent 
exactly 8 minutes focusing on the items. In our current study, we decided to 
administer the manipulation in two blocks because we were concerned that the 
effect of the manipulation might fade whilst participants are trying to solve all 
four problems. Thus one half of the rumination/distraction manipulation (23 items) 
was administered before the first two SPS tasks were presented. The remaining 
half of the thinking style manipulation task (22 items) was then administered 
before the final two SPS tasks were presented. Thus the participants spent 4 
minutes on the thinking style manipulation task in each block. The items were 
printed each on a single card, which was handed to the participants one at a time. 
During each manipulation, participants were instructed to focus their mind on 
each item and think about each idea.  
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4.2.3.5 Means-Ends Problem-Solving Procedures (MEPS; Platt & Spivack, 
1975a) 
 
In this study, four MEPS tasks were used to assess participants’ social problem 
solving ability (see Appendix 6). The MEPS is a hypothetical SPS task and 
consists of 10 vignettes that first describe a problem situation and then the 
resolution of that problem situation. Problems revolve around social themes such 
as: 
 
“You notice that your friends seem to be avoiding you. You 
want to have friends and to be liked. The story ends when 
your friends like you again. You begin where you first 
notice your friends avoiding you.” 
 
 Respondents are required to describe the actions needed to be taken so that 
the conclusion may be reached effectively. Platt and Spivack (1975b) showed that 
it is not necessary to administer all 10 vignettes. In this study we used four 
vignettes that covered the following areas: problem with a boss/teacher, falling out 
with friends, moving to a new neighborhood, and dispute with partner/parents. An 
example was presented before beginning the actual experiment to make sure that 
participants understood the instructions completely. Following each MEPS task, 
the participants were asked to write down any thoughts or images that crossed 
their mind whilst trying to solve this social problem. 
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Responses were marked for relevant means according to the criteria 
determined by Platt and Spivack (1975) and for effectiveness according to the 
rating used by Marx et al. (1992). The effectiveness measure was marked on a 
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not at all effective) to 7 (very effective) for each 
problem. Scores were summed across the four problems to give each respondent a 
total effectiveness score and a means score. 
 
4.2.4 Procedure 
 
This experiment received ethical approval from the Tayside Committee on 
Medical Research Ethics and extended to Fife area by Fife NHS Board, Local 
Research Ethics Committee. 
 
The participants were tested individually either in an interview room in the 
Ninewells Hospital or in the School of Psychology, University of St. Andrews. 
 
Informed consents were sought from all before starting the experiment. 
Participants were informed that the study was examining the relationship between 
the processes of imagination, dreaming, levels of consciousness and cognition. 
This provided a cover story designed to minimize possible demand characteristics. 
 
In the beginning, the participants were given the first self-report mood 
questionnaire to assess their baseline mood state. Then, the BDI was used to 
obtain their mood states. A word-generating task was administered immediately 
after the BDI, which required participants to write down as many words as 
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possible that began with an “S” in 90 seconds. This task was designed to eliminate 
any ruminating effect, which might be brought by completing the BDI. 
 
A questionnaire about imaging colors, and a questionnaire on dreaming were 
then given to the participants. These two questionnaires were included as filler 
tasks to prevent participants from guessing the purpose of the study or the link 
between the thinking style manipulation task and SPS tasks. 
 
In the AMT cueing task, the participants were asked to retrieve a specific 
memory in response to each 10 (5 positive and 5 negative) emotional cue words, 
which are orally and visually presented with positive and negative words 
alternating. The participants’ responses were audiotaped and categorized 
according to the following criteria: specific memory, extended general memory, 
and categoric general memory. The definitions for these memories are explained 
in Section 2.3.1, Chapter 2. In the rumination/distraction manipulation, 
participants in the rumination condition focused their attention on items that are 
symptom-focused, emotion-focused, and self-focused, whereas in the distraction 
condition, they focused their attention on the items that are externally focused. 
Thus, in each condition, participants first concentrated on 23 items for 4 minutes. 
Following the manipulation, the participants completed a self-report measure of 
mood. Then, two hypothetical social problems selected from the MEPS and their 
happy endings were presented to the participants. The participants were asked to 
list the steps that were required to reach the happy ending to the hypothetical 
social-problems. Next the participants concentrated on the remaining 22 items in 
the response-manipulation task for four minutes before solving two further social 
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problems from the MEPS. The order of presentation for the four MEPS problems 
was random. The inter-rater reliability for the means and effectiveness scores on 
the MEPS were .86 (for means) and .81 (for effectiveness) respectively, based on 
15 participants. 
 
After responding to each social problem, the participants were asked to write 
down any thoughts or images that crossed their mind whilst trying to solving the 
social problems. Their responses were categorized according to the following 
criteria: specific memory, extended general memory, categoric general memory, 
and general knowledge concerning the problem. As a manipulation check for the 
thinking style manipulation, participants were asked to fill in a debriefing 
questionnaire administered at the end of the study to recall the instructions to this 
task and to describe what they exactly did during this task.  
 
According to previous research, the mood of the dysphoric/depressed 
individuals   becomes worse after receiving the rumination manipulation. To 
address this ethical consideration, a number of distraction items were given to the 
dysphoric/depressed ruminators at the end of the experiments involving the 
rumination manipulation. These distraction items should have eliminated the 
negative effect on mood caused by the rumination manipulation. 
 
The whole test session took less than one hour. 
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4.3 Results 
 
4.3.1 Manipulation Check 
 
As can be seen in Table 4.4, at the beginning of the study, participants in the 
depressed group reported greater depressed mood than participants in the 
nondepressed group. A Pearson’s correlation was conducted to examine the 
association between participants’ BDI score and their self-report mood measure 
and a satisfactory positive correlation was found (r = 0.68, p < 0.01). Baseline 
mean levels of depressed mood of each group were as follows: nondepressed 
rumination group, 9.80 (SD = 3.00); nondepressed distraction group, 9.27 (SD = 
1.91); depressed rumination group, 26.27 (SD = 2.28); depressed distraction group, 
27.87 (SD = 2.90). 
 
Group differences in baseline mood were assessed in a 2 (depressed status: 
nondepressed vs. depressed) × 2 (thinking style: rumination vs. distraction) 
ANOVA with baseline mood rating measured by Likert-type scale ratings, as the 
dependent variable. There was a main effect of depressed status such that 
depressed participants had higher levels of depressed mood at the outset of the 
experiment (M = 27.07, SD = 2.69) than nondepressed participants (M = 9.53, SD 
= 2.49) (F(1, 56) = 701.714, p < .001). There were no differences in baseline 
depressed mood rating between rumination and distraction thinking style 
conditions (F(1, 56) = 0.649, p > .05). The interaction between depressed status 
and thinking style condition was also not significant (F(1, 56) = 2.597, p > .05) 
(see Table 4.4). 
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Table 4.4 Mean and SD of Levels of Mood of Each Group (Depressed Status × 
Thinking Style) 
 Nondepressed  Depressed 
 
Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
 Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
Mood 1 
M 
(SD) 
 
 
9.80 
(3.00) 
 
 
9.27 
(1.97) 
  
26.27 
(2.28) 
 
27.87 
(2.90) 
Mood 2 
M 
(SD) 
 
 
9.73 
(2.96) 
 
8.93 
(1.79) 
  
28.60 
(3.20) 
 
19.87 
(3.50) 
Mood 3 
M 
(SD) 
 
 
9.53 
(2.95) 
 
8.80 
(1.97) 
  
29.00 
(3.84) 
 
19.40 
(3.50) 
Mood 1: At the beginning of the experiment 
Mood 2: After the first time manipulation 
Mood 3: After the second time manipulation 
 
 
Mean levels of mood rating after the first time rumination/distraction 
manipulation were as follows: nondepressed rumination group, 9.73 (SD = 2.96); 
nondepressed distraction group, 8.93 (SD = 1.79); depressed rumination group, 
28.60 (SD = 3.20); depressed distraction group, 19.87 (SD = 3.50). A 2 (depressed 
status: nondepressed vs. depressed) × 2 (thinking style: rumination vs. distraction) 
ANCOVA (analysis of covariance, with baseline mood as the covariance) was 
conducted to assess the effects of the rumination/distraction manipulation on post 
manipulation depressed mood. The results of ANCOVA demonstrated a main 
effect of rumination/distraction thinking style manipulation (F(1, 56) = 65.845, p 
< .001). The depressed status × thinking style interaction (F(1, 56) = 52.962, p 
< .001), explained group differences in terms of mood 2 of the participants in the 
depressed rumination group were significantly worse than mood 2 of the 
participants in the depressed distraction group (t(28) = 7.127, p < .001). The 
depressed ruminators also demonstrated worse mood than the nondepressed 
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ruminators (t(28) = 16.747, p < .001) and nondepressed distracters (t(28) = 20.756, 
p < .001) (see Table 4.4). 
 
To address concerns that the effect of the rumination/distraction manipulation 
might not persist over time, the manipulation was repeated once the first two 
social problem-solving tasks were completed. Then the participants were asked to 
complete the self-report measure of mood again. The results of paired samples t 
tests revealed that after the second rumination/distraction manipulation, the mood 
rating (Mood 3) remained very similar to the rating made after the first response 
manipulation (Mood 2) for all four groups in the study (all t(14) < 0.50, p > .05) 
(see Table 4.4). 
 
4.3.2 AM Retrieval on the AMT Cueing Task in the Nondepressed and 
Depressed Groups 
 
Table 4.5 Total number and SD of AM Retrieved on the AMT (Depressed 
Status × Thinking Style) 
 Nondepressed  Depressed 
 
Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
 Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
 Specific Memory 
M 
(SD) 
 
 
7.87 
(1.18) 
 
 
6.87 
(1.40) 
 
 
2.27 
(0.88) 
 
2.13 
(1.18) 
Categoric Memory 
M 
(SD) 
 
 
1.27 
(0.88) 
 
1.80 
(0.94) 
  
6.80 
(1.61) 
 
6.93 
(1.75) 
 
Two separate 2 (depressed status: nondepressed vs. depressed) × 2 (thinking 
style: rumination vs. distraction) ANOVAs were conducted on the numbers of 
specific AMs and categoric AMs retrieved on the AMT cueing task. 
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The first analysis examined the numbers of specific AMs. The results revealed 
that there was a significant main effect of depressed status such that the depressed 
participants retrieved significantly fewer specific AMs on the AMT cueing task 
than the nondepressed participants (F(1, 56) = 286.988, p < .001) (nondepressed 
participants, M = 7.37, SD = 1.38; depressed participants, M = 2.20, SD = 1.03). 
However, there was neither a significant main effect of thinking style (F(1, 56) = 
3.452, p > .05), nor significant depressed status × thinking style interaction (F(1, 
56) = 2.019, p > .05) (see Figure 4.1). 
 
For the number of categoric AMs, there was a main effect of depressed status 
such that the depressed participants retrieved significantly more categoric AMs on 
the AMT cueing task than the nondepressed participants (F(1, 56) = 232.727, p 
< .001) (nondepressed participants, M = 1.53, SD = 0.94; depressed participants, 
M = 6.87, SD = 1.66). But, there was neither a significant thinking style main 
effect (F(1, 56) = 0.909, p > .05), nor significant depressed status × thinking style 
interaction (F(1, 56) = 0.327, p > .05) (see Figure 4.1). 
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Figure 4.1 AM Retrieval on the AMT (Dysphoric Status × Thinking Style) 
 
4.3.3 The Effects of Rumination/Distraction on SPS Performance in terms of 
Means and Effectiveness 
Table 4.6 SPS in terms of Means and Effectiveness (Depressed Status × 
Thinking Style) 
 Nondepressed  Depressed 
 
Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
 Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
Means 
M 
(SD) 
 
17.27 
(3.03) 
 
 
19.13 
(3.96) 
 
  
9.73 
(2.02) 
 
 
15.93 
(3.53) 
 
 Effectiveness 
M 
(SD) 
 
 
12.67 
(2.92) 
 
 
13.33 
(3.33) 
 
 
 
7.53 
(1.85) 
 
 
12.40 
(3.50) 
 
 
As can be seen in Table 4.6, the depressed ruminators produced fewer relevant 
means (M = 9.73, SD = 2.02) as well as less effective solutions (M = 7.53, SD = 
1.85) than the other groups. Two 2 (depressed status: nondepressed vs. depressed) 
× 2 (thinking style: rumination vs. distraction) ANOVAs were then calculated to 
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examine the effects of rumination/distraction on SPS performance (MEPS means 
scores and MEPS effectiveness scores). For the MEPS means score, there was a 
significant main effect of depressed status (F(1, 56) = 41.674, p < .001) and a 
significant main effect of thinking style (F(1, 56) = 23.539, p < .01). There was 
also a significant depressed status × thinking style interaction (F(1,56) = 6.793, p 
< .05), which explained group differences in terms of the MEPS means score of 
the participants in the depressed rumination group were significantly lower than 
the participants in the depressed distraction group, nondepressed rumination and 
nondepressed distraction group (t(28) = -5.900; t(28) = 8.007; t(28) = 8.190, all p 
< .001) (see Figure 4.2). 
 
For the MEPS effectiveness score, there was a significant main effect of 
depressed status (F(1, 56) = 15.646, p < .001) and a main effect of thinking style 
(F(1, 56) = 13.016, p < .01). Also an depressed status × thinking style interaction 
effect was observed (F(1, 56) = 7.499, p < .01), which explained group 
differences in terms of the MEPS effectiveness score of the participants in 
depressed rumination group were significantly lower than the participants in 
depressed distraction group, nondepressed rumination and nondepressed 
distraction group (t(28) = -4.762; t(28) = 5.755; t(28) = 5.898, all p < .001) (see 
Figure 4.2). 
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Figure 4.2 SPS in terms of Means and Effectiveness  (Dysphoric Status × 
Thinking Style) 
 
4.3.4 The Effects of Rumination/Distraction on AM Retrieval during SPS 
 
Two separate 2 (depressed status: nondepressed vs. depressed) × 2 (thinking 
style: rumination vs. distraction) ANOVAs were conducted on the numbers of 
specific and categoric AMs retrieved while executing the MEPS task. 
 
The first analysis examined the numbers of specific AMs retrieved. The results 
revealed that there was a significant main effect of depressed status such that the 
depressed participants retrieved significantly fewer specific AMs during the 
MEPS task than the nondepressed participants (F(1, 56) = 12.106, p < .001) 
(nondepressed participants, M = 2.13, SD = 0.94; depressed participants, M = 1.43, 
SD = 0.68) (see Figure 4.3). There was also a significant main effect of thinking 
style (F(1, 56) = 7.933, p < .05), such that the ruminators (M = 1.50, SD = 0.78) 
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retrieved significantly fewer specific AMs during the MEPS task than the 
distracters (M = 2.07, SD = 0.91). There was no significant depressed status × 
thinking style interaction (F(1, 56) = 0.027, p > .05). However, in view of the 
hypotheses, the planned contrast comparisons were conducted. Moreover, in the 
depressed group, the participants who received the rumination manipulation 
retrieved significantly fewer specific AMs than those who received the distraction 
manipulation (t(28) = -2.662, p < .05), as well as fewer than the nondepressed 
ruminators (t(28) = 2.896, p < .01) and the nondepressed distraction group (t(28) 
= 3.974, p < .001). 
 
For the number of categoric AMs retrieved, there was also a main effect of 
depressed status such that the depressed participants retrieved significantly more 
categoric AMs during the MEPS task than the nondepressed participants 
(nondepressed participants, M = 1.33, SD = 1.03; depressed participants, M = 
2.17 , SD = 0.83 ) (F(1, 56) = 12.718, p < .001) (see Figure 4.3). There was also a 
significant main effect of thinking style (F(1, 56) = 5.881, p < .05) where the 
ruminators (M = 2.03, SD = 0.93) retrieved significantly more categoric AMs 
during the MEPS task than the distracters (M = 1.47, SD = 1.04). However, there 
was no significant depressed status × thinking style interaction (F(1, 56) = 0.183, 
p > .05). In view of the hypotheses, the planned contrast comparisons were 
conducted. In the depressed group, there was no significant difference between the 
ruminators and distracters in their categoric AM retrieval during SPS (t(28) = 
1.571, p > .05). However, the depressed rumination group did retrieve more 
categoric AMs during SPS than the nondepressed rumination group (t(28) = 
-2.323, p < .05) and the nondepressed distraction group (t(28) = -3.729, p < .01) 
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(see Figure 4.3). 
 
Table 4.7 Number of AM retrieval during SPS (Depressed Status × Thinking 
Style) 
 Nondepressed  Depressed 
 
Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
 Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
 Specific Memory 
M 
(SD) 
 
 
1.87 
(0.74) 
 
 
2.40 
(1.06) 
 
 
1.13 
(0.64) 
 
1.73 
(0.59) 
 Categoric Memory 
M 
(SD) 
 
 
1.67 
(0.82) 
 
1.00 
(1.13) 
 
 
2.40 
(0.91) 
 
1.93 
(0.71) 
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Figure 4.3 AM Retrieved during SPS (Dysphoric Status × Thinking Style) 
 
4.3.5 Association between SPS Performance and AM Retrieval during SPS 
 
Firstly, a correlation between MEPS performance (in terms of means and 
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effectiveness) and the AM retrieval during SPS were examined in the total sample 
of 60 participants. A significant positive correlation between the specific AM 
retrieval during SPS and SPS performance was found (r = .649, p < .01 for MEPS 
means score; r = .518, p < .01 for MEPS effectiveness score). There was also a 
significant negative correlation between the categoric AM retrieval during SPS 
and SPS performance (r = -.478, p < .01 for MEPS means score; r = -.429, p < .01 
for MEPS effectiveness score). 
 
When the association between MEPS performance and AM retrieval during 
SPS was examined within groups, first of all there was a significant positive 
correlation between the MEPS effectiveness scores and specific AM retrieval (r 
= .472, p < .05, 1-tailed); as well as a negative correlation approaching significant 
between MEPS effectiveness scores and categoric AM retrieval in the 
nondepressed ruminators (r = -.439, p > .05, 1-tailed). Also a significant positive 
correlation was found between the MEPS means scores and specific AM retrieval 
in nondepressed distracters (r = .550, p < .05, 1-tailed) (see Table 4.8). For the 
depressed ruminators, a significant positive correlation between the MEPS means 
scores and specific AM retrieval (r = .694, p < .01, 1-tailed) was found; as well as 
a significant negative correlation between categoric AM retrieval and the MEPS 
means score (r = -.599, p < .01, 1-tailed) as well as the MEPS effectiveness score 
(r = -.518, p < .05, 1-tailed) were also observed. For the depressed distracters, the 
significant positive correlations were found between their MEPS means scores 
and specific AM retrieval (r = .536, p < .05, 1-tailed), and their MEPS 
effectiveness scores (r = .639, p < .01, 1-tailed) (see Table 4.8). 
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Table 4.8 Correlation between SPS and AM Retrieval during SPS (1-tailed) 
 Nondepressed  Depressed 
 Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
 Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
 Specific Memory 
MEPS Means score 
MEPS Effectiveness score 
 
 
.270 
.472* 
 
 
.550* 
.102 
 
 
.694** 
.359 
 
.536* 
.639**
 
 Categoric Memory 
MEPS Means score 
MEPS Effectiveness score 
 
 
.038 
-.439(.051) 
 
 
-.334 
.038 
 
 
-.599** 
-.518*
 
 
-088 
-.365 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
4.4 Discussion 
 
 This experiment was designed to examine the impact of thinking style 
(rumination versus distraction) on SPS as well as a key process argued to be 
involved in SPS, the retrieval of specific versus categoric AMs. The results with 
respect to SPS performance are consistent with previous investigations involving 
a rumination manipulation (e.g., Watkins & Baracaia, 2002; Kao et al., 2006, see 
also Chapter 3 of this thesis) in that rumination interacts with depression to 
influence the quality of SPS solutions produced. That is, depressed ruminators are 
significantly more impaired than depressed distracters, nondepressed ruminators 
and nondepressed distracters on two outcome measures of SPS: number of 
relevant means and effectiveness of the solution. This finding was not consistent 
with the finding in Study 1 where only a significant difference was found on the 
MEPS effectiveness measure. It seems that rumination interacts with level of 
mood severity (i.e., dysphoria versus depression), to influence MEPS performance. 
The data suggest that the effectiveness measure may be more sensitive to the 
effects of rumination because it was impaired under the rumin
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in both the dysphoric and the clinically depressed samples. 
 
However, when AM retrieval during SPS was examined, a more complex 
relationship emerged. The results indicated that the rumination manipulation 
influenced AM retrieval during SPS in both the depressed and nondepressed 
conditions. While there was no evidence for a depressed status and thinking style 
interaction, planned contrast comparisons provided some evidence for the 
expected pattern. Further analysis (Independent-sample t-test) demonstrated that 
depressed ruminators did retrieve less specific AMs during SPS than depressed 
distracters, but this difference was not observed on the categoric AM retrieval 
during SPS. This result provides evidence that distraction enhances specific 
memory retrieval during SPS. 
 
 However, when the association between AM retrieval during SPS and SPS 
performance was examined, some interesting findings emerged that supported the 
argument that AM retrieval during SPS is an important mechanism. First of all, 
specific AM retrieval during SPS was found to be associated with better SPS 
performance; categoric AM retrieval during SPS was also found to be associated 
with poorer SPS in the total sample of 60 participants. Furthermore, when this 
association was examined within groups, specific AM retrieval during SPS was 
strongly positively associated with the performance of SPS in all four groups. 
Greater retrieval of specific AMs during SPS resulted in better performance on the 
SPS task. This association was the most salient in the depressed distracters as both 
of their SPS measures were significantly associated with their specific AM 
retrieval during SPS. The specific AM retrieval was only found to be associated 
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with MEPS means scores in depressed ruminators and nondepressed distracters; 
and the MEPS effectiveness score in nondepressed ruminators. 
 
It seems then as if the distraction manipulation is enhancing awareness of 
mental processes. Indeed, Watkins and Baracaia (2002) argued that 
process-focused questions significantly improve SPS performance in depressed 
patients compared to either no questions group or state-oriented questions group. 
The process-focused questions involve focusing on “How am I deciding to solve 
this problem”. Although the manipulation in the present study did not specifically 
direct individuals to think about the processes involved in processing, it seems 
possible that this manipulation was breaking the negative thinking style by 
improving mood and freeing more cognitive resources for accessing specific AMs. 
Future work should consider using a process-focused manipulation to see if the 
effects would be enhanced.  
 
In contrast, categoric AM retrieval during SPS was only negatively associated 
with SPS performance in the depressed ruminators. It seems that categoric AM 
retrieval during SPS is affected by the rumination manipulation for individuals 
experiencing depression; greater retrieval of categoric AMs during SPS was 
associated with poorer performance on both SPS measures. This result suggests 
that the rumination/distraction manipulation is influencing memory processing 
during SPS. Goddard et al. (1996) found an association between categoric AM 
retrieval and SPS performance. They hypothesized that categoric AM retrieval 
was facilitating ruminative thinking and creating poor problem orientation. The 
present correlation tentatively suggests that rumination is also creating greater 
112  
categoric AM retrieval. The memories retrieved could be instances of failure, 
which according to the differential activation hypotheses lead to more negative 
thinking (Williams et al., 2005). Hence a solution to the problems fails to emerge. 
More negative thinking and negative global self-attributions follow. Ciesla and 
Roberts (2002) indicated that one possible mechanism that influences the 
rumination process is “negative cognitive styles”. Negative cognitive styles refer 
to “maladaptive beliefs about the self ”, which is defined operationally as low 
self-esteem and high scores on the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS) 
(Weissman & Beck, 1978), or a internal, global, stable attributional style to 
stressful events. Previous work by Robinson and Alloy (2003) demonstrated an 
interaction between rumination and negative cognitive style, and this interaction 
predicted the previous and future episodes of depression in college undergraduate 
students. Morrow and Nolen-Hoeksema (1990) also indicated that rumination 
enhancing the perpetuating effects of negative cognitive styles by encouraged the 
pre-existing negative cognitive styles occurring more often in depressed 
individuals. Taken these implications together, they shed some lights on results of 
the present study that the rumination encourages the negative cognitive styles in 
depressed people in turn affects the subsequent performance such that more 
categoric AM retrieval was associated with poorer SPS (i.e., fewer relevant means 
and less effective solutions on the MEPS). 
 
Considered together, the findings on the association between AM retrieval 
during SPS and SPS performance are different from those of Goddard et al. 
(1996). Goddard et al. found a more pronounced association between categoric 
AM retrieval during SPS and SPS performance. Whereas only a significant 
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positive correlation was found between specific AM retrieval and the MEPS 
effectiveness score in the nondepressed control group. The results in the present 
study suggest the importance of both specific and categoric AM retrieval during 
the SPS process. Future works need to be done to further examine the impact that 
rumination/distraction have on AM retrieval during SPS and SPS performance, by 
using more refined thinking style manipulations such as process-focused 
manipulation used by Watkins and Baracaia (2002). 
 
When the results of the present study are considered together with results of 
Study 1 (see Chapter 3 in this thesis), a conclusion can be drawn such that 
rumination may affect different processes involving SPS such as AM retrieval 
during SPS, depending upon the severity of the mood (i.e., dysphoria and clinical 
depression). If mood is less severe (i.e., in the dysphoric state), the effects on AM 
retrieval during SPS are overshadowed by lower mood affecting processes like the 
spontaneous initiation of useful strategies (e.g., Hertel & Hardin, 1990). However, 
as mood becomes more severe (i.e., in the clinically depressed state), the 
ruminative effects on AM retrieval during SPS become more pronounced and 
detrimental. 
 
In conclusion, the results demonstrated quite clearly that rumination has a 
negative impact on SPS when depressed mood is present. However, the results 
also indicate that different processes may be affected, depending on the severity of 
the mood. Research needs to examine these processes in greater depth in order to 
design interventions to improve SPS performance in individuals with different 
levels of mood severity. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
STUDY 3 
 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY RETRIEVAL IN 
DEPRESSION:  
A CROSS-CULTURAL STUDY 
 
5.1 Literature Review 
 
 There is well established evidence demonstrating that depression is 
associated with distinct patterns of AM retrieval (cf. Williams & Dritschel, 1998; 
Williams & Scott, 1992). Research has shown that depressed individuals have 
greater difficulty in retrieving specific AMs than nondepressed controls. A specific 
AM refers to a memory for an event lasting less than one day and occurring at a 
particular time and place (e.g., “playing squash last Friday night”). When asked to 
retrieve a specific AM, depressed individuals are more likely to produce 
overgeneral memories, which are categoric in form. Categoric AMs are memories 
for collections of events such as “times that I have gone to the cinema”. 
 
 According to Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000), specific AM retrieval can 
occur through a generative process. This generative process involves first 
accessing an underlying knowledge base which is almost always general 
autobiographical knowledge in the form of general event representations. In 
addition, it is likely that working-self goal structures are also activated at this 
early stage. Once pathways through the knowledge base are activated, this 
knowledge becomes available to central executive control processes and to the 
retrieval model that evaluates this information. The specific AM is retrieved 
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through activation across indices of the autobiographical knowledge base together 
with the retrieval model used to direct the pattern of retrieval. It is possible that 
with depression a global negative model of self is activated at this early stage. 
This model of self increases the tendency to access global event representations 
and stop the search process at this point. Further limited central executive 
resources associated with depression (Williams, 2006) may increase the difficulty 
in evaluating if this information matches retrieval requirements.  
 
An interesting question, which has never been addressed with respect to the 
AM bias exhibited by depressed individuals, is whether it occurs cross-culturally. 
There is some evidence that culture may influence the ability to retrieve specific 
AM of participants from the nondepressed population (Han, Leichtman, & Wang, 
1998; Wang, 2001). Wang (2001) investigated the interactive relationship between 
AMs and cultural construal of the self. In this study, she compared Chinese and 
American college students’ style of reporting their earliest memories using a 
memory questionnaire as well as their type of self-descriptions on the abbreviated 
Twenty Statements Test (TST; Kuhn & McPartland, 1954).3 The results showed 
that the earliest memories reported by the Americans were more specific, 
self-focused, emotionally elaborate and lengthier than their Chinese counterparts. 
The Chinese students focused on collective activities and were more likely to 
describe events in an emotionally neutral tone. Thus, it could be that different 
working-self goal structures may be operating and then contributing to differences 
in AM retrieval patterns between Western and Eastern people. Moreover, 
according to Wang’s finding (2001), the Americans exhibited a more salient 
                                                
3
 In the TST, participants are required to describe themselves by completing 20 sentences; each 
begins with “I am”. This instrument was considered a reliable measure for an index of cultural 
construal of self in the dimension of independent and interdependent (see Wang, 2001, pp. 222). 
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tendency to express autonomous orientation than their Chinese counterparts. In 
addition, compared to the Americans, the Chinese mentioned other people in their 
memory narratives more frequently. The results suggested that people from 
different cultures have different underlying memory representations, which are 
strongly shaped by their cultural surroundings.  
 
This hypothesis is consistent with research demonstrating that culture 
influences conceptualizations of the self. Western cultures are characterized as 
emphasizing an independent-oriented self whereby the self is viewed as an 
autonomous being that is separate from other individuals (Wang, 2001). This view 
of self arises from a culture that emphasizes self-expression, individual 
uniqueness and personal efficiency. In contrast, Eastern cultures emphasize an 
interdependent self whereby the self has important social roles, duties, and 
responsibilities and is viewed as part of existing relationships (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991; Wang, 2001). This view of self arises from a culture that 
emphasizes group solidarity, interpersonal connectedness and personal humility.  
 
Taking these independent orientation and interdependent orientation into 
account, it was speculated that the specific and general AM retrievals might serve 
different functions in different cultures. For example, the specific AM “having a 
birthday party with Chelsea Clinton” may help to differentiate one’s self from 
others in a society that respects individuality; whereas the general memory “going 
to church everyday” is a more socially conventional description and helps people 
to fit into a society that values interdependency (see Wang, 2001, pp. 229). These 
cultural differences may be reflected in people with depression such that 
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depressed individuals from Eastern societies may retrieve fewer overgeneral AMs 
than depressed individuals from Western societies.  
  
However, it could also be that an interaction might occur such that culture 
affects the production of specific AMs in the nondepressed controls but not in the 
depressed groups. Such an interaction might arise if central executive functioning 
impairments associated with depression make the retrieval of specific AMs more 
difficult irrespective of the effects of culturally influenced working self. Another 
possible source for this interaction might be that depression creates a more 
ruminative thinking style in Western people. This ruminative thinking style would 
lead to greater global negative self-representations and more categoric AM 
retrievals. In Eastern cultures, depression may lead to greater self-focus and the 
retrieval of more specific negative memories. 
 
The aim of the present study was to examine these issues (i.e., the interaction 
between depression and culture for AM retrieval on the AMT cueing task) using 
clinically depressed people and nondepressed controls from Taiwan and Britain 
respectively. Secondly, the AM responses on the AMT cueing will also be 
compared cross-culturally in terms of autonomous orientation and self-other ratio 
to examine the tendency to express autonomy and the frequency of mentioning 
self relative to the frequency of mentioning other people between two cultures. 
 
5.2 Method  
 
5.2.1 Design 
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The design was a 2 (culture: British vs. Taiwanese) × 2 (depressed status: 
nondepressed vs. depressed) between subjects design. The AM retrieval on the 
AMT cueing task, the tendency to show autonomous orientation and the self-other 
ratio served as the dependent measurements. 
 
5.2.2 Participants  
 
Fifteen Taiwanese clinically depressed patients (Age: M = 37.6 years old, SD 
= 10.32 years old) were recruited from the Department of Psychiatry, the 
Chung-Shang Medical University Hospital. Fifteen British clinically depressed 
patients (Age: M = 43.13 years old, SD = 5.88 years old) recruited from the 
Affective Disorders Centre of Ninewells Hospital in Dundee as well as the Health 
Centre in St. Andrews took part in this experiment. 4All the patients were 
interviewed using the SCID to assess whether they met the diagnosis of Major 
Depressive Disorder according to the DSM-IV. Participants were excluded if they 
had either any manic episode, or any psychotic symptoms (i.e., delusion and 
hallucination) or their depression symptoms were due to the organic reasons such 
as brain damage. 
 
Fifteen nondepressed Taiwanese controls (Age: M = 36.6 years old, SD = 9.15 
years old) were recruited from a local community society through advertisement. 
Fifteen British nondepressed participants (Age: M = 44.4 years old, SD = 5.34 
years old) were recruited through advertisements around St. Andrews. All the 
                                                
4
 The British participants in this study were from part of the Study 2 in this thesis. 
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nondepressed participants were assessed using the structured clinical interview for 
DSM-IV to ensure that they were not currently suffering from Major Depressive 
Disorder nor experiencing any significantly low mood. 
 
The clinically depressed and nondepressed participants from two cultures 
were matched in their years of education and the BDI scores. There was a main 
effect of age such that the Taiwanese participants were significantly younger than 
the British participants (see Section 5.2.2.1). ANCOVAs using age as a covariate 
were also conducted to partial out this effect (See Section 5.3.1 for analysis of AM 
retrieval on the AMT and Section 5.3.3 for analysis of Autonomous orientation 
and Self-other ratio). 
 
5.2.2.1 Age 
  
To ensure that there were no differences in age, a 2 (culture: British vs. 
Taiwanese) × 2 (depressed status: nondepressed vs. depressed) ANOVA was 
conducted. This analysis showed a main effect of culture (F(1, 56) = 10.47, p 
< .01), such that the Taiwanese participants were significantly younger (M = 37.1, 
SD = 9.6) than the British participants (M = 43.77, SD = 5.56) (See table 5.1). 
Neither a main effect of depressed status (F(1, 56) = 0.12, p > .05), nor a culture × 
depressed status interaction (F(1, 56) = 0.244, p > .05), was found. 
 
5.2.2.2 Years of Education 
 
To ensure that there were no differences in years of education received, a 2 
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(culture: British vs. Taiwanese) × 2 (depressed status: nondepressed vs. depressed) 
ANOVA was conducted and no significant differences were found (main effect of 
depressed status: F(1, 56) = 3.383; main effect of culture: F(1, 56) = .491; 
interaction: F(1, 56) = .928; all p > .05) (see Table 5.1). 
 
5.2.2.3 The BDI Score 
 
The total BDI score was compared between the British and the 
Taiwanese depressed patients and the nondepressed controls. A 2 
(culture: British vs. Taiwanese) × 2 (depressed status: nondepressed vs. 
depressed) ANOVA demonstrated a main effect of depressed status 
(F(1, 56) = 612.19, p < .01). Neither a main effect of culture (F(1, 56) 
= 3.17, p > .05), nor a culture × depressed status interaction (F(1, 56) 
= 2.95, p > .05), was found. These results were replicated using age as 
a covariate, with the same results being produced such that there was a 
main effect of depressed status (F(1, 56) = 604.80, p < .01). There was 
no main effect of culture (F(1, 56) = 3.95, p > .05) and no culture × 
depressed status interaction (F(1, 56) = 2.73, all p > .05) (see Table 
5.1). 
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Table 5.1 Mean Years of Age, Years of Education and the BDI scores. 
British Taiwanese  
Nondepressed Depressed Nondepressed Depressed 
Age 44.40 
(5.34) 
43.13 
(5.88) 
36.60 
(9.15) 
37.60 
(10.32) 
Years of 
Education 
8.67 
(2.69) 
8.00 
(2.93) 
9.93 
(3.33) 
7.80 
(2.81) 
BDI 3.33 
(1.05) 
31.07 
(4.54) 
3.27 
(1.67) 
27.40 
(6.43) 
 
5.2.3 Materials 
 
5.2.3.1 Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1961) 
 
The BDI (Beck et al., 1961) is a 21-item self-report inventory measuring the 
degree of depression occurring over the past 2 weeks (see Appendix 1). The 
21-item inventory focuses on various aspects of depression, which include 
subjective mood state, the feelings of self-esteem, propensity to initiate action, 
motivation for completing tasks, as well as the quality of sleep and appetite. 
 
The BDI, Mandarin-Chinese version was translated by Ko in 1991 from the 
BDI (cf. Wang, 2001). The Cronbach’s Alpha was .87 and the split-half reliability 
was .84, which has been corrected using the Spearman-Brown prophecy formula 
for the BDI Mandarin-Chinese version (cf. Wang, 2001).  
 
5.2.3.2 Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986) 
 
The AMT requested that the participants to retrieve a specific AM as quickly 
as possible in response to a cue word. 10 cue words were used which consisted of 
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five positive words (i.e., happy, safe, interested, successful, and surprised) and 
five negative words (i.e., sorry, angry, clumsy, hurt, and lonely) presented orally 
and visually to the participants in this order, with positive and negative words 
alternating (see Appendix 3). A maximum of 60 seconds was given to retrieve a 
memory in response to each cue word. If a response was not given in that time, a 
score of 60 seconds was recorded and the next word was given. The responses 
were scored for the specificity of the participants’ first response. A tape recorder 
was used to record all the responses. 
 
There were three codings involved in this study. First of all, the AM responses 
were categorized as specific AM, extended AM, and categoric AM according to 
the criteria in the previous chapter (see Section 2.3.1). Furthermore, in an attempt 
to capture qualitative differences between the interdependent and independent self, 
the AM responses were further rated in terms of autonomous orientation as well as 
self-other ratio following Wang’s coding of memory variables (2001). The 
autonomous orientation refers to the tendency to express autonomy and 
self-determination in the content of their memories. The frequency with which 
they mentioned in their 10 AM responses, any one of the following four categories 
was recorded: (1) reference to personal needs, desires, or preferences; (2) 
reference to personal dislikes or avoidance; (3) references to personal evaluations, 
judgments, or opinions regarding other people, objects, or events; and (4) 
reference to retaining control over one’s own actions and resisting group or social 
pressure (cf. Wang, 2001). The self-other ratio is the frequency with which the 
participant mentioned themselves respective to other people in their 10 AM 
responses. The numbers were calculated separately and finally a ratio (the number 
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of times they mentioned themselves over the number of times they mentioned 
other people in 10 AM responses) was obtained for each participant to indicate 
their social orientation. 
 
5.2.3.3 Cultural Equivalent Consideration 
 
Translation and back-translation were carried out to ensure that the two 
versions of experimental materials of each language are literally and semantically 
equivalent.  
 
To ensure that the two different versions of the AMT cueing task are identical 
in their semantic meanings, a Mandarin-Chinese equivalent of the AMT cueing 
task was developed which consisted of emotional cue words that had identical 
semantic meanings. To develop the Mandarin-Chinese version of the AMT cueing 
task, the Academia Sinica Bilingual Ontological Wordnet was employed. This 
programme provides an exact translation of the word meanings from Chinese to 
English as well as from English to Chinese, while holding word frequency 
constant.  
 
5.2.4 Procedure 
 
The study conducted in Taiwan received ethical approval from the Institutional 
Review Board, Chung Shan University Hospital. The study in the U.K. received 
ethical approval from the Tayside Committee on Medical Research Ethics and 
extended to Fife area by Fife NHS Board, Local Research Ethics Committee.  
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Informed consent was sought from all before starting the experiment. All 
participants were first asked to complete the BDI, or its Mandarin-Chinese version 
to assess their current emotional state. Then, participants completed the AMT 
cueing task, or its Mandarin-Chinese version. They were required to retrieve a 
specific AM in response to 10 (5 positive and 5 negative) emotional cue words, 
which are orally and visually presented with positive and negative words 
alternating. Their responses were categorized as specific memory, extended 
general memory, and categoric general memory. The definitions for these 
memories are explained in Section 2.3.1, Chapter 2. At the end of experiment, 
participants were debriefed. 
 
5.3 Results 
 
5.3.1 AM Retrieval on the AMT Cueing Task 
 
The number of specific and categoric memories retrieved by all four groups on 
the AMT cueing task was compared (see Table 5.2 & 5.3).  
 
 
A 2 (Culture: British vs. Taiwanese) × 2 (Depressed status: Nondepressed vs. 
Depressed) × 2 (Valence: Positive vs. Negative) mixed ANOVA was used to 
analyze number of specific memory retrieval to positive and negative cues. We 
did not find any significant within-subjects effect (of valence F(1, 56)=0.396, p 
> .05). 
 
Specific Memory 
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Table 5.2 Number of specific memory retrieved to positive and negative cues 
 British  Taiwanese 
 
Nondepressed 
(n = 15) 
Depressed 
(n = 15) 
 Nondepressed 
(n = 15) 
Depressed 
(n = 15) 
Number of Specific 
Memory to Positive 
Cue 
M 
(SD) 
 
 
 
3.73 
(0.88) 
 
 
1.20 
(1.42) 
  
 
2.80 
(1.57) 
 
 
1.40 
(1.12) 
Number of Specific 
Memory to Negative 
Cue 
M 
(SD) 
 
 
3.40 
(1.18) 
 
 
1.27 
(1.10) 
  
 
2.20 
(1.26) 
 
 
1.67 
(1.11) 
 
 
A significant main effect of Depressed status, F(1, 56) = 63.349, p < .001, 
showed that depressed participants offered significantly fewer specific memories 
than nondepressed participants. However, no main effect for Culture has been 
found (F(1, 56)=3.419, p >. 05. The Culture × Depressed status interaction, F(1, 
56) = 10.865, p < .01, explained group differences in terms of number of specific 
memories offered by British nondepressed participants significantly more than 
those offered by Taiwanese nondepressed participants, t(28) = 3.127, p < .01. 
 
No other 2-way or 3-way interaction have been found (Valence × Depressed 
status interaction, F(1, 56) = 1.766, p >. 05; Valence × Culture interaction, F(1, 56) 
= 0.005, p >. 05; Valence × Depressed status × Culture interaction, F(1, 56) = 
0.240, p >.05.). 
 
Considering there was significant age difference between groups, firstly a 2 
(Culture: British vs. Taiwanese) × 2 (Depressed status: Nondepressed vs. 
Depressed) ANCOVA (with age as a covariate) was conducted to partial out the 
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affect of the age difference between British and Taiwanese participants. The 
results paralleled the above findings. We found a main effect of depression status, 
F(1, 56) = 62.728, p < .001, also a culture by depressed status interaction has been 
found, F(1, 56) = 10.986, p < .01. However, there was no culture main effect, F(1, 
56) = 3.735, p >. 05. 
 
 
Categoric Memory 
 
 
A 2 (Culture: British vs. Taiwanese) × 2 (Depressed status: Nondepressed vs. 
Depressed) × 2 (Valence: Positive vs. Negative) mixed ANOVA was used to 
analyze number of categoric memory retrieval to positive and negative cues. We 
did not find any significant within-subjects effect (of valence F(1, 56) = 1.796, p 
>. 05) 
 
Table 5.3 Number of categoric memory retrieved to positive and negative 
cues 
 British  Taiwanese 
 
Nondepressed 
(n = 15) 
Depressed 
(n = 15) 
 Nondepressed 
(n = 15) 
Depressed 
(n = 15) 
Number of Categoric 
Memory to Positive 
Cue 
M 
(SD) 
 
 
 
0.42 
(1.32) 
 
 
3.40 
(1.40) 
  
 
1.47 
(1.25) 
 
 
3.20 
(0.94) 
Number of Categoric 
Memory to Negative 
Cue 
M 
(SD) 
 
 
0.65 
(1.64) 
 
 
2.87 
(1.46) 
  
 
1.67 
(0.98) 
 
 
2.47 
(0.99) 
 
A significant main effect of depressed status, F(1, 56) = 101.529, p < .001, 
showed that depressed subjects offered significantly more categoric memories 
than nondepressed participants. There was a main effect of culture, F(1, 56) = 
3.559, p <. 05. The Culture × Depressed status interaction, F(1, 56) = 10.529, p 
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< .01, explained group differences in terms of number of categoric memories 
offered by British nondepressed participants significantly fewer than those offered 
by Taiwanese nondepressed participants, t(28) = -4.384, p < .05. 
 
No any 2-way or 3-way interaction been found (Valence × Depressed status 
interaction, F(1, 56) = 3.395, p > .05; Valence × Country interaction, F(1, 56) = 
0.000, p > .05; Valence × Depressed status × Country interaction, F(1, 56) = 0.253, 
p > .05). 
 
Considering there was significant age difference between groups, firstly a 2 
(Country: British vs. Taiwanese) × 2 (Depressed status: Nondepressed vs. 
Depressed) ANCOVA (with age as a covariate) was conducted to partial out the 
affect of the age difference between British and Taiwanese participants. The 
results paralleled the above findings. We found a main effect of Depression status, 
F(1, 56) = 102.690, p < .001, as well as a main effect of Culture, F(1, 56) = 5.666, 
p < .05, as well as a Culture × Depressed status interaction has been found, F(1, 
56) = 11.169,  p < .01.  
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Figure 5.1 AM Retrieval on the AMT (Dysphoric Status  × Culture) 
 
 
5.3.2 Association between the BDI Scores and AM Retrieval on the AMT 
Cueing Task 
 
To examine the association between the types of AM retrievals on the AMT 
cueing task (i.e., specific AM retrieval and categoric AM retrieval) and the BDI 
scores, a Pearson Correlation was carried out. A significant negative correlation 
was found between the specific AM retrieval and their BDI scores in the total 
sample of 60 participants (r = -.672, p < .01) such that higher BDI scores (more 
depressed) were related to retrieval of fewer specific AMs. Also a significant 
positive correlation was found between the categoric AM retrieval and their BDI 
scores in the total sample of 60 participants (r = .727, p < .01). Thus more 
depressed participants (higher BDI scores) retrieved a greater number of categoric 
AMs. 
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Table 5.4 Correlation between the BDI Scores and AM Retrieval on the AMT  
 British 
(n = 30) 
 Taiwanese 
(n = 30) 
  
Specific Memory 
 
-.874** 
 
 
 
-.428* 
 
Categoric Memory 
 
 
.906** 
 
  
.524** 
 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
When looking at the correlation between the BDI score and AM retrieval on 
the AMT cueing task across the two countries, there was a significant negative 
correlation between the BDI score and number of specific AM retrieval in both 
British and Taiwanese participants respectively (see Table 5.4: r = -.874, p < .01; r 
= -.428, p < .05). Moreover, there was also a significant positive correlation 
between the BDI score and number of categoric AM retrieval in both British and 
Taiwanese groups (see Table 5.4: r = .906, p < .01; r = .524, p < .01). The 
scattergram of the correlations for Table 5.4 is shown below. No significant 
outliers are observed. Therefore the correlations are not reliant on outliers (see 
Appendix 8). 
 
Table 5.5 Correlation between the BDI Scores and AM Retrieval on the AMT  
 British  Taiwanese 
 
Nondepressed 
(n = 15) 
Depressed 
(n = 15) 
 Nondepressed 
(n = 15) 
Depressed 
(n = 15) 
  
Specific Memory 
 
-.651** 
 
-.337  
 
-.228 
 
.293 
 
Categoric Memory 
 
 
.259 
 
 
.435 
 
  
.393 
 
 
-.663** 
 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
However, when further examining the correlations between the 
British/Taiwanese versus depressed/nondepressed groups, the results 
demonstrated that there was significant negative correlation between the specific 
130  
AM retrieval and the BDI scores in British nondepressed participants such that the 
British nondepressed participants retrieved significantly less specific AMs when 
they were more depressed (see Table 5.5: r = -.651, p < .01). Moreover, there was 
a significant negative correlation between the categoric AM retrieval and the BDR 
scores in Taiwanese depressed participants. That is, the Taiwanese depressed 
participants retrieved significantly less categoric AMs when they were more 
depressed (see Table 5.5: r = -.663, p < .01). 
 
5.3.3 Qualitative Analysis: Autonomous Orientation & Self-other Ratio 
 
A 2 (culture: British vs. Taiwanese) × 2 (depressed status: nondepressed vs. 
depressed) ANOVA was conducted to evaluate the tendency to express 
autonomous orientation in their AM responses. First of all, this revealed a 
significant main effect of culture. The British participants (M = 1.77, SD = 0.97) 
showed more autonomous orientation than the Taiwanese Participants (M = 1.20, 
SD = 0.71) (F(1, 56) = 6.881, p < .05) (see Table 5.6). There was also an 
approaching significance main effect of depressed status (F(1, 56) = 4.024, p 
= .05). However, there was no significant culture × depressed status interaction 
effect (F(1, 56) = .214, p > .05). 
Table 5.6 Autonomous Orientation & Self-other Ratio 
British  Taiwanese  
Nondepressed 
(n = 15) 
Depressed 
(n = 15) 
 Nondepressed 
(n = 15) 
Depressed 
(n = 15) 
Autonomous orientation 
M 
(SD) 
 
 
1.93 
(1.16) 
 
 
1.60 
(0.74) 
 
  
1.47 
(0.52) 
 
 
0.93 
(0.80) 
 
 Self-other ratio 
M 
(SD) 
 
 
3.38 
(2.76) 
 
 
3.56 
(1.19) 
 
 
 
1.63 
(0.55) 
 
 
2.15 
(0.85) 
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Considering there was significant age difference between groups, firstly a 2 
(culture: British vs. Taiwanese) × 2 (depressed status: nondepressed vs. depressed) 
ANCOVA (with age as a covariate) was conducted to partial out the effect of the 
age difference between British and Taiwanese participants. The results paralleled 
the above findings. A main effect of culture was found (F(1, 56) = 4.953, p < .05), 
also a approaching significant main effect of depressed status was found (F(1, 56) 
= 3.950, p = .052). However, there was no significant culture × depressed status 
interaction effect ((F(1, 56) = .239, p > .05). 
 
When examing the Self-other ratio, only a significance main effect of culture 
was found (F(1, 29) = 14.856, p < .001). The British participants (M = 3.47, SD = 
2.09) mentioned themselves more often than the Taiwanese Participants did (M = 
1.89, SD = 0.75) (F(1, 56) = 6.881, p < .05). Neither a main effect of depressed 
status (F(1, 56) = .730, p > .05) nor a culture × depressed status interaction effect 
was found (F(1, 56) = .180, p > .05) (see Table 5.6). 
 
Considering there was significant age difference between groups, firstly a 2 
(culture: British vs. Taiwanese) × 2 (depressed status: nondepressed vs. depressed) 
ANCOVA (with age as a covariate) was conducted to partial out the effect of the 
age difference between British and Taiwanese participants. The results paralleled 
the above findings. A main effect of culture was found (F(1, 56) = 14.604, p 
< .001), also a approaching significant was found (F(1, 56) = 3.950, p = .052). 
However, there was neither significant main effect of depressed status ((F(1, 56) 
= .714, p > .05) nor culture × depressed status interaction effect ((F(1, 56) = .227, 
p > .05). 
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When looking at the association between the BDI scores and autonomous 
orientation as well as self-other ratio across the four groups, only a significant 
negative correlation between the BDI scores and autonomous orientation in the 
British depressed group was identified (see Table 5.7: r = -.632, p < .05).  
Table 5.7 Correlations between the BDI, Specific AM, Categoric AM and 
Autonomous Orientation & Self-other Ratio 
British  Taiwanese  
Nondepressed 
(n = 15) 
 
Depressed 
(n = 15) 
 Nondepressed 
(n = 15) 
Depressed 
(n = 15) 
BDI score 
Autonomous orientation 
Self-other ratio 
 
 
-.039 
-.175 
 
-.632* 
.101 
  
-.072 
-.240 
 
-.384 
-.090 
 Specific Memory 
Autonomous orientation 
Self-other ratio 
 
 
.342 
.500 
 
.229 
.148 
 
 
-.401 
-.324 
 
.262 
.641* 
Categoric Memory 
Autonomous orientation 
Self-other ratio 
 
 
.006 
-.068 
 
-.539* 
-.114 
  
.416 
.347 
 
-.080 
-.509(*) 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
Further examining the association between AM retrieval and autonomous 
orientation as well as self-other ratio, categoric AM retrieval by the British 
depressed group was significantly negatively correlated with their autonomous 
orientation scores (see Table 5.7: r = -.539, p < .05). The more categoric AMs they 
retrieved on the AMT cueing task, the less autonomous tendency they expressed 
in their AM recollections. As to the Taiwanese depressed participants, their 
specific AM retrieval was significantly correlated with their self-other ratio (see 
Table 5.7: r = .641, p < .05). The more specific AMs they retrieved on the AMT 
task, the more often they tended to mention themselves in their AM recollections. 
Furthermore, in the Taiwanese depressed group, there was an approaching 
significant negative correlation between their categoric AMs and the Self-other 
ratio (see Table 5.7: r = -.509, p = .053). 
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5.4 Discussion 
 
The main aim of this study was to examine the AM retrieval on the AMT 
cueing task in the British and the Taiwanese clinically depressed groups and 
nondepressed control groups. Consistent with previous research (Williams & 
Dritschel, 1988), the clinically depressed patients retrieved significantly fewer 
specific AMs and more categoric AMs in response to emotional cue words on the 
AMT cueing task when compared to the nondepressed people. Furthermore, a 
culture by depressed status interaction was observed in the present study such that 
the British nondepressed participants retrieved significantly more specific AMs as 
well as fewer categoric AMs than the Taiwanese nondepressed participants. 
However, there were no significant differences between the clinically depressed 
groups as a function of culture in terms of their AM retrieval pattern. Thus the 
interaction was carried only by differences in the nondepressed groups. 
 
One conclusion from this study is that the Taiwanese nondepressed 
participants employed a more overgeneral AM retrieval style than the British 
counterparts. This finding is consistent with Wang’s study (2001), which 
investigated the difference of the childhood recollections between the Chinese and 
the American college students. The results in Wang’s study showed that, compared 
to the Chinese college students, the American college students reported lengthier, 
more specific, self-focused and emotionally elaborated memories about their 
earliest childhoods. Wang (2001) concluded that specific AM and overgeneral AM 
play distinctive roles in a person’s self-development in different cultures. Specific 
memory (e.g., memory about having a birthday party with Chelsea Clinton, see 
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Wang, 2001, pp. 229, for a reference) is unique to the individual and helps the 
individual to distinguish oneself from the others. Whereas general memory offers 
routine activities (e.g., a memory about going to church everyday, see Wang, 2001, 
pp. 229 for a reference), which de-emphasizes the unique role of the individual in 
society. 
 
In addition, Wang and Conway (2004) further examined AM in a 
questionnaire study in European American and Chinese adults. The results 
demonstrated that the European American adults provided more emotionally 
focused and individually focused memories. In contrast, the Chinese adults, 
whose memory recollections are more focused on social interaction and 
interpersonal relationships, provided less individualistic memories and less 
emotionally elaborated memories. They provided more similar answers when 
asked to retrieve a memory. For example, when asked to recollect New Year’s Day, 
they would offer similar answers such as having hotpot with their family. 
 
Markus and Kitayama (1991) argued that the way that people experience and 
express their emotions is a function of their self-system. They proposed two 
different self-construals, the independent view of the self and the interdependent 
view of the self. The independent view of the self is exemplified in most of the 
Western countries whereas the interdependent view of the self is exemplified in 
most of the Eastern countries. In their research, they proposed that Westerners 
attend more to ego-focused emotions. The Easterners, on the other hand, 
emphasize the other-focused emotion. For example, the Westerners reported 
experiencing ego-focused emotions such as joy, sadness, anger, guilt, fear, shame 
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and disgust longer and more intensely than their Japanese counterparts, who 
reported more bodily symptoms in a comparative study (cf., Matsumoto, Kudoh, 
Scherer, & Wallbott, 1988). Markus and Kitayama also mentioned that the 
Easterners, unlike the Westerners, do not go directly to “the heart of the matter”. 
When discussing their problems, the Easterners will first start from a common 
point of view. For example, they will start by stating their common problems and 
pointing out all the limitations that all participants have. Only then will they 
present their individual opinions. This vague response pattern may be associated 
with their cognitive style and facilitates a more general pattern in experiencing 
and expressing their thoughts, especially for the emotional materials. This 
independent versus interdependent orientation has also been reported by Conway, 
Wang, Hanyu, and Haque (2005). They examined the descriptions of AMs in 
children from Japan, China, Bangladesh, England, and the United States. From the 
content analysis, they found that Chinese children had more interdependent 
self-focus than children from the United States, who had more independent 
self-focus. The results strongly demonstrated that the content of memories is 
influenced by culture. 
 
Based on these findings, one conclusion may be that the nondepressed British 
people are more likely to represent the emotional features of the events that they 
are remembering than the nondepressed Taiwanese. It must be noted that 
emotional cue words were used on the AMT cueing task in this study. This 
emotional dimension could partially explain why the British nondepressed 
participants were more specific in their recall than the Taiwanese nondepressed 
participants. The emotional label associated with the word cue could make 
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specific emotional events more available for recall. The inclusion of a neutral 
word condition would help clarify the role of emotion in determining the 
specificity of AM recall form a cross-cultural perspective. Another conclusion is 
that the construal of self is different in the two nondepressed samples. The British 
sample may be more self-focused than the Taiwanese nondepressed sample. 
 
The interesting question here is why the interaction failed to extend to the 
clinically depressed sample. One possibility is that depression is impairing the 
functioning of the central executive and this reduced activity is causing 
overgeneral AM retrieval to occur. Support for this argument comes from 
Dalgleish, Williams, Golden, Perkins, Barrett, Barnard, Au-Yeung, Murphy, 
Elward, Tchanturia, & Watkins (2007) who argued that overgeneral AMs may 
result from impoverished central executive functioning. Depression is associated 
with diminished central executive functioning (Williams, 2006) No work to date 
has really examined the relative components of the working self versus the central 
executive functioning in the self-memory system framework (Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Future work needs to test this hypothesis directly by 
manipulating central executive load in the nondepressed cross cultural samples to 
see if both culture groups converge towards a more categoric AM retrieval style. 
 
The correlational data, in contrast, seem to indicate that there may be a subtle 
interaction between depression, AM retrieval and culture. Across all participants 
irrespective of depressed status or culture, specific AM retrieval was negatively 
associated with the level of depressed mood (i.e., measured by the BDI), whereas 
categoric AM retrieval was positively associated with the level of depressed mood 
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in all the participants regardless of their depressed status and culture. However, 
when these correlations were examined within groups, a different pattern emerged. 
A significant negative correlation was found for specific AM retrieval and the 
level of depressed mood in the British nondepressed group. Whereas a significant 
negative correlation was found between categoric AM retrieval and the level of 
depressed mood in the Taiwanese depressed group. These results demonstrated 
that the Taiwanese depressed people retrieved less categoric AMs when they were 
more depressed. One possible speculation for this reversed phenomenon found in 
the Taiwanese depressed people is that rumination is interacting with depression 
and having different effects on AM retrieval. In participants from a Western 
culture, greater rumination is associated with increased depression (Morrow & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991); rumination also leads to more 
categoric retrieval (Watkins et al., 2000). Therefore it seems that rumination could 
be one mechanism underlying increased categoric retrieval in the British 
depressed sample. 
 
 In contrast, for participants from an Eastern culture, it is possible that 
rumination may have different consequences. Eastern people show more 
tendencies to reflect to themselves on the rightness of their actions when they are 
facing a problem (Wang, 2004; Wang & Conway, 2004). Therefore, this particular 
reflective style may lead to greater self-focus in the Taiwanese depressed group 
when experiencing increased depression. As a result more specific negative 
retrieval may occur. Thus, It could be that rumination is not operating in the same 
way in the two culture groups. Future work is needed to explore this possibility. 
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One interesting phenomenon was observed in the Taiwanese depressed sample 
was the association between their AM retrieval and Self-other ratio. The results 
indicated that the depressed Taiwanese people demonstrated more significant 
self-focused concerns in their AM recollections, both specific and categoric 
(approaching significant). When they were depressed, the Taiwanese people 
focused more on themselves as opposed to others in the content of both their 
specific and categoric AMs. This self-focused style may cause the Taiwanese 
depressed people to have more difficulties in fitting into their society where an 
interdependent self-concept is emphasized (e.g., they may encounter more 
interpersonal problems in their daily life). However, in the British depressed 
people, a greater level of depression was only associated with less autonomous 
orientation. This change in content shows that more global self-reflection is 
occurring. Culture determines a person’s sense of self and the self-perception such 
as being autonomous or relational (Wang, 2001, 2003). Wang and Conway (2004) 
have argued that Westerners, living in a culture which emphasis autonomy, are 
encouraged to remember their personal experiences in more specific detail; 
therefore they can differentiate themselves from other people. 
  
In conclusion, the findings of the present study suggested that culture seems to 
impact AM retrieval differently in depressed and nondepressed samples. It seems 
as if different mechanisms are operating in depression cross-culturally. However, 
these are merely preliminary findings from one study. Further research is 
necessary to replicate these findings and to investigate the mechanisms underlying 
this effect. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
STUDY 4 
 
THE EFFECT OF RUMINATION/DISTRACTION ON SPS AND 
AM RETRIEVAL DURING SPS IN CLINICAL DEPRESSION:  
A CROSS-CULTURAL STUDY 
 
6.1 Literature Review 
 
Major Depressive Disorder is a universally severe mood disorder that has 
specific affective, cognitive and somatic features, such as feeling low nearly 
everyday, loss of pleasure from usual activities, fatigue and difficulty in 
concentrating (Davidson & Neale, 2001). Prevalence rates for depression vary 
considerably across different cultures; rates range from 1.5 percent in Taiwan to 
19 percent in Beirut, Lebanon (cf. Davidson & Neale, 2001). There are also 
numerous epidemiological studies that have shown that the features of depression 
can vary between cultures. For example, somatization is the dominant chief 
complaint in Chinese depressed people (Cheung, Lau, & Waldman, 1982; 
Kleinman & Good, 1985). In many Chinese societies, individuals tend to report 
feelings of boredom, discomfort and pressure whereas Western individuals report 
feelings of sadness (Kleinman, 2004). One of the possible explanations for this 
phenomenon is that reporting physical distress is more acceptable than reporting 
psychological distress in Eastern countries as Eastern societies look down upon 
the mentally ill (Kleinman & Kleinman, 1985; Thakker & Ward, 1998). While 
there has been considerable research examining the reporting of symptoms, much 
less attention has been directed toward the cognitive processes underpinning 
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depression across cultures. Hence, this study investigated the association between 
depression and two cognitive processes, AM retrieval and SPS, from a 
cross-cultural perspective. 
 
There is strong evidence that deficient AM retrieval is associated with 
depression (Williams & Broadbent, 1986; Brittlebank et al., 1993). People who 
suffer from depression retrieve significantly more categoric AMs, as well as fewer 
specific AMs than nondepressed people. For example, they offer an overgeneral 
AM “Playing squash on Fridays” instead of providing a specific response 
“Playing squash last Friday night” when requested to produce a specific AM to a 
cue word. Depressed people also perform less effectively on SPS tasks such as the 
MEPS than their nondepressed counterparts (Goddard et al., 1996; Marx et al., 
1992). This poorer SPS performance has been found to be associated with the 
categoric AM retrieval during SPS process (Goddard et al., 1996). 
 
Research also indicates that thinking style (i.e., rumination versus distraction) 
seems to be a mechanism underlying both cognitive deficits. Both dysphoric and 
depressed individuals who receive a rumination manipulation have poorer SPS 
performance than those individuals receiving a distraction manipulation 
(Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002; Donaldson 
& Lam, 2004; Watkins & Moulds, 2005; Raes et al., 2005). Lyubomirsky and 
Nolen-Hoeksema (1995) found that dysphoric people who received a rumination 
manipulation offered a lower percentage of solutions that were model solutions in 
response to the first situation. They also produced less effective solutions than the 
other three groups. The results also demonstrated that increased rumination was 
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associated with impaired SPS performance. Donaldson and Lam (2004) measured 
SPS performance prior to and after the rumination/distraction response induction 
and found that the depressed ruminators perform more poorly on the MEPS than 
the depressed distracters. Raes et al. (2005) also replicated this finding that 
rumination, impaired SPS and reduced AM specificity were associated. Especially, 
the Raes et al. (2005) study revealed that the association between rumination and 
poor SPS was mediated by reduced AM specificity. However, this conclusion was 
drawn from a correlation analysis. Thus a causal effect relationship has to be 
further examined. 
 
There is some evidence that culture may play an important role in cognitive 
biases in depressed people. With respect to the AM retrieval, several findings with 
nondepressed samples have revealed that there are differences in AM retrieval 
between individuals from Eastern versus Western cultures (Wang, 2001; Wang, 
2004; Wang & Conway, 2004). Individuals from a Western culture retrieve AMs 
with greater specific details and more emotional elaborations. The reason that 
leads to these cross-cultural differences might be a contrast between independent 
versus interdependent style between Western culture and Eastern culture. However, 
not much work to date has been done to look at AM differences in depressed 
people across different cultures. A cross-cultural comparison of the ability to 
retrieve AM was presented in Chapter 5 (Study 3), in both British and Taiwanese 
participants. The results revealed an interesting interaction between depression 
and culture. The British nondepressed participants retrieved more specific AMs 
and fewer categoric AMs than the Taiwanese nondepressed participants. In 
contrast, the depressed British and Taiwanese participants did not differ in the 
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number of categoric AMs produced. However, a greater depression score was 
associated with less categoric AMs in the Taiwanese depressed sample. 
 
Although much work has been done to investigate SPS, it still remains unclear 
how culture may influence social problem-solving performance in people from 
different cultures (Chang, D’Zurilla & Sanna, 2004). Chang (1998) investigated 
the relationship between cultural influences, perfectionism, SPS, and subsequent 
suicidal risk in both Asian American and Caucasian American college students. 
The results indicated that SPS, rather than hopelessness, is an important predictor 
for suicidal potential, independent of ethnic status and perfectionism (Chang, 
1998). Thus, across ethnic groups, poorer SPS is associated with increased 
suicidal ideas. It is worth mentioning that when examining the responses on the 
Social Problem Solving Inventory-Revised (SPSI-R; D’Zurilla et al., 2002), there 
was some evidence suggesting that cultural differences do exist for SPS ability. In 
Chang’s study (1998), the results also showed that Asian Americans scored 
significantly higher on the two subscales of SPSI-R; namely Negative Problem 
Orientation and Impulsivity/carelessness style. However, significant correlations 
were not found between these maladaptive SPS styles and the hopelessness 
tendency as well as increased suicidal risk in Asian Americans. Moreover, the 
Asian Americans also differed from the Caucasian Americans on several 
perfectionism dimensions such as the level of concern about making mistakes and 
caring more about parental expectations. In addition, Chang (2001) examined the 
association between SPSI-R, life satisfaction, and depressive symptoms between 
Caucasian Americans and Asian Americans. Compared to Caucasian Americans, 
Asian Americans scored significantly higher on one subscale of SPSI-R, the 
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Impulsivity/carelessness style. The Impulsivity/carelessness style is defined as 
taking action without considering the results caused. However, this deficit in 
problem solving style measured by SPSI-R was not associated significantly with 
either less satisfaction or greater depressive symptoms. Interestingly, Chang 
indicated that given these cultural differences, maladaptive SPS in Asian 
Americans is not necessarily associated with less positive psychological outcomes 
(e.g., life satisfaction, Chang, 2001). In sum, there is not really strong evidence to 
suggest that a culture differences exist in terms of SPS ability across different 
cultures. However, it should be pointed out that all these investigations have been 
based on self-report measures and thus there is a need to examine cross-cultural 
differences in SPS using a qualitative approach. 
 
As rumination is indicated as a key process in AM retrieval and SPS, it is 
worth considering how culture impacts on this process. There is limited work 
looking at the effects of rumination (i.e., self-focused attention on the symptoms, 
feelings and thoughts) and distraction between different racial groups using self- 
report assessments of thinking style. Eshun, Chang and Owusu (1998) examined 
the role of culture as a potential moderator of gender differences in response to 
depression in students from Ghana and U. S. A. The participants were asked to 
complete the Responses Style Questionnaire (RSQ; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 
1991). The results showed a significant effect of culture on response styles. For 
example, Americans scored significantly higher than the Ghanaians on the 
Dangerous-activity and Ruminative subscales. In addition, there was a significant 
interaction between gender and culture for Dangerous-activity subscale in 
Americans, providing some evidence that the thinking styles associated with 
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depression (measured by RSQ) may differ cross-culturally. This study 
demonstrated a preliminary finding for cross-cultural differences in responses to 
depression in terms of rumination. However, more work needs to be done to 
further examine the cultural differences in depth in terms of thinking style, for 
example, the tendency to ruminate.  
 
It seems possible that rumination may be associated with enhanced self-focus 
in terms of thinking about one’s own failures. In view of evidence that Western 
individuals are characterized as having an independent view of self whilst Eastern 
individuals have an interdependent view of self, it is possible that a rumination 
manipulation promoting greater self-focus would have more effect in Western 
versus Eastern samples in terms of mood and cognitive processing on SPS and 
AM retrieval. 
 
In conclusion, there is clear evidence that there is an association between 
rumination, SPS and AM retrieval in Western populations. Although there is 
independent evidence that culture may influence rumination, SPS or AM retrieval, 
no study has examined the interaction of these factors from a cross-cultural 
perspective. This study addresses this question in this chapter. In addition, the 
AMT cueing task will be used to establish baseline how culture influences AM 
performance prior to the manipulation. 
 
6.2 Method 
 
6.2.1 Design 
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The design was a 2 (culture: British vs. Taiwanese) × 2 (depressed status: 
nondepressed vs. depressed) × 2 (thinking style: rumination vs. distraction) 
between subjects design. The number of relevant means and the effectiveness on 
the MEPS task, as well as the AM retrieved during SPS served as the dependent 
measurements. 
 
6.2.2 Participants 
 
Thirty Taiwanese clinically depressed patients (Age: M = 37.53 years old, SD 
= 10.08 years old) were recruited from the Department of Psychiatry of the 
Chung-Shang Medical University Hospital. For the British group, thirty clinically 
depressed patients (Age: M = 39.47 years old, SD = 7.42 years old) were recruited 
from either the Affective Disorders Centre of Ninewells Hospital in Dundee or the 
Health Centre in St. Andrews. 5All the patients were interviewed to assess 
whether they met the diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder according to 
DSM-IV criteria (APA, 1994). Participants were excluded if they had any manic 
episode because previous research (Ridout, 2004) has indicated they have a 
different cognitive profile from the patients with Major Depressive Disorder. 
Patients were also excluded if they had any previous psychotic symptoms or if the 
depressed symptoms were due to organic factors. Participants were tested 
individually in an interview room in the hospitals or within the School of 
Psychology, University of St. Andrews. 
 
                                                
5
 The British participants in this study are identical to the participants in Study 2. 
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Thirty nondepressed Taiwanese controls (Age: M = 37.3 years old, SD = 9.16 
years old) were recruited from a local community society through an 
advertisement. Thirty British nondepressed participants (Age: M = 39.33 years old, 
SD = 8.58 years old) were recruited through advertisement, placed around St. 
Andrews. All the nondepressed participants were assessed using the SCID to 
ensure that they were neither currently suffering from Major Depressive Disorder 
nor currently experiencing any low mood. 
 
The characteristics of age, years of education and BDI scores of each group 
are displayed in Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1 Characteristics of participants in terms of age, years of education 
and the BDI scores 
   Age Years of education BDI scores 
R
 
37.33 
(9.52)
 
12.07 
(3.31) 
2.33 
(1.18) 
N
N
D
 
D
 
41.33 
(7.31) 
10.67 
(3.81) 
2.73 
(1.58) 
R
 
38.00 
(7.99) 
11.00 
(2.78) 
30.33 
(4.27) B
rit
ish
 
D
PS
 
D
 
40.93 
(6.75) 
10.93 
(5.02) 
30.80 
(4.20) 
R
 
35.33 
(9.69) 
11.13 
(4.31) 
2.73 
(1.71) 
N
N
D
 
D
 
39.27 
(8.46) 
10.27 
(4.82) 
2.27 
(1.54) 
R
 
39.40 
(8.42) 
8.93 
(3.86) 
28.60 
(5.21) Ta
iw
an
es
e 
D
PS
 
D
 
35.67 
(11.49) 
10.33 
(4.35) 
29.27 
(7.37) 
 
NND = Nondepressed R = Rumination  
DPS = Depressed D = Distraction 
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To establish if the groups were equivalent in age, a 2 (culture: British vs. 
Taiwanese) × 2 (depressed status: nondepressed vs. depressed) × 2 (thinking style: 
rumination vs. distraction) ANOVA on age was conducted to determine if the 
groups differed. There were no significant main effects of either culture (F(1, 112) 
= 1.518, p > .05), depressed status (F(1, 112) = .013, p > .05) or thinking style 
(F(1, 112) = 1.228, p > .05). The interaction between culture and depressed status 
(F(1, 112) = .001, p > .05), culture and thinking style (F(1, 112) = 1.094, p > .05), 
as well as the depressed status and thinking style were not significant (F(1, 112) = 
1.840, p > .05). The interaction between culture, depressed status and thinking 
style was not significant (F(1, 112) = 1.051, p > .05) (see Table 6.1). 
 
To establish if the groups were comparable in received years of education, a 2 
(culture: British vs. Taiwanese) × 2 (depressed status: nondepressed vs. depressed) 
× 2 (thinking style: rumination vs. distraction) ANOVA was conducted to 
determine if the groups differed in mean years of education. There were no 
significant main effects of either culture (F(1, 112) = 1.791, p > .05), depressed 
status (F(1, 112) = .963, p > .05) or thinking style (F(1, 112) = .098, p > .05). The 
interaction between culture and depressed status (F(1, 112) = .199, p > .05), 
culture and thinking style (F(1, 112) = .448, p > .05), as well as the depressed 
status and thinking style was not significant (F(1, 112) = 1.451, p > .05). The 
interaction between culture, depressed status and thinking style was not 
significant (F(1, 112) = .098, p > .05) (see Table 6.1). 
 
To determine if the groups were equivalent in mood state, a 2 (culture: British 
vs. Taiwanese) × 2 (depressed status: nondepressed vs. depressed) × 2 (thinking 
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style: rumination vs. distraction) ANOVA was conducted to determine if the 
groups differed in BDI scores. Only a significant main effect of depressed status 
was found (F(1, 112) = 1407.568, p < .001) such that the depressed group (M = 
29.75, SD = 5.35) was significantly more depressed than the nondepressed group 
(M = 2.52, SD = 1.49). Neither a main effect of culture (F(1, 112) = 1.318, p > .05) 
nor of thinking style (F(1, 112) = .135, p > .05) was found. No interaction 
between culture and depressed status (F(1, 112) = 1.215, p > .05), culture and 
thinking style(F(1, 112) = .053, p > .05), depressed status and thinking style (F(1, 
112) = .171, p > .05), as well as culture, depressed status and thinking style (F(1, 
112) = .135, p > .05) were found (see Table 6.1). 
 
6.2.3 Materials 
 
6.2.3.1 Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1961) 
 
The BDI (Beck et al., 1961) is a 21-item self-reported inventory measuring the 
degree of depressed symptoms occurring over the past 2 weeks (see Appendix 1). 
The 21-item inventory focuses on various aspects of depressed symptoms, which 
include subjective mood state, feelings of self-esteem, propensity to initiate action, 
motivation for completing tasks, as well as the quality of sleep and appetite. 
 
The BDI, Mandarin-Chinese version was translated by Ko in 1991 from the 
BDI (cf. Wang, 2001). The Cronbach’s Alpha was .87 and the split-half reliability 
was .84, which has been corrected using the Spearman-Brown prophecy formula 
for the BDI Mandarin-Chinese version (cf. Wang, 2001).  
149  
6.2.3.2 Mood Questionnaires 
 
Participants completed three identical packets of mood questionnaires during 
the experiment (see Appendix 2). Each packet contained questionnaires that asked 
participants to rate their current mood state on 9-point Likert-type scales (e.g., 1 = 
not at all cheerful; 9 = extremely cheerful). The mood questionnaires were 
administered at the outset of the experiment to obtain the initial mood state and 
then right after each thinking style manipulation to measure the impact of the 
manipulation on their mood states. 
 
6.2.3.3 Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986) 
 
The AMT requested the participants to retrieve a specific AM as quickly as 
possible to a cue word (see Appendix 3). Ten cue words were used which 
consisted of five positive words (i.e., happy, safe, interested, successful, and 
surprised) and five negative words (i.e., sorry, angry, clumsy, hurt, and lonely). 
These words were presented orally and visually to the participants in this order, 
with positive and negative words alternating. Participants were required to 
retrieve a specific AM as quickly as possible to each cue word. A maximum of 60 
seconds was given to retrieve a AM to each cue word. If a response was not given 
in that time, a score of 60 seconds was recorded and the next word was presented. 
The responses were scored for the specificity of the participants’ first response. A 
tape recorder was used to record all the responses. 
 
6.2.3.4 Thinking Style Manipulation (Rumination versus Distraction) 
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The original response-manipulation tasks were designed to influence the 
content of participants’ thoughts by requiring them to focus their attention and 
“think about” a series of 45 items (Lyubomirsky et al., 1998). This task was 
adapted by Watkins (2000) from the tasks used by Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow 
(1993), with items adjusted for British participants (see Appendices 4 & 5). 
Following Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1991) definition of ruminative responses, the 
ruminative condition instructs participants to focus their attention on thoughts that 
are emotion focused, symptom focused, and self-focused, although they are not 
told especially to think about negative emotions and negative personal attributes. 
For example, participants are asked to think about “ your current level of energy”, 
“why your body feels this way”, “trying to understand your feelings”, “your 
character and who you strive to be”, and “why you turned out this way”. In 
contrast, participants in the distraction condition focus their attention on the 
thoughts that are externally focused and not related to symptoms, emotions, and 
the self. For example, they are asked to think about “clouds forming in the sky”, 
“the expression on the face of the Mona Lisa,” and “the shiny surface of a 
trumpet.” 
 
In previous work using this response-manipulation task, participants spent 
exactly 8 minutes focusing on the items. In our current study, we decided to 
administer the manipulation in two blocks because we were concerned that the 
effect of the manipulation might fade whilst participants are trying to solve all 
four problems. Thus one half of the rumination/distraction manipulation (23 items) 
was administered before the first two SPS tasks were presented. The remaining 
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half of the thinking style manipulation task (22 items) was then administered 
before the final two SPS tasks were presented. Thus the participants spent 4 
minutes on the thinking style manipulation task in each block. The items were 
printed each on a single card, which was handed to the participants one at a time. 
During each manipulation, participants were instructed to focus their mind on 
each item and think about each idea.  
 
6.2.3.5 Means-Ends Problem-Solving Procedures (MEPS; Platt & Spivack, 
1975a) 
 
In this experiment, four hypothetical problems from the MEPS tasks are used 
to assess participants’ problem solving ability (see Appendix 6). The MEPS is a 
hypothetical SPS task and consists of 10 vignettes that first describe a problem 
situation and then the resolution of that problem situation. Problems revolve 
around social themes such as:  
 
“You notice that your friends seem to be avoiding you. You want to 
have friends and to be liked. The story ends when your friends like 
you again. You begin where you first notice your friends avoiding 
you.” 
 
Respondents are required to describe the actions needed to be taken so that the 
conclusion may be reached effectively. Platt and Spivack (1975b) showed that it 
is not necessary to administer all 10 vignettes. In this study four vignettes were 
used that covered the following areas: problem with a boss/teacher, being teased 
by friends, moving to a new neighborhood, and argument with partner/parents. An 
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example was presented before beginning the actual experiment to make sure that 
participants understood the instructions completely. Following each MEPS task, 
the participants were asked to write down any thoughts or images that crossed 
their mind whilst trying to solve this social problem. 
 
Responses were marked for relevant means according to the criteria 
determined by Platt and Spivack (1975) and for effectiveness according to the 
rating used by Marx et al. (1992). The means measure was the number of the steps 
to solve the hypothetical problems. The effectiveness measure was marked on a 
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not at all effective) to 7 (very effective) for each 
problem. Scores were summed across the four problems to give each respondent a 
total effectiveness score and a means score. In considering that the effective 
strategies to solve a social problem in one country is not necessarily as effective 
as those in another country, the ratings of the effectiveness score were done 
independently by the raters who are from the same culture as the participants are 
from.  
 
6.2.3.6 Cultural Equivalent Consideration 
 
Translation and back-translation were carried out to ensure that the two 
versions of experimental materials of each language were literally and 
semantically equivalent. 
 
To ensure that two different versions of the AMT cueing task were identical in 
their semantic meanings, a Mandarin-Chinese equivalent of the AMT cueing task 
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was developed which consisted of word cues that were identical in their semantic 
meaning. To develop the Mandarin-Chinese version of the AMT cueing task, the 
Academia Sinica Bilingual Ontological Wordnet was employed. This programme 
provides an exact translation of the word meanings from Chinese to English as 
well as from English to Chinese, while also matching on word frequency. 
 
The mood questionnaires were also translated into Mandarin-Chinese version 
and back translation was administered to ensure that these two mood-measuring 
materials were identical in their semantic meanings. 
 
The MEPS (Platt & Spivack, 1975a) and the rumination/distraction thinking 
style task (Lyubomirsky et al., 1998) were translated into Mandarin-Chinese 
version by a native Chinese-speaking student in the Department of English. A 
back translation was performed by a Chinese-English bilingual student in 
Psychology and a clinical psychologist in Taiwan. The back-translation was 
compared to the original version by two native English-speaking psychology PhD 
students on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = totally incorrect, 7 = completely 
correct). The back-translation was rated a 6 by one person and a 7 by the other on 
the four measures of the MEPS as well as both rated a 6 on the 45 items of 
rumination/distraction thinking style task. 
 
6.2.4 Procedure 
 
The study conducted in Taiwan received ethical approval from the Institutional 
Review Board, Chung Shan University Hospital. The study in the U.K. received 
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ethical approval from the Tayside Committee on Medical Research Ethics and 
extended to Fife area by Fife NHS Board, Local Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Participants were informed that the study was examining the relationship 
between the processes of imagination, dreaming, levels of consciousness and 
cognition. This provided a cover story designed to minimize possible demand 
characteristics. 
 
In the beginning, the participants were given the first self-report mood 
questionnaire to assess their baseline mood state. Then, the BDI was used to 
assess their mood state to allocate participants. A word-generating task was 
administered immediately after the BDI, which required participants to write 
down as many words as possible that began with an “S” in 90 seconds. This task 
was designed to eliminate the possible ruminating effects that were created by 
completing the BDI. 
 
A questionnaire about imaging colors, and a questionnaire on dreaming was 
then given to the participants. These two questionnaires were included as filler 
tasks to prevent participants from guessing the purpose of the study or the link 
between the response manipulation task and social problem solving tasks (see 
Appendix 6). The AMT cueing task was then administered. 
 
In the AMT cueing task, the participants were asked to retrieve a specific AM 
in respond to 10 (5 positive and 5 negative) emotional cue words, which are orally 
and visually presented with positive and negative words alternating. Their 
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responses were categorized as specific memory, extended general memory, and 
categoric general memory. The definitions for these memories are explained in 
Chapter 2. After completing the AMT cueing task, participants were administered 
either the rumination or the distraction manipulation. In the rumination/distraction 
manipulation, participants in the rumination condition focused their attention on 
items that are symptom-focused, emotion-focused, and self-focused, whereas in 
the distraction condition, they focused their attention on the items that are 
externally focused. Thus, in each condition of the manipulation, participants 
concentrated on 23 items for 4 minutes. Following the manipulation, the 
participants completed a self-report measure of mood. Then, two hypothetical 
social problems selected from the MEPS and their happy endings were presented 
to the participants. The participants were asked to list the steps that were required 
to reach the happy ending to the hypothetical social-problems. Next the 
participants concentrated on the remaining 22 items in the response-manipulation 
task for four minutes before solving two further social problems from the MEPS. 
The order of presentation for the four MEPS problems was randomized across 
participants. For the Taiwanese participants, the inter-rater reliability for the 
means and effectiveness scores on the MEPS were .84 (for means) and .82 (for 
effectiveness) respectively, based on 15 participants. The inter-rater reliability for 
the British participants can be seen in Chapter 4, Section 4.2.4. 
 
After responding to each social problem, the participants were asked to write 
down any thoughts or images that crossed their mind whilst trying to solving the 
social problems. Their responses were categorized according to the following 
criteria: specific memory, extended general memory, categoric general memory, 
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and general knowledge concerning the problem.  
 
According to previous research, the mood of the dysphoric/depressed 
individuals becomes worse after receiving the rumination manipulation. To 
address this ethical consideration, a number of distraction items were given to the 
dysphoric/depressed ruminators at the end of the experiments involving the 
rumination manipulation. These distraction items should have eliminated the 
negative effect on mood caused by the rumination manipulation.  
 
The participants were debriefed at the end of the study. The whole test session 
took less than one hour. 
 
6.3 Results 
 
6.3.1 Manipulation Check 
 
The manipulation check of mood rating was examined in the British (see Table 
6.2) and the Taiwanese groups (see Table 6.2) separately as follows  
 
Firstly, as can be seen in Table 6.2 above, at the beginning of the study, the 
British depressed participants reported greater depressed mood than the British 
nondepressed participants. A Pearson’s correlation was conducted to examine the 
association between participants’ BDI score and their self-report mood measure 
and a satisfactory positive correlation was found (r = 0.68, p < 0.01). Baseline 
mean levels of depressed mood of each group were as follows: nondepressed 
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rumination group, 9.80 (SD = 3.00); nondepressed distraction group, 9.27 (SD = 
1.91); depressed rumination group, 26.27 (SD = 2.28); depressed distraction group, 
27.87 (SD = 2.90). 
 
Table 6.2 Mean and SD of Levels of Mood of British Group (Depressed Status 
× Thinking Style) 
 British Nondepressed  British Depressed 
 
Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
 Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
Mood 1 
M 
(SD) 
 
 
9.80 
(3.00) 
 
 
9.27 
(1.97) 
  
26.27 
(2.28) 
 
27.87 
(2.90) 
Mood 2 
M 
(SD) 
 
 
9.73 
(2.96) 
 
8.93 
(1.79) 
  
28.60 
(3.20) 
 
19.87 
(3.50) 
Mood 3 
M 
(SD) 
 
 
9.53 
(2.95) 
 
8.80 
(1.97) 
  
29.00 
(3.84) 
 
19.40 
(3.50) 
Mood 1: At the beginning of the experiment 
Mood 2: After the first time manipulation 
Mood 3: After the second time manipulation 
 
Group differences in baseline mood were assessed in a 2 (depressed status: 
nondepressed vs. depressed) × 2 (thinking style: rumination vs. distraction) 
ANOVA with baseline mood rating measured by 9-point Likert-type scale ratings, 
as the dependent variable. There was a main effect of depressed status (F(1, 56) = 
701.714, p < .001); depressed participants had higher levels of depressed mood at 
the outset of the experiment (M = 27.07, SD = 2.69) than nondepressed 
participants (M = 9.53, SD = 2.49). There were no differences in baseline 
depressed mood rating between the rumination and the distraction thinking style 
conditions (F(1, 56) = .649, p > .05). The interaction between depressed status and 
thinking style was also not significant (F(1, 56) = 2.597, p > .05) (see Table 6.2). 
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Mean levels of mood rating after the first time rumination/distraction 
manipulation were as follows: nondepressed rumination group, 9.73 (SD = 2.96); 
nondepressed distraction group, 8.93 (SD = 1.79); depressed rumination group, 
28.60 (SD = 3.20); depressed distraction group, 19.87 (SD = 3.50). A 2 (depressed 
status: nondepressed vs. depressed) × 2 (thinking style: rumination vs. distraction) 
ANCOVA (analysis of covariance, with baseline mood as the covariance) was 
conducted to assess the effects of the rumination/distraction manipulation on post 
manipulation depressed mood. The results of the analysis of covariance 
demonstrated a main effect of thinking style (F(1, 56) = 65.845, p < .001). There 
was a depressed status × thinking style interaction (F(1, 56) = 52.962, p < .001), 
explained group differences in terms of the mood 2 of the participants in the 
depressed rumination group being significantly worse than the mood 2 of the 
participants in the depressed distraction group (t(28) = 7.127, p < .001). The 
depressed ruminators also demonstrated worse mood than the nondepressed 
ruminators (t(28) = 16.747, p < .001) and nondepressed distracters (t(28) = 20.756, 
p < .001) (see Table 6.2). 
 
To address concerns that the effect of the rumination/distraction manipulation 
might not persist over time, the manipulation was repeated once the first two SPS 
tasks were completed. Then participants were asked to complete the self-report 
measure of mood again. The results of paired samples t tests revealed that after the 
second rumination/distraction manipulation, the mood rating (Mood 3) remained 
very similar to the rating made after the first response manipulation (Mood 2) for 
all four groups in the study (all t(14) < .90, p > .05). 
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Secondly, as can be seen in Table 6.3 above, at the beginning of the study, the 
Taiwanese depressed participants reported greater depressed mood than the 
Taiwanese nondepressed participants. A Pearson’s correlation was conducted to 
examine the association between participants’ BDI score and their self-report 
mood measure and a satisfactory positive correlation was found, r = .894, p < .01. 
Baseline mean levels of depressed mood of each group were as follows: 
nondepressed rumination group, 8.46 (SD = 2.45); nondepressed distraction group, 
8.93 (SD = 1.71); depressed rumination group, 21.53 (SD = 2.50); depressed 
distraction group, 22.40 (SD = 2.23). 
 
Table 6.3 Mean and SD of Levels of Mood of Taiwanese Group (Depressed 
Status × Thinking Style) 
 Taiwanese Nondepressed  Taiwanese Depressed 
 
Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
 Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
Mood 1 
M 
(SD) 
 
 
8.46 
(2.45) 
 
8.93 
(1.71) 
  
21.53 
(2.50) 
 
22.40 
(2.23) 
Mood 2 
M 
(SD) 
 
 
8.60 
(2.26) 
 
8.73 
(2.09) 
  
22.73 
(2.43) 
 
19.07 
(2.25) 
Mood 3 
M 
(SD) 
 
9.00 
(2.72) 
 
8.80 
(2.31) 
  
24.13 
(1.85) 
 
 
18.26 
(2.15) 
Mood 1: At the beginning of the experiment 
Mood 2: After the first time manipulation 
Mood 3: After the second time manipulation 
 
Group differences in baseline mood were assessed in a 2 (depressed status:  
nondepressed vs. depressed) × 2 (thinking style: rumination vs. distraction) 
ANOVA with baseline mood rating measured by 9-point Likert-type scale ratings, 
as the dependent variable. There was a main effect of depressed status (F(1, 56) = 
524.269, p < .001); depressed participants had higher levels of depressed mood at 
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the outset of the experiment (M = 21.97, SD = 2.37) than nondepressed 
participants (M = 8.70, SD = 2.09). There were no differences in baseline 
depressed mood rating between the ruminative and distracting thinking style 
conditions (F(1, 56) = 1.324, p > .05). The interaction between depressed status 
and thinking style was also not significant (F(1, 56) = .119, p > .05) (see Table 
6.3). 
 
Mean levels of mood rating after the first time rumination/distraction 
manipulation were as follows: nondepressed rumination group, 8.60 (SD = 2.26); 
nondepressed distraction group, 8.73 (SD = 2.09); depressed rumination group, 
22.73 (SD = 2.43); depressed distraction group, 19.07 (SD = 2.25). A 2 (depressed 
status: nondepressed vs. depressed) × 2 (thinking style: rumination vs. distraction) 
ANCOVA (analysis of covariance, with baseline mood as the covariance) was 
conducted to assess the effects of the rumination/distraction manipulation on post 
manipulation depressed mood. The results of analysis of covariance demonstrated 
a main effect of thinking style (F(1, 56) = 34.187, p < .001). The depressed status 
× thinking style interaction (F(1, 56) = 28.415, p < .001), explained group 
differences in terms of mood 2 of the participants in depressed rumination group 
were significantly worse than mood 2 of the participants in depressed distraction 
group (t(28) = 4.284, p < .001). The depressed ruminators also demonstrated 
worse mood than the nondepressed ruminators (t(28) = 16.476, p < .001) and 
nondepressed distracters (t(28) = 16.914, p < .001) (see Table 6.3). 
 
To address concerns that the effect of the rumination/distraction manipulation 
might not persist over time, the manipulation was repeated once the first two SPS 
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tasks were completed. Then the participants were asked to complete the 
self-report measure of mood again. The results of paired samples t tests revealed 
that after the second rumination/distraction manipulation, the mood rating (Mood 
3) remained very similar to the rating made after the first response manipulation 
(Mood 2) for all four groups in the study (all t(14) < 2.00, p > .05). 
 
6.3.2 AM Retrieval on the AMT Cueing Task 
 
Specific Memory 
 
A 2 (culture: British vs. Taiwanese) × 2 (depressed status: nondepressed vs. 
depressed) × 2 (thinking style: rumination vs. distraction) ANOVA was conducted 
on the numbers of specific AMs retrieved on the AMT cueing task. The results 
revealed that there was a significant main effect of culture (F(1, 112) = 4.794, p 
< .05), such that the British participants (M = 4.78, SD = 2.87) retrieved 
significantly more specific AMs than the Taiwanese participants (M = 4.22, SD = 
1.79). Also a main effect of depressed status was found (F(1, 112) = 172.578, p 
< .001) such that the depressed participants (M = 2.80, SD = 1.40) retrieved 
significantly less specific AMs on the AMT cueing task than the nondepressed 
participants (M = 6.20, SD = 1.94). However, there was no significant main effect 
of thinking style (F(1, 112) = 0.415, p > .05) (see Table 6.4). 
 
Furthermore, there was also a two-way interaction between culture and 
depressed status (F(1, 112) = 46.595, p < .001), which explained group 
differences that the British nondepressed participants (M = 7.37, SD = 1.38) 
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produced significantly more specific AMs than the nondepressed Taiwanese 
participants (M = 3.93, SD = 1.91) (t(58) = 5.818, p < .001). Moreover, the British 
depressed participants (M = 2.20, SD = 1.03) produced significantly less specific 
AMs than Taiwanese depressed participants (M = 3.40, SD = 1.48) (t(58) = -3.651, 
p < .01). There was no significant culture × thinking style interaction (F(1, 112) = 
2.389, p > .05), depressed status × thinking style interaction, F(1, 112) = 1.344, p 
> .05), nor culture × depressed status × thinking style interaction (F(1, 112) = 
0.265, p > .05) (see Table 6.4). 
 
Table 6.4 Specific AM Retrieval on the AMT (Culture × Depressed Status) 
British Taiwanese 
Nondepressed Depressed Nondepressed Depressed 
 
R(15) D(15) R(15) D(15) R(15) D(15) R(15) D(15) 
Specific 7.87 
(1.19) 
6.87 
(1.41) 
2.27 
(0.88) 
2.13 
(1.18) 
5.00 
(1.51) 
5.07 
(1.94) 
3.20 
(1.08) 
3.60 
(1.80) 
Categoric 1.27 
(0.88) 
1.80 
(0.94) 
6.80 
(1.61) 
6.93 
(1.75) 
3.87 
(2.10) 
4.00 
(1.77) 
6.27 
(1.22) 
5.20 
(1.82) 
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Figure 6.1 Specific AM Retrieval on the AMT  
 
 
Categoric Memory 
 
A 2 (culture: British vs. Taiwanese) × 2 (depressed status: nondepressed vs. 
depressed) × 2 (thinking style: rumination vs. distraction) ANOVA was also 
conducted on the numbers of categoric AMs on the AMT cueing task. The results 
revealed that there was a significant main effect of culture (F(1, 112) = 4.888, p 
< .05), such that the British participants (M = 4.20, SD = 3.00) retrieved 
significantly less categoric AMs than the Taiwanese participants (M = 4.83, SD = 
1.98). Also a main effect of depressed status was found (F(1, 112) = 155.015, p 
< .001) such that the depressed participants (M = 6.30, SD = 1.72) retrieved 
significantly more categoric AMs on a AMT cueing task than the nondepressed 
participants (M = 2.73, SD = 1.92). However, there was no significant main effect 
of thinking style (F(1, 112)= .054, p > .05) (see Table 6.4).  
 
There was a significant culture × depressed status interaction (F(1, 112) = 
38.033, p < .001). The interaction was explained by group differences in terms of 
number of categoric AMs offered by the British nondepressed participants (M = 
1.53, SD = 0.94) being significantly less than those offered by the Taiwanese 
nondepressed participants (M = 3.93, SD = 1.91) (t(58) = -6.177, p < .001). 
Moreover, the British depressed participants (M = 6.87, SD = 1.66) also provided 
significantly more categoric AMs than the Taiwanese depressed participants (M = 
5.73, SD = 1.62) (t(58) = 2.682, p < .05). However, there were no significant 
culture × thinking style interaction (F(1, 112) = 1.950, p > .05), depressed status × 
thinking style interaction, F(1, 112) = 1.950, p > .05), and culture × depressed 
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status × thinking style interaction (F(1, 112) = .487, p > .05) (see Table 6.4). 
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Figure 6.2 Categoric AM Retrieval on the AMT  
 
6.3.3 Association between the BDI Score and AM Retrieval on the AMT 
Cueing Task 
 
Firstly, Pearson Correlation was carried out to examine the association 
between memory retrievals on the AMT cueing task and the BDI scores. A 
significant negative correlation was found between the specific AM retrieval and 
their BDI scores in the total sample of 120 participants (r = -.67, p < .01). Also a 
significant positive correlation was found between the categoric AM retrieval and 
their BDI scores in the total sample of 120 participants (r = .73, p < .01).  
 
When looking at the correlation between BDI score and AM retrieval on the 
AMT cueing task across the two countries, there was a significantly negative 
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correlation between the BDI score and number of specific AM retrieval in both 
British and Taiwanese participants respectively (r = -.907, p < .05; r = -.462, p 
< .05). Moreover, a significantly positive correlation was also found between the 
BDI score and number of categoric AMs retrieved in both British and Taiwanese 
groups (r = .888, p < .05; r = .469, p < .05) 
 
However, after dividing the participants into four groups (i.e., 
British/Taiwanese versus depressed/nondepressed), only a significant negative 
correlation was found such that the British nondepressed participants retrieved 
significantly less specific AMs if they scored higher on the BDI (r = -.595, p < .05) 
(see Table 6.5). 
 
Table 6.5 Correlation between the BDI Scores and AM Retrieval on the AMT  
 British  Taiwanese 
 
Nondepressed 
(n = 30) 
Depressed 
(n = 30) 
 Nondepressed 
(n = 30) 
Depressed 
(n = 30) 
  
Specific Memory 
 
 
-.595* 
 
-.132  
 
-.094 
 
-.112 
 
Categoric Memory 
 
 
-.147 
 
 
.186 
 
  
.179 
 
 
.134 
 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
6.3.4 The Effects of Rumination/Distraction on SPS Performance in terms of 
Means and Effectiveness 
 
Table 6.6 and Table 6.7 display the means and SDs of the two MEPS measures 
in each group. The patterns were verified with two 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVAs. 
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Table 6.6 MEPS Means Scores (Culture × Depressed Status) 
 British  Taiwanese 
 
 Nondepressed 
 
Depressed 
 
  Nondepressed 
 
Depressed 
 
 
Rumination 
 
 
17.27 
(3.03) 
 
 
9.73 
(2.02) 
 
  
16.20 
(5.49) 
 
 
9.80 
(3.08) 
 
 
Distraction 
 
 
19.13 
(3.96) 
 
 
15.93 
(3.53) 
 
  
18.60 
(3.91) 
 
 
14.00 
(5.36) 
 
 
A 2 (culture: British vs. Taiwanese) × 2 (depressed status: nondepressed vs. 
depressed) × 2 (thinking style: rumination vs. distraction) ANOVA was conducted 
on the MEPS means scores. The results revealed that there was a significant main 
effect of depressed status (F(1, 112) = 56.650, p < .001). Also a main effect of 
thinking style was found (F(1, 112) = 25.800, p < .001). However, there was no 
significant main effect of culture (F(1, 112) = 1.441, p > .05) (see Table 6.6). 
 
Furthermore, there was a two-way interaction between depressed status × 
thinking style (F(1, 112) = 4.512, p < .05). The interaction was explained by 
group differences in terms of number of relevant means offered by nondepressed 
ruminators (M = 16.73, SD = 4.39) significantly more than those offered by 
depressed ruminators (M = 9.77, SD = 2.56) (t(58) = 7.507, p < .001). The 
depressed ruminators also provided significantly less relevant means than the 
depressed distracters (t(58) = 5.442, p < .01) as well as the nondepressed 
distracters (t(58) = 10.738, p < .001). However, there were no significant culture × 
depressed status interaction (F(1, 112) = .009, p > .05), culture × thinking style 
interaction (F(1, 112) = .258, p > .05), nor culture × depressed status × thinking 
style interaction (F(1, 112) = .770, p > .05) (see Table 6.6). 
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Figure 6.3 SPS in terms of Relevant Means  
 
Table 6.7 MEPS Effectiveness Scores (Culture × Depressed Status) 
 British  Taiwanese 
 
 Nondepressed 
 
Depressed 
 
  Nondepressed 
 
Depressed 
 
 
Rumination 
 
 
12.67 
(2.92) 
 
 
7.53 
(1.85) 
 
  
11.40 
(4.42) 
 
 
8.20 
(2.14) 
 
 
Distraction 
 
 
13.33 
(3.33) 
 
 
12.40 
(3.50) 
 
  
13.20 
(4.26) 
 
 
12.20 
(4.55) 
 
 
A 2 (culture: British vs. Taiwanese) × 2 (depressed status: nondepressed vs. 
depressed) × 2 (thinking style: rumination vs. distraction) ANOVA was also 
conducted. The results revealed that there was a significant main effect of 
depressed status (F(1, 112) = 16.077, p < .001). Also a main effect of thinking 
style was found (F(1, 112) = 19.591, p < .001). However, there was no significant 
main effect of culture (F(1, 112) = .133, p > .05) (see Table 6.7). 
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Furthermore, there was a two-way interaction between depressed status × 
thinking style (F(1, 112) = 6.248, p < .05), explained group differences in terms of 
effectiveness where nondepressed ruminators (M = 12.03, SD = 3.74) significantly 
better than depressed ruminators (M = 7.87, SD = 1.99) (t(58) = 5.387, p < .001). 
The depressed ruminators also provided significantly less effective solutions than 
the depressed distracters (t(58) = 5.440, p < .01) as well as the nondepressed 
distracters (t(58) = 6.949, p < .01). However, there were no significant culture × 
depressed status interaction (F(1, 112) = .531, p > .05), culture × thinking style 
interaction (F(1, 112) = .011, p > .05), or culture × depressed status × thinking 
style interaction (F(1, 112) = .610, p > .05) (see Table 6.7). 
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Figure 6.4 SPS in terms of Effectiveness 
 
6.3.5 The Effects of Rumination/Distraction on AM retrieval during SPS 
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Table 6.8 and Table 6.9 display the means and SDs of the specific AM 
retrieval and categoric AM retrieval during SPS in each group. The patterns were 
verified with two 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVAs. 
Table 6.8 Specific AM Retrieval during SPS in British and Taiwanese Groups 
(Culture × Depressed Status) 
 British  Taiwanese 
 
 Nondepressed 
 
Depressed 
 
  Nondepressed 
 
Depressed 
 
 
Rumination 
 
 
1.87 
(0.74) 
 
 
1.13 
(0.64) 
  
2.00 
(0.93) 
 
 
1.27 
(0.70) 
 
Distraction 
 
 
 
2.40 
(1.06) 
 
1.73 
(0.59) 
  
2.20 
(0.56) 
 
1.93 
(1.03) 
 
A 2 (culture: British vs. Taiwanese) × 2 (depressed status: nondepressed vs. 
depressed) × 2 (thinking style: rumination vs. distraction) ANOVA was also 
conducted on the numbers of specific AMs retrieved during SPS. The results 
revealed that there was a significant main effect of depressed status (F(1, 112) = 
16.738, p < .001), such that the depressed participants (M = 1.52, SD = 0.81) 
retrieved significantly fewer specific AMs during SPS than the nondepressed 
participants (M = 2.12, SD = 0.85). Also a main effect of thinking style was found 
(F(1, 112) = 11.624, p < .01) such that the distracters (M = 2.07, SD = 0.86) 
retrieved significantly more specific AMs than the ruminators (M = 1.57, SD = 
0.83). However, there was no significant main effect of culture (F(1, 112) = .207, 
p > .05) (see Table 6.8). 
 
There was no significant culture × depressed status interaction (F(1, 112) 
= .465, p > .05), culture × thinking style interaction (F(1, 112) = .207, p > .05), 
depressed status × thinking style interaction (F(1, 112) = .827, p > .05), or culture 
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× depressed status × thinking style interaction (F(1, 112) = .465, p > .05) (see 
Table 6.8). 
 
Table 6.9 Categoric AM Retrieval during SPS in British and Taiwanese 
Groups (Culture × Depressed Status) 
 British  Taiwanese 
 
 Nondepressed 
 
Depressed 
 
  Nondepressed 
 
Depressed 
 
 
Rumination 
 
 
 
1.67 
(0.82) 
 
2.40 
(0.91) 
  
1.77 
(0.83) 
 
2.47 
(0.83) 
 
Distraction 
 
 
 
1.00 
(1.13) 
 
1.93 
(0.71) 
  
1.33 
(0.82) 
 
1.73 
(1.03) 
 
A 2 (culture: British vs. Taiwanese) × 2 (depressed status: nondepressed vs. 
depressed) × 2 (thinking style: rumination vs. distraction) ANOVA was also 
conducted on the numbers of categoric AMs during SPS. The results revealed that 
there was a significant main effect of depressed status (F(1, 112) = 19.347, p 
< .001), such that the depressed participants (M = 2.13, SD = 0.91) retrieved 
significantly more categoric AMs during SPS than the nondepressed participants 
(M = 1.42, SD = 0.93). Also a main effect of thinking style was found (F(1, 112) = 
11.395, p < .01.) such that the ruminators (M = 2.05, SD = 0.91) retrieved 
significantly more categoric AMs than the distracters (M = 1.50, SD = 0.98). 
Moreover, there were no significant main effect of culture (F(1, 112) = .094, p 
> .05) (see Table 6.9). 
 
There was no significant culture × depressed status interaction (F(1, 112) 
= .513, p > .05), culture × thinking style interaction (F(1, 112) = .010 p > .05), 
depressed status × thinking style interaction, (F(1, 112) = .094, p > .05), or 
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culture× depressed status × thinking style interaction (F(1, 112) = .848, p > .05) 
(see Table 6.9). 
 
6.3.6 Association between SPS Performance and the AM Retrieval during 
SPS 
 
Firstly, a correlation between SPS performance (in terms of means and 
effectiveness) and AM retrieval during SPS was examined in the total sample of 
120 participants. A significant positive correlation between specific AM retrieval 
during SPS and SPS performance was found (MEPS means score: r = .693, p 
< .01 for; MEPS effectiveness score: r = .516, p < .01). There was also a 
significant negative correlation between categoric AM retrieval during SPS and 
SPS performance (MEPS means score: r = -.566, p < .01; MEPS effectiveness 
score: r = -.500, p < .01). 
 
Next examining the association between SPS performance and AM retrieval 
during SPS according to country. Consider first the results of the British 
participants on the means measure. In all four groups (the nondepressed 
ruminators, the nondepressed distracters, the depressed ruminators, the depressed 
distracters) there was positive correlation between the number of specific AMs 
retrieved and the means scores (the nondepressed distracters: r = .550, p < .05, 
1-tailed; the depressed ruminators: r = .694, p < .01, 1-tailed; the depressed 
distracters: r = .536, p < .05, 1-tailed). A less consistent pattern emerged for 
categoric AM retrieval during SPS. Only in the depressed ruminators a negative 
correlation was found between the MEPS means scores and the number of 
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categoric AMs retrieved (r = -.599, p < .01, 1-tailed) (see Table 6.10). 
 
For the effectiveness measure, a less consistent profile was observed across all 
British groups in that specific AM retrieval was positively associated with higher 
effectiveness scores (the nondepressed ruminators: r = .472, p < .05, 1-tailed; the 
depressed distracters: r = .639, p < .01, 1-tailed). In the two British groups, the 
British nondepressed ruminators and the depressed ruminators, there was a 
significant negative correlation found between greater categoric AM retrieval and 
lower effectiveness scores (the nondepressed ruminators: r = -.439, p = .051, 
1-tailed; the depressed distracters: r = -.518, p < .05) (see Table 6.10). 
 
For the Taiwanese participants, all groups again demonstrated a positive 
correlation between specific AM retrieval during SPS and the means produced 
during SPS (the nondepressed ruminators: r = .885, p < .01, 1-tailed; the 
nondepressed distracters: r = .561, p < .05, 1-tailed; the depressed ruminators: r 
= .554, p < .01, 1-tailed; the depressed distracters: r = .658, p < .05, 1-tailed).  
For the effectiveness measure, the pattern was less consistent with only the 
Taiwanese nondepressed ruminators and the Taiwanese depressed ruminators 
showing a positive correlation between specific AM retrieval during SPS and 
greater effectiveness scores (the nondepressed ruminators: r = .733, p < .01, 
1-tailed; the depressed ruminators: r = .530, p < .05, 1-tailed). For categoric AM 
retrieval during SPS, the Taiwanese nondepressed ruminators and the Taiwanese 
depressed distracters produced a negative correlation between the MEPS means 
score and number of categoric AMs retrieved during SPS (the nondepressed 
ruminators: r = -.764, p < .01, 1-tailed; the depressed distracters: r = -.632, p < .01, 
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1-tailed). Similarly on the effectiveness measure, the Taiwanese nondepressed 
ruminators and the Taiwanese depressed ruminators showed a negative correlation 
between the effectiveness scores and numbers of categoric memories retrieved 
(the nondepressed ruminators: r = -.732, p < .01, 1-tailed; the depressed 
ruminators: r = -.495, p < .05, 1-tailed) (see Table 6.11). 
 
Table 6.10 Correlation between SPS and AM Retrieval during SPS (1-tailed) 
in British Group (Depressed Status × Thinking Style) 
 British Nondepressed  British Depressed 
 Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
 Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
 Specific Memory 
MEPS Means score 
MEPS Effectiveness score 
 
 
.270 
.472* 
 
 
.550* 
.102 
 
 
.694** 
.359 
 
.536* 
.639**
 
 Categoric Memory 
MEPS Means score 
MEPS Effectiveness score 
 
 
-.038 
-.439(.051) 
 
 
-.334 
.038 
 
 
-.599** 
-.518*
 
 
-.088 
-.365 
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (1-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (1-tailed). 
 
 
Table 6.11 Correlation between SPS and AM Retrieval during SPS (1-tailed) 
in Taiwanese Group (Depressed Status × Thinking Style) 
 Taiwanese Nondepressed  Taiwanese Depressed 
 Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
 Rumination 
(n = 15) 
Distraction 
(n = 15) 
 Specific Memory 
MEPS Means score 
MEPS Effectiveness score 
 
 
.885** 
.733**
 
 
 
.561* 
.311 
 
 
.554* 
.530*
 
 
.658** 
.216 
 Categoric Memory 
MEPS Means score 
MEPS Effectiveness score 
 
 
-.764** 
-.732**
 
 
 
-.403 
-.308 
 
 
-.267 
-.495* 
 
-.632** 
-.428 
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (1-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (1-tailed). 
 
 
6.4 Discussion 
 
The aim of the present study was to examine how culture influences the 
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effects of thinking style (rumination versus distraction) on SPS performance and 
AM retrieval during SPS process in clinically depressed patients and 
nondepressed controls. In addition, a baseline measure of AMT cueing task 
performance was obtained in order to establish how culture would influence AMT 
cueing task performance prior to the rumination manipulation. 
 
 First consider performance on the AMT that served as the baseline measure 
of AM performance. The results revealed that depressed patients in both Taiwan 
and Britain had more impaired AM retrieval on the AMT cueing task than their 
nondepressed counterparts, as hypothesized. This finding is consistent with 
previous research (Williams & Dritschel, 1988; Goddard et al., 1996) and the 
results of a cross-cultural comparison of AM retrieval on the AMT cueing task 
described in Chapter 5.   
 
Furthermore, a culture by depressed status interaction was found such that the 
British nondepressed participants retrieved more specific AMs as well as less 
categoric AMs than the Taiwanese nondepressed participants. This finding was 
also replicated in the first cross-cultural study in Chapter 5. It seems that the 
Taiwanese nondepressed participants employed a more overgeneral AM retrieval 
style compared to the British nondepressed participants. This phenomenon was 
consistent with a previous cross-cultural investigation of adults’ earliest childhood 
recollections and self-descriptions (Wang, 2001), where the AM recollections of 
Western participants were significantly more specific than the recollections of 
Eastern participants. It is likely that different views of self are driving this pattern 
of retrieval. According to Markus and Kitayama (1991), an interdependent 
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construal of self and the relationship of self and other results in a less elaborated 
self-knowledge schemata as found in Eastern population. By contrast, an 
independent construal of self involves a representation of self that is independent 
and separate from others. In Western culture, the self-schemata associated with an 
independent, autonomous construal of self is very elaborated and interconnected. 
Hence retrieval of self-relevant information is facilitated in western population. 
 
Previous research has demonstrated that Eastern people have a less specific 
AM retrieval style compared to Western people (Wang, 2001). One of the possible 
explanations comes from the investigation on the relationship between social 
interaction and memory development (Mullen & Yi, 1995). Research has 
demonstrated that the development of memory is determined by the nature of 
conversation between adult and child. When conversing with adults, children are 
taught the usefulness of conveying information about personal experience in order 
to meet the requirements of cultural values about issues like socialization. The 
results revealed that Western adults and children engaged in memory talk more 
often than Eastern adults and children in naturally occurring conversation. The 
results supported the theory that early experiences with past events talk influence 
the development of autobiographical memory. Moreover, the content of past event 
talk is associated with cultural values concerning socialization and culture value. 
For example, Western children are encouraged to talk about more personal 
feelings and thoughts in order to develop a strong sense of individuality. They also 
talked more about feelings and thoughts of self and others. Eastern children, on 
the other hand, focus their conversation more on the social role and behavioural 
expectations. Therefore, research has provided some evidence that the AM is 
developed at the stage of encoding process where AM recollection is determined 
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during the process of memory construction. 
 
Furthermore, one conclusion from this study as well as based on previous 
research (Conway & Wang, 2004; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002; Watkins & Teasdale, 
2001) is that there needs to be greater understanding of how culture interacts with 
thinking style manipulations (e.g., rumination) to influence cognitive processing. 
That is, rumination can be investigated in different components such as 
rumination versus distraction, self-focus versus analytic thinking and experiential 
versus analytical self-focus. All these subcomponents of thinking style could be 
influenced by culture. This will be described in the following sections. 
 
Firstly, there are different ways of manipulating thinking style. For example, 
Watkins and Baracaia (2002), they found that by manipulating the awareness of 
mental process (i.e., participants were asked to focus on “how you decide to solve 
a problem”, process-focused questions versus “why you have a problem”, 
state-orientated ruminative questions) whilst engaging in a SPS task significantly 
influenced the SPS performance in depressed people. How culture would interact 
with different rumination subcomponents to influence subsequent cognitive 
processing remains a question.  
 
Moreover, there is evidence from Wang and Conway (2004) such that people 
from different cultures use their memories for different directive functions. For 
example, the Eastern people are more encouraged to learn from their past 
experiences. They tend to engage in self-reflection to cultivate and perfect the self 
and therefore reflect on past mistakes in order to direct future behaviours. A 
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process-focused manipulation would facilitate this type of thinking. In contrast, 
Western people may use their memories for an instrumental purpose to approach 
the problems they are currently facing. It could be that the Eastern people would 
be more responsive to process-focused questions as these questions help them to 
direct the analytical thinking into more instrumental strategies for solving a 
problem. 
 
In addition, previous research has shown that rumination can be investigated 
in terms of two independent components: self-focused and analytic thinking 
(Watkins & Teasdale, 2001). Self-focus refers to “a focus on symptoms and other 
aspects of self-experiences” whereas analytic thinking refers to “an analytical, 
evaluative cognitive style” (see Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, pp. 354). Their result 
demonstrated that these two factors have differential effects on AM retrieval as 
well as SPS. That is, self-focused thinking influences despondent mood whereas 
analytical thinking influences AM specificity respectively. As it has been 
suggested that Easterners are less self-focused than the Westerners, they also have 
more analytic thinking when facing problems and more self-reflection on past 
negative experiences (Wang, 2001; Wang & Conway, 2004). Therefore, it would 
be possible that the individuals from these two cultures would respond differently 
to these two distinct manipulations, as they are different at the baseline levels of 
self-focused and analytical thinking. Moreover, it was suggested that people from 
Western countries and Eastern countries have different ways of self-representation 
and different self-orientation such as independent oriented versus interdependent 
oriented (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Leichtman, Wang, & Pillemer, 2003). 
Moreover, different varieties of ruminative self-focus have distinctive functional 
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properties (Watkins, 2004; Watkins & Teasdale, 2004; Watkins & Moulds, 2005). 
Not only research has demonstrated that focus on the emotional events and 
self-experience can help an individual to improve mental health and lead to more 
effective self-regulation (cf. Watkins, 2004, for a review), but also the self-focused 
attention helps to regulate emotional state (McFarland and Buehler, 1998). And 
further, mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT) helps the depressed patients 
to prevent from relapse (Teasdale et al., 2000). Furthermore, Watkins and Teasdale 
(2004) looked at the effect of manipulating either experiential self-focus (e.g., 
“Focus your attention your experience of the way you feel inside”) or analytical 
self-focus (e.g., “Think about the way you feel inside”) on the AMT performances 
in depressed patients. They found that experiential self-focus manipulation 
significantly reduced the categoric AM retrieval in depressed people pre- to 
post-manipulation. The results suggested that different modes of self-focus have 
differential effect in AM retrieval in depressed people. However, as it has been 
suggested that people in Western countries have more independent self-focus and 
people in Eastern countries have more interdependent self-focus. Eastern people 
also tend to employ self-reflection as a strategy to solve the problems that they are 
facing (Wang & Conway, 2004). It could be that the Eastern people would be 
more sensitive to the experiential self-focused manipulation than the Western 
people. However, there is no clear and direct evidence indicating that these two 
facets of self-focus are identical. Hence the association between this 
independent/interdependent self-focus and the different modes of self-focus (in 
terms of experiential versus analytical) needs to be further investigated. Moreover, 
future research on different dimensions of rumination needs to be explored in 
order to clarify the role of self-focused attention involved in the cognitive process 
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in different countries. 
 
 Unlike Study 3, the interaction between depression and culture in this study 
extended to the clinically depressed samples. In Study 3, a similar pattern of 
categoric and specific AM retrieval was found in the depressed groups from each 
culture such that both retrieved fewer specific AMs and more categoric AMs. In 
this study, the AM retrieval pattern found in the nondepressed controls was 
opposite to that pattern found in the clinically depressed groups. The British 
depressed participants retrieved significantly fewer specific AMs and more 
categoric AMs than their Taiwanese counterparts. In other words, the specific AM 
retrieval of the British depressed participants decreased dramatically compared to 
the British nondepressed participants, whereas this was not observed in the 
Taiwanese group. This inconsistent finding between the two studies may have 
occurred due to a smaller sample size being employed in Study 3. Study 3 
involved 60 participants whilst the present study involved 120 participants, 
rendering it more reliable. The result demonstrated that depression may influence 
the model of working self driving AM retrieval in different ways, depending on 
culture. That is, with greater depression the Western individuals are probably 
activating more global negative emotional AMs of themselves. In contrast, 
depression may make individuals from the East more focused on themselves in a 
negative way which is manifested in their retrieval of specific instances of 
negative experience or negative emotion. 
 
Interestingly, while culture interacted with depression on the AMT cueing task, 
the SPS performance as well as the AM retrieval during SPS showed more 
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cross-cultural consistency. For the two measures of MEPS performance, means 
and effectiveness, there was only an interaction for depressed status and thinking 
style. Consistent with previous research (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; 
Lyubomirsky et al., 1999), the depressed ruminators from both countries 
performed significantly poorer than the depressed distracters and their 
nondepressed counterparts. There were no cultural differences in terms of main 
effects or interactions on the two measures of the MEPS. This failure to find 
cross-cultural differences is consistent with Chang’s findings (1998, 2001) 
showing that culture does not influence SPS performance. The failure to find 
cross-cultural differences extends the findings of Chang by demonstrating a lack 
of difference using a qualitative measure of SPS performance in addition to the 
quantitative, process measure administered by Chang (1998). At it has been 
indicated by D’Zurilla, Nezu, and Maydeu-Olivares (2004) that there are two 
different SPS measures: the process measure and the outcome measure. Process 
measures refer to the evaluation of one’s strength or weakness such as attitudes or 
skills of solving social problems; whereas outcome measures refer to the 
assessment of one’s performance to a specific social problem. As Chang’s study 
(1998) used the SPSI-R, which is regarded as a process measure and the MEPS 
used in the present studies in this thesis, which is categorized as an outcome 
measure (cf. D’Zurilla et al., 2004). Taken the results from Chang (1998) and the 
Study 4 in this thesis together, the reason of this inconsistent result might be that 
people from Eastern culture and Western culture respond differently on the 
process measure. It might be that people from different cultures have different 
problem orientations; they might also employ different skills to approach a social 
problem. The reason why there was a cultural difference in Chang’s study using 
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the SPSI-R is because the process measure is more sensitive to cross-cultural 
differences. However, in the present study the MEPS was administered to measure 
SPS. As the hypothetical problems in the MEPS can happen in the real-life 
situation in any cultures, thus an effective solution represents a good SPS ability 
in each culture. The reason for not replicating the previous finding by Chang 
(1998) might be due to the different SPS measurement used, which measure 
different aspects of SPS ability. 
 
 The failure to find differences on AM retrieval during SPS is in marked 
contrast to the AM differences observed on the AMT cueing task. There was 
neither a main effect of culture nor any interactions in respect of culture. These 
results suggested that depressed participants retrieved more categoric AMs as well 
as fewer specific AMs during SPS than the nondepressed participants. In addition, 
the ruminators from both countries had significantly more categoric AMs as well 
as fewer specific AMs than the distracters. It seems that cultural impact was no 
longer observed when the thinking style was manipulated. However, as there was 
no manipulation of the rumination before administering the AMT cueing task, it is 
difficult to ascertain whether the effects are due to the manipulation or to the task.  
With respect to the AMT cueing task and AM retrieval during SPS, a dual-task 
paradigm has suggested that different cognitive demands are involved in these two 
memory retrieval tasks. Goddard et al. (1998) investigated the effect of cognitive 
load on AM retrieval by manipulating the level of difficulty in a secondary task 
conducted concurrently with a primary task (i.e., one is the AMT cueing task, the 
other is a AM retrieval during the MEPS). They found that the AM retrieval 
during SPS was interfered with by both of the secondary tasks. On the other hand, 
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the AM retrieval on the AMT cueing task was only interfered with by the difficult 
dual-task. This result suggested that AM cueing Task makes fewer demand. Using 
a rumination manipulation with both the AMT and AM retrieval during SPS 
would help to resolve this issue. 
 
Another difference between the two tasks is that the AMT cueing task requires 
individuals to retrieve AMs to emotional cue words. There is some evidence that 
there is cross-cultural variation in emotional processing. For example, Wang 
(2001) has demonstrated that, in contrast to the Easterners, the Westerners 
provided more emotionally elaborated AM recollections. They also rated their 
memories more positive or more negative rather than neutral; and their AM 
recollections were of higher emotional intensity. Wang also argued that emotion 
serves different functions in Western people and Eastern people. Western people 
are encouraged to express their feelings and emotion in order to affirm the 
importance of self. In contrast, Eastern people are encouraged to inhibit their 
emotional expression as this might be regarded as disruptive to interpersonal 
relationship. Thus it needs to be strictly controlled. 
 
When the association between SPS and AM retrieval during SPS was 
examined through a correlation analysis, there did seem to be some subtle 
suggestion of a cultural impact. The result for the British group showed that 
specific AM retrieval during SPS was significantly positively associated with both 
the MEPS means score and the MEPS effectiveness score. However, the 
significant negative association between the categoric AM retrieval and the two 
MEPS scores was only found in the depressed ruminators. As for the Taiwanese 
183  
group, both the specific AM retrieval and the categoric AM retrieval during the 
SPS demonstrate significant association with SPS performance in all groups. 
Specific AM retrieval was positively associated with both means and effectiveness 
scores while categoric AM retrieval was negatively associated with these 
performance indices. Taking the two results together, culture seems to interact 
with depression in different ways for the ruminators and distracters respectively. 
The British depressed samples seem to be differentially responsive to the 
rumination and distraction manipulations whereas these manipulations are having 
less discriminating effects in the Taiwanese sample. It could be that the 
rumination manipulation is more likely to affect a well-constructed independent 
self-construal system manifested by Western participants. 
 
 One conclusion from this work is that there needs to be greater understanding 
of how culture interacts with thinking style manipulations to influence cognitive 
processing. There are different ways of manipulating thinking style. For example, 
Watkins and Baracaia (2002), they found that by manipulating the awareness of 
mental process (i.e., participants were asked to focus on “how you decide to solve 
a problem”, process-focused questions versus “why you have a problem”, 
state-orientated ruminative questions) whilst engaging in a SPS task significantly 
influenced the SPS performance in depressed people. How culture would interact 
with different rumination subcomponents to influence subsequent cognitive 
processing remains a question. However, there is evidence from Wang and 
Conway (2004) such that people from different cultures use their memories for 
different directive functions. For example, the Eastern people are more 
encouraged to learn from their past experiences. They tend to engage in 
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self-reflection to cultivate and perfect the self and therefore reflect on past 
mistakes in order to direct future behaviours. A process-focused manipulation 
would facilitate this type of thinking. In contrast, Western people may use their 
memories for an instrumental purpose to approach the problems they are currently 
facing. It could be that the Eastern people would be more responsive to a 
process-focused questions as this questions help them to direct the analytical 
thinking into more instrumental strategies for solving a problem. 
 
In addition, previous research has shown that rumination can be investigated 
in terms of two independent components: self-focused and analytic thinking 
(Watkins & Teasdale, 2001). Self-focus refers to “a focus on symptoms and other 
aspects of self-experiences” whereas analytic thinking refers to “an analytical, 
evaluative cognitive style” (see Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, pp. 354). Their result 
demonstrated that these two factors have differential effects on AM retrieval as 
well as SPS. That is, self-focused thinking influences despondent mood whereas 
analytical thinking influences AM specificity respectively. As it has been 
suggested that Easterners are less self-focused than the Westerners, they also have 
more analytic thinking when facing problems and more self-reflection on past 
negative experiences (Wang, 2001; Wang & Conway, 2004). Therefore, it would 
be possible that the individuals from these two cultures would respond differently 
to these two distinct manipulations, as they are different at the baseline levels of 
self-focused and analytical thinking. Moreover, it was suggested that people from 
Western countries and Eastern countries have different ways of self-representation 
and different self-orientation such as independent oriented versus interdependent 
oriented (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Leichtman et al., 2003). Moreover, different 
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varieties of ruminative self-focus have distinctive functional properties (Watkins, 
2004; Watkins & Teasdale, 2004; Watkins & Moulds, 2005). Not only research 
has demonstrated that focus on the emotional events and self-experience can help 
an individual to improve mental health and lead to more effective self-regulation 
(cf. Watkins, 2004, for a review), but also the self-focused attention helps to 
regulate emotional state (McFarland and Buehler, 1998). And further, 
mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT) helps the depressed patients to 
prevent from relapse (Teasdale et al., 2000). Furthermore, Watkins and Teasdale 
(2004) looked at the effect of experiential self-focus (e.g., “Focus your attention 
your experience of the way you feel inside”) and analytical self-focus (e.g., 
“Think about the way you feel inside”) on the AMT performances in depressed 
patients. They found that experiential self-focus manipulation significantly 
reduced the categoric AM retrieval in depressed people pre- to post-manipulation. 
The results suggested that different modes of self-focus have differential effect in 
AM retrieval in depressed people. However, as it has been suggested that people 
in Western countries have more independent self-focus and people in Eastern 
countries have more interdependent self-focus. Eastern people also tend to employ 
self-reflection as a strategy to solve the problems that they are facing. It could be 
that the Eastern people would be more sensitive to the experiential self-focused 
manipulation than the Western people. The association between this independent 
self-focus versus interdependent self-focus and the different modes of self-focus 
in terms of experiential versus analytical needs to be further investigated. Future 
research on different dimensions of rumination is needed to be explored in order 
to clarify the role of self-focused attention involved in the cognitive process in 
different countries. 
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To sum up, there seems to be complex relationship between depression, 
culture and cognitive processing. When no thinking style manipulation is 
administered, there seems to be evidence of cross-cultural differences in AM 
retrieval. These differences seem to disappear with a rumination manipulation. 
More work needs to focus on how thinking styles interact with culture to 
influence cognitive processing. Such work is key in understanding how the 
self-schema operates in depression. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
7.1 Overview 
 
As it has been reviewed in Chapter 1, plenty of research has suggested that 
there is an association between thinking style (in terms of rumination and 
distraction), AM retrieval and SPS performance in depression. Rumination leads 
to more dysfunctional categoric AM retrieval as well as poorer SPS performance 
in depressed people (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993; 
Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993; Watkins et al., 2000). However, no work has 
examined how thinking style influences AM retrieval in SPS. Furthermore, the 
way in which culture would interact with depression to influence SPS and AM 
retrieval during SPS has never been examined in this area. Therefore, the main 
aim of this thesis is twofold. Firstly, it will consider the role of rumination in SPS 
performance and AM retrieval during SPS. Secondly, it will examine how culture 
influences some aspects of cognitive processing in depression, notably AM 
retrieval and SPS performance. Depression is a universal mental disorder and 
there is a great deal of research about the epidemiology across cultures (Davidson 
& Neal, 2001). Research using depressed patients from a Western background 
shows that they manifest deficits in AM retrieval and SPS (Goddard et al., 1996; 
Williams & Dritschel, 1992; Williams & Scott, 1988). Little research has been 
conducted to see if these biases are culturally invariant. 
 
Moreover, the cognitive mechanism underpinning this mood disturbance has 
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not been investigated from a cross-cultural perspective. Although it has been 
pointed out that it is of great importance to analyze and to interpret the findings of 
cross-cultural study in terms of both pan-cultural consistencies and cross-cultural 
differences (Mauro, Sato, & Tucker, 1992), there are few studies in this area. In 
this thesis, both accounts were taken into consideration and findings of the two 
cross-cultural studies will be interpreted in the following sections. 
 
Study 1 (Chapter 3) examined the effect of rumination versus distraction on 
SPS ability and AM retrieval during the SPS process in a dysphoric university 
student sample. Study 2 (Chapter 4) used identical procedures to further 
investigate the association between these factors in a clinically depressed group. 
The results taken from Study 1 and Study 2 provided an opportunity to clarify the 
possible mechanism of thinking style on SPS process and AM retrieval during 
SPS. Moreover, the comparison between these two studies also allows an 
examination of the role that level of mood severity plays in this process. Study 3 
(Chapter 5) and Study 4 (Chapter 6) were cross-cultural studies. Study 3 
investigated cross-cultural differences in AM retrieval on the AMT cueing task in 
depressed people as a function of depression between Taiwanese and British 
(Eastern culture versus Western culture). In this study, the theories of central 
executive capacity and working self are considered in explaining the differences 
in AM retrieval in these two samples. The results from Study 4 investigated the 
influence of culture, depression, and thinking style on two other cognitive 
processes: SPS ability and AM retrieval during SPS. The main findings from the 
studies in this thesis will be discussed comprehensively in the following sections. 
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7.2 Summary and Implication of Main Findings 
 
This thesis makes an attempt to elucidate the causal role of rumination and 
distraction in SPS as well as in AM retrieval during SPS. A linkage between 
cognitive measures (i.e., AM retrieval and thinking styles) and behaviour 
measures (SPS) was built. The main findings will be presented in the following 
paragraphs in the following sequences: (1) AM retrieval on the AMT, without the 
influence of thinking style manipulation, (2) SPS performance (in terms of 
relevant means and effectiveness of solutions), (3) AM retrieval during SPS (a 
spontaneous memory recollection) after receiving a thinking style manipulation. 
The implications of cross-cultural studies will also be introduced. 
 
7.2.1 Findings of AM Retrieval on the AMT 
 
7.2.1.1 AM Retrieval in terms of Specific and Categoric 
 
A consistent finding was observed throughout the studies in this thesis. That is, 
both dysphoric and depressed samples demonstrated fewer specific AM retrieval 
and more categoric AM retrieval on the AMT cueing task than their nondysphoric 
and nondepressed counterparts. These results replicated previous research that 
depressed mood has a detrimental effect on the specificity of AM retrieval on the 
AMT cueing task (Williams & Scott, 1988; Williams & Dritschel, 1992). A great 
deal of evidence has demonstrated that both clinically depressed individuals and 
remitted depressed individuals (who are not currently experiencing any depressed 
mood or meeting the clinically diagnostic criteria of depression) have difficulties 
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in retrieving a specific AM whilst being required to do so (Brittlebank et al., 1993; 
Mackinger et al., 2000; Williams & Dritschel, 1988). 
 
According to Beck’s Schema theory (see Section 1.1.2.1 for a review), mood 
disturbance is the result of an interaction between negative cognitions and 
external stressful events. According to the differential activating hypothesis by 
Teasdale (1988), there is an association between a negative thinking pattern and 
depressed mood. This association is maintained by a reciprocal loop such that a 
negative thinking pattern is activated by the negative mood and the negative mood 
in turn strengthens the negative thinking pattern. This negative thinking pattern is 
repeatedly activated by stressful events and it becomes more and more sensitive to 
the external challenges, thus less and less negative impact is required to induce a 
negative mood. This provides some evidence that dysphoric and depressed 
individuals might be distinct from each other in their cognitive processing, such as 
the types of negative thinking pattern. For example, the depressed people may 
have a more global, negative and self-referent thinking style than dysphoric and 
nondepressed people. 
 
Cognitive processing in dysphoric and depressed people has never been 
examined within one study. However, the results of Study 1 and Study 2 in this 
thesis show that these two groups did demonstrate similar AM retrieval style (i.e., 
they retrieved fewer specific AMs and more categoric AMs than healthy controls). 
Moreover, our data from Study 1 and Study 2 also allowed us to determine if 
differences in specificity existed between our non-clinically dysphoric group and 
the clinically depressed group. An analysis comparing levels of specificity 
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between the dysphoric group and the clinically depressed group revealed that the 
dysphoric group produced more specific AMs (t(58) = 24.357, p < .01) and fewer 
categoric AMs (t(58) = -17.169, p < .01) than the clinically depressed group did. 
This finding provided a further confirmation that dysphoric individuals had a 
different degree of AM specificity on the AMT cueing task when compared to the 
clinically depressed patients. A preliminary conclusion was made such that the 
specificity of AM retrieval is a function of the severity of depressed mood in 
terms of dysphoria and depression. However, there is a confounding variable that 
the two groups are different in their age and educational years. That is, the 
dysphoric students are younger and have more years of education than the 
clinically depressed patients group. We cannot conclude that the difference in AM 
retrieval between dysphoric and depressed groups is exclusively due to different 
levels of mood severity. As it has been pointed out in a review paper by Williams, 
Barnhofer, Crane, Hermans, Raes, Watkins, and Dalgleish (2006), IQ, educational 
years and other variables, such as processing speed and semantic fluency, need to 
be considered when studying AM retrieval in different groups. In order to 
elucidate the association between AM specificity and level of mood severity, 
further studies are called for, in which these two potential confounding variables 
are controlled. 
 
Culture seems to have a pronounced effect on AM retrieval elicited from AMT 
in two cross-cultural studies (Study 3 and Study 4). The depressed groups from 
Taiwan and Britain produced fewer specific AMs and more categoric AMs than 
their nondepressed counterparts. This result revealed that depression has a 
universally detrimental effect to the AM retrieval on the AMT cueing task. This 
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result indicated that the central executive capacity is hindered by depression in 
both countries. Thus, they demonstrated a deficient AM retrieval strategy than that 
in nondepressed people. 
 
In the nondepressed groups, a consistent finding was found between these two 
cross-cultural studies. The British nondepressed group had more specific AM 
retrieval and fwer categoric AM retrieval than their Taiwanese counterparts. This 
result replicated Wang’s finding that Western people are more specific in their AM 
recollections than Eastern people. Interestingly, across the two cross-cultural 
studies, the pattern of AM retrieval on the AMT cueing task was different in terms 
of differences between the depressed groups. In Study 3, the results of 
independent sample t-test revealed that the depressed Taiwanese did not differ 
from the depressed British in their specific AMs as well as categoric AMs on the 
AMT. This result demonstrated that depression overrides the effect of culture on 
their AM recollections. One possibility for this phenomenon was that the 
decreased central executive capacity was responsible for the overgeneral AM 
retrieval in both cultures. It has been indicated by Dalgleish et al. (2007) that the 
overgeneral AM retrieval on the AMT is associated with an impaired central 
executive control. Moreover, Markus and Kitayama (1991) have proposed that the 
way in which people experience and express their emotion is influenced by their 
memory system (see Section 5.4 for a review). In this case, it seems that the 
intense negative emotion (clinical depression) wipes out the cultural effect for the 
AM retrieval in these two ethnic groups. However, a culture by depressed status 
interaction was also observed such that the British nondepressed had more 
specific AMs than the Taiwanese nondepressed participants (see Chapter 5 & 6). 
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On the other hand, the British depressed participants had fewer specific AMs and 
more categoric AMs than the Taiwanese depressed participants (see Chapter 6). 
The decreased central executive capacity hypothesis fails to explain this more 
complex observed phenomenon. It could possibly be that the different working 
selves are involved in this AM retrieval process across two countries. According 
to Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000), the working self is grounded in the AM in 
terms of the ranges and types of goals a person holds (see Section 1.2.2.3). The 
construction and processing of AM recollections are determined by the working 
self, and the working self is influenced by the interaction of the self-schema and 
external environment. For example, as research has demonstrated, Western culture 
is characterized by the independent view of self whereas the Eastern culture is 
characterized by the interdependent view of self (see Section 1.2.2.3 for a detailed 
description). Furthermore, it was suggested by Wang (2001) that the AM 
recollections in Westerners were more specific, self-focused, emotionally 
elaborated and lengthier than the AM recollections in the Easterners (see Section 
5.1). Hence, AM strategy will definitely be influenced by culture through the 
different working self, which is shaped in different cultures. More recently, some 
research also demonstrated that the specific AM recall is associated with more 
differential affect-related self-representations (Ramponi et al., 2004). 
 
With regard to the AM retrieval, difference was not observed between the 
Taiwanese depressed group and the British depressed group in the first 
cross-cultural study (see Chapter 5). Firstly the sample characteristics of the two 
Taiwanese depressed participants were examined using an independent sample 
t-test. There was no significant difference between ages (t(43) = -.021, p > .05), 
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years of education (t(43) = 1.553, p > .05) and the BDI scores (t(43) = .766, p 
> .05) between the two Taiwanese depressed samples (in Study 3 and Study 4). 
Thus the non-parallel finding between these two cross-cultural studies cannot be 
attributed to the differences in sample characteristics. One speculation for this 
inconsistent finding would be the smaller sample size used in the first 
cross-cultural study. Thus a type II error was considered to influence the 
interpretation of the findings (Williams et al., 2005, pp. 429). 
 
7.2.1.2 Qualitative Analysis in terms of Autonomous Orientation and 
Self-other Ratio 
 
According to Markus and Kitayama (1991), there are major differences 
between the self-construals of Western individuals and Eastern individuals, which 
are influenced by an independent view of self and an interdependent view of self 
respectively. A qualitative analysis of the AM recollections in terms of 
autonomous orientation and self-other ratio in Chapter 5 (Study 3, the first 
cross-cultural study) was conducted to verify these differences. Content analysis 
of AM retrievals provided preliminary evidence that these different self-construals 
exist. People from a Western culture are more autonomously oriented than people 
from an Eastern culture. In addition, people from a Western culture are also more 
self-focused (i.e., they revealed more self-related information than other-related 
information in their AM protocols on the AMT) than people from an Eastern 
culture. The results verify that the construction of the self-schema is a function of 
culture. 
 
Furthermore, when the correlation between AM retrieval on the AMT and the 
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two qualitative measures were examined, a double dissociation between the 
specificity of AM retrieval and autonomous orientation or self-other ratio was 
revealed between the Taiwanese and the British depressed groups. As has been 
indicated in Chapter 5, when the British depressed participants were more 
autonomously orientated, they also generated less categoric AM recollections. In 
contrast, the more the Taiwanese depressed participants mentioned themselves in 
their AM recollections, the more specific AMs and the fewer categoric AMs they 
produced on the AMT. It seems that for the Taiwanese depressed people, the 
specificity of AM on the AMT is associated with the degree of self-focus. The 
more autonomous the British depressed people were, the less categoric AMs they 
retrieved on the AMT. The results suggest that AM specificity serves different 
functions in depressed people in different cultures to influence their cognitive 
styles (i.e., autonomous orientation and self-other ratio). As to the Taiwanese 
depressed people, this self-focused style may make it more difficult for them to fit 
into their society, in which an interdependent view of self is emphasized. As to the 
British depressed people, it seems that the depressed status influences both their 
autonomous orientation and the categoric AMs on the AMT. 
 
The findings of the association between the BDI score and the autonomous 
orientation tendency provided evidence that, in the case of the British depressed 
people, as their depression increased, so their autonomous orientation decreased. 
However, this preliminary finding was based on a relatively small sample size and 
so it needs to be replicated in future studies. 
 
7.2.1.3 Role of Emotional Stimulus in the AMT  
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Another possible reason for the observed cross-cultural differences on the 
AMT cueing task is that emotional cue words were employed. Wang (2001) 
indicated that the Westerners provided more recollections of high emotional 
intensity in their protocols than the Easterners. Moreover, the Westerners in this 
study were more likely to spontaneously mention feelings and emotions in their 
protocols. They also rated their recollections more positively or more negatively 
in contrast to the Easterners. The Easterners, in contrast, tended to rate their 
recollections neutrally. It seemed that the Westerners are more emotionally 
elaborated and more sensitive to emotional materials than the Easterners. 
 
It was demonstrated that different types of emotional stimuli (i.e., 
nonverbal cues, such as emotional faces, affective images; verbal cues such as 
emotional words) have consistent impact on the retrieval of personal memories 
(Ridout, 2004; Ridout et al., 2003). 
 
In cross-cultural studies of AM retrieval on the AMT in this thesis, an 
interesting phenomenon was observed such that British nondepressed participants 
retrieved more specific AMs than Taiwanese nondepressed participants did. One 
implication indicated by the results was the cross-cultural difference of the AM 
retrieval on the AMT. It was suggested that Western people had more emotionally 
elaborated AM retrievals compared to the Eastern people (Wang, 2001). In the 
AMT, emotional cue words are used which are self-focused in nature. Thus the 
British nondepressed participants are more responsive to these self-focused 
emotional cue words, which offered them a richer database to generate an AM in 
their past. However, a reversed pattern was found such that the British depressed 
participants had less specific AMs than Taiwanese depressed participants (see 
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Section 5.4 for a review). As Markus and Kitayama suggested, the way in which 
people experience and express their emotions is influenced by their self-construals, 
which are distinctively influenced by cultures. Matsumoto et al. also argued that 
the Westerners attend to more self-focused emotions such as joy, sadness, anger, 
and fear than the Easterners. From previous research, it was speculated that one 
possibility for this reversed phenomenon is that British people are more sensitive 
to emotionally elaborated materials, such as emotional words used in the AMT 
cueing task. The emotional cue words used in the AMT are self-focused emotional 
cue words such as happy, sad, angry. Thus, the emotional cue words have a 
particularly strong impact on the British depressed participants. Hence, the 
specific AM retrieval of British people decreased more dramatically when they 
became depressed, in comparison with Taiwanese people. As suggested in Chapter 
5, a memory retrieval task using neutral words would be helpful to clarify the role 
that emotion plays in memory processing between people from a Western culture 
and a Eastern culture. It would also help to investigate whether this different AM 
retrieval style still exists when the emotion variable is controlled.  
 
7.2.2 Role of Rumination in SPS and AM Retrieval during SPS 
 
A great deal of evidence has indicated that rumination can influence cognitive 
performance on tasks such as SPS and AM retrieval in depressed people. With 
respect to the relationship between rumination and SPS, as indicated in the 
introduction, rumination can influence SPS in depressed people (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1991; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993). 
Depressed people who were requested to focus on their thoughts, feelings and 
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possible causes and consequences of these thoughts and feelings would 
demonstrate poorer SPS performance (i.e., they tended to produced less relevant 
means and their solutions were less effective) when compared to the depressed 
people who were requested to distract themselves from their thoughts and feelings 
(Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Lyubomirsky et al., 1999). Other 
studies have shown that rumination also influences AM retrieval in depressed and 
dysphoric people (Lyubomirsky et al., 1998; Watkins et al., 2000). For example, 
depressed and dysphoric people who ruminate come up with more categoric AMs 
on the AMT, or they generate more negative AMs in a free recall task than the 
distracters. Furthermore, there is also evidence that AM retrieval during SPS 
influences SPS performance (Goddard et al., 1996). However, there is no clear 
evidence that rumination influences AM retrieval during SPS, which in turn could 
influence SPS performance. The results of two studies (i.e., the Study 1 using 
dysphoric sample and the Study 2 using a clinically depressed sample) provided 
data to answer this question. 
 
In the dysphoric sample, rumination was found to influence one of the MEPS 
measures: the MEPS effectiveness score but not the MEPS means score. However, 
rumination had no significant influence on AM retrieval during SPS. In the 
clinically depressed group, the effect of rumination was more pronounced than the 
effect in the dysphoric sample such that rumination significantly influenced SPS 
performance on both measures of the MEPS: number of relevant means and 
effectiveness of solutions. Moreover, rumination also influenced AM retrieval 
during SPS such that the ruminators had significantly fewer specific AMs and 
more categoric AMs during SPS than the distracters. Considered together, the 
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results of these two studies demonstrated that rumination interacts with mood 
severity (in terms of dysphoria and depression) to influence SPS performance and 
AM retrieval during SPS. Williams et al. (2005) tested a Differential Activation 
Theory in formerly depressed patients with a suicide ideation (MDD -suic) by 
examining their SPS and AM retrieval pre- and post- negative mood induction. 
The negative mood induction was manipulated prior to performing the MEPS and 
the AMT cueing task by asking the participants to listen to sad music and to read 
the cards containing sad statements such as “There are things about me that I 
don’t like”. Their mood ratings were taken by using the visual analogue scales 
(VAS; each 10 centimetres in length). It was shown that the mood ratings of the 
MDD –suic group were significantly worse than the control group after the 
negative mood induction. The AMT cueing task and the MEPS were used to 
examine the specificity of AMs as well as SPS ability. They found that previously 
suicidal patients did not show impairment on the number of relevant means on the 
MEPS performance following mood challenge. However, they did demonstrate 
impairment in another measurement of the MEPS: effectiveness of solutions 
following mood challenge. Taken together with their previous findings with 
suicidal patients (Pollock & Williams, 2001), the AM specificity was correlated 
more highly with MEPS effectiveness scores than the MEPS means scores.  
 
One of the possible explanations that the authors made to this puzzle was 
based on the differential activation model. According to this model, mood 
challenge reactivates negative thinking, which in turn impedes SPS performance. 
It could be that effectiveness is more sensitive to the reactivated negative thinking 
pattern. That is, mood challenge leading to a more internally focused, ruminative 
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processing style that has a stronger effect on effectiveness index in contrast to 
relevant means index. 
 
In conclusion, rumination has no significant effect on the cognitive processing 
in the dysphoric group. In contrast, rumination does show strong influence on SPS 
through the dysfunctional categoric AM retrieval during SPS. Mechanisms 
involved in SPS are quite complex and warrant further investigation. 
 
There is consistent evidence that rumination influenced AM retrieval and SPS 
in clinically depressed people (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1993, Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993). With respect to SPS and AM 
retrieval during SPS, the culture no longer affected either of these cognitive 
measures after the thinking style manipulation was conducted. As has been 
indicated in the Discussion of Chapter 6 (Section 6.4), with regard to SPS 
performance, there was an interaction between thinking style and depressed status 
on SPS performance. The depressed ruminators performed more poorly on SPS 
than the depressed distracters and nondepressed controls. The results suggested 
that depressed individuals do show some pan-culture consistencies in their 
cognitive performance. The depressed individuals demonstrated SPS deficits 
regardless of culture, though their solutions to hypothetical problem situation may 
be varied according to the different culture they are from. Moreover, the effective 
solutions should be culture-specific as the solutions were evaluated within a 
cultural construct, which means that one effective solution to a hypothetical 
problem situation in one culture will not necessarily be still effective in another 
culture. It is of great interest to look at the pan-culture similarity as well as the 
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cross-cultural discrepancies on their SPS performance in future studies.  
 
With regard to AM retrieval during SPS, the pan-culture consistency was 
again observed such that the depressed participants and the ruminators from both 
countries demonstrated a dysfunctional AM retrieval during SPS. This result, 
concerning AM retrieval during SPS, was different from the results on the AMT 
cueing task, which did show cross-cultural difference. There are at least two 
possible explanations for this discrepancy. One of the possible explanations for 
this non-parallel finding was that the two AM tasks are distinct from each other in 
nature. Previous research has suggested that these two memory tasks are 
distinctive in their cognitive load (Goddard et al., 1998). The AMT cueing task is 
less resource demanding, as only emotional cue words are involved, whereas AM 
retrieval during SPS is more resource demanding, as a more complex problem 
situation is involved. The other possibilities could be the effect of thinking style 
manipulation involved (rumination versus distraction). The effect of culture no 
longer holds after the rumination manipulation. It was speculated that rumination 
interacted with the different working selves (which are presumed to be different in 
baseline levels of self-focus) and wiped out the culture influence. Hence, the 
individuals did not show different AM retrieval strategies in their SPS process. 
 
Research focusing on the association between rumination and SPS, as well as 
AM retrieval during SPS in depressed people, has not yielded strong evidence. As 
was indicated in the previous research, rumination is not a unitary phenomenon 
(Watkins & Teasdale, 2001). Watkins and Teasdale investigated the influence of 
two different components of rumination on AM retrieval in depression. These two 
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components are termed analytic thinking and self-focused thinking. The results 
demonstrated that these two components were found to have differential influence 
on mood and AM retrieval such that self-focused thinking is associated with 
depressed mood whereas analytic thinking is associated with AM retrieval 
independently. As was demonstrated in the previous studies, that rumination has 
significant influence on AM retrieval and SPS in depressed people. Thus it was 
speculated that these two different components might influence AM retrieval 
during SPS distinctly, which in turn affects the SPS performance in depressed 
people. It would be worth identifying further the role of self-focus and analytic 
thinking in AM retrieval during SPS and SPS performance.  
 
Previous research has discussed different functions of state-oriented 
rumination and process-focused rumination in depressed people (Kuhl, 1981, 
1994; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002). A state-oriented rumination involved analysis 
and evaluation of past experience to generate alternatives to solve a problem, and 
this preoccupation further inhibited individuals from taking new actions to solve a 
problem. In contrast, a process-focused rumination involved effective 
self-monitoring and direction of the reflective thoughts into actions towards a 
problem (Watkins & Baracaia, 2002). Recent findings have also revealed that a 
process-focused rumination is helpful in increasing the mental processing in 
depressed people by asking them to focus on the moment-to-moment experience, 
thus in turn improving their SPS performance. Whereas a state-oriented 
rumination is detrimental, such that it impairs SPS performance in the recovered 
depressed people (Watkins & Baracaia, 2002). The causal role of rumination and 
its subcomponents in cognitive process needs to be further explored in the future. 
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7.2.3 Association between SPS Performance and AM Retrieval during SPS 
 
It was indicated in previous research that SPS performance is associated with 
the types of AM retrieval during SPS, such that the categoric AM was found to 
contribute to poor SPS in depression (Goddard et al., 1996). Taking the results 
from studies using dysphoric and depressed groups together, a consistent 
association was observed in overall participants such that SPS performance (in 
terms of means and effectiveness) was significantly positively correlated with 
specific AM retrieval during SPS. A significant negative correlation was found 
between SPS performance and categoric AM retrieval during SPS. The only 
exception was that in the Study 1 (in the total sample of 60 participants), only 
significant correlations were found between the specific and categoric AMs 
retrieval during SPS and the MEPS effectiveness score but not for the means score. 
It warrants noting that there is a possibility of overestimating the association 
between MEPS performance and AM retrieval during SPS due to Type I error 
arising from conducting multiple correlations. 
 
The differential activation theory (Teasdale, 1988) might offer some possible 
explanations for this selective association between the two different MEPS 
measures and AM retrieval during SPS. The differential activation theory 
suggested that the association between negative thinking and depressed mood is 
maintained through a reciprocal loop such that negative mood leads to negative 
thinking and vice versa. The severity of depression is determined by the types of 
negative thinking patterns. The depressed individuals hold a more negative, global, 
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and self-referent dysfunctional thinking pattern than that in nondepressed 
individuals. This dysfunctional thinking pattern is activated and strengthened 
through the low mood that is triggered by the external stressful events. Hence, less 
stress is required to trigger or worsen the depressed mood in the depressed 
individuals, in contrast to nondepressed individuals. Also, this detrimental process 
becomes more and more autonomous with the increasing episodes of depression 
(Lau & McMain, 2005; Lau et al., 2004; Williams et al., 2005). Research has also 
demonstrated that formerly depressed patients showed reactivated negative 
thinking patterns after mood challenge (Lau et al., 2004). Given that rumination is 
one form of mood challenge (i.e., the mood rating becomes worse after the 
rumination manipulation, see sections relating to manipulation check in this 
thesis), it reactivates the negative thinking pattern in depressed individuals that 
can, in turn, worsen their SPS performance and AM retrieval during SPS. It has 
been proposed that the two MEPS measures are distinctly influenced by the 
reactivation of negative thinking pattern (Pollock & Williams, 2001; Williams et 
al., 2005). In Williams et al., (2005), the results demonstrated that, although the 
MDD -suic patients remained able to produce some relevant means toward a 
problem solution, in contrast, the effectiveness measure was more easily 
interfered with by mood challenge. It was argued that effectiveness measure was 
more sensitive to the reactivation of the negative thinking pattern following mood 
challenge, in which an internally focused, ruminative strategy is involved. As can 
be seen in Pollock and Williams (2001), memory specificity was correlated more 
highly with the effectiveness score than with the number of means score (Pollock 
& Williams, 2001). It seems that there are different mechanisms involved in these 
two MEPS measures, relevant means and effectiveness. 
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Furthermore, when further examination was done on the association between 
SPS and AM retrieval during SPS between the dysphoric/depressed versus 
nondysphoric/nondepressed and rumination/distraction groups, a mixed picture 
was presented. First of all, in the dysphoric/nondysphoric sample (Study 1), only a 
significant negative correlation was found between the SPS and categoric AM 
retrieval in the dysphoric group. Secondly, in the depressed/nondepressed sample 
(Study 2), specific AM retrieval was found to be associated with MEPS means 
score or/and MEPS effectiveness score in four groups (i.e., the 
nondepressed/depressed ruminators and distracters). However, categoric AM 
retrieval was only found to be associated with MEPS scores in the depressed 
ruminators. The implication from these two studies was that specific AM enhance 
the SPS in four groups whereas the deteriorated SPS in the depressed ruminators 
was mediated by the categoric AM during SPS. It showed a particularly negative 
effect of categoric AM retrieval on SPS.  
 
Taking the results from Study 1 and Study 2 together, the discrepancies 
between the results of association between SPS and AM retrieval during SPS can 
provide further evidence for the differential activation hypothesis. Only categoric 
AM retrieval was found to be associated with SPS performance in the dysphoric 
group. It could be that the thinking pattern of the dysphoric individuals is less 
impaired and less negative so that the reactivation of negative thinking by 
rumination has a less detrimental effect on both their SPS performance and AM 
retrieval during SPS. In contrast, rumination has a greater negative influence in 
depressed individuals on their SPS performance and AM retrieval during SPS. It 
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could be that depressed individuals have more a dysfunctional thinking pattern 
and this pattern is more sensitive to mood challenge (e.g., rumination). Thus, both 
the SPS performance and AM retrieval during SPS were more impaired compared 
to the other three groups. A more significant association was also found between 
both specific and categoric AM retrieval and the SPS performance.  
 
As has been reviewed in Chapter 6 (Section 6.4), culture interacted with 
depression and thinking style to influence the association between SPS and AM 
retrieval during SPS. More specifically examined, a double disassociation was 
found in the British depressed groups such that the specific AM retrieval during 
SPS was positively associated with SPS performance in the British depressed 
distracters. On the other hand, the categoric AM retrieval during SPS was 
negatively associated with SPS performance in the British depressed ruminators. 
The results suggested that the impeded SPS performance (both means and 
effectiveness) in the British depressed ruminators is associated with the number of 
their categoric AMs during SPS. This finding replicated previous research that 
categoric AM retrieval was strongly associated with the impaired SPS (Goddard et 
al., 1996). The improved SPS performance demonstrated in the British depressed 
distracters is contributed to by the specific AMs retrieved during SPS. However, 
the results were more divergent in the Taiwanese depressed groups. The specific 
AM retrieval during SPS is significantly associated with both SPS measures in the 
Taiwanese depressed ruminators, whereas only fewer categoric AM retrieval 
during SPS is associated with more effective SPS performance. In the Taiwanese 
depressed distracters, more specific AMs and fewer categoric AMs are associated 
with the relevant means generated on SPS but not with the effective SPS 
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performance. It seems that the distraction manipulation can only improve the 
relevant means in the Taiwanese depressed people but not the effectiveness of 
solutions. However, their improved SPS in contrast to the ruminators was 
contributed to by other factors but not by AMs retrieved during SPS. One of the 
possible factors for the increased relevant means in the distracters might be that 
the distraction enhances their mood and makes them take more initiative in 
engaging in SPS. The reason for failing to replicate on another SPS measure, that 
of effectiveness, might be because an effective SPS strategy in the Taiwanese 
sample was the solution of problems according to social norms but not by 
autobiographical recollections. In contrast, the distraction helps the British 
depressed participants to free more cognitive resources from the depressogenic 
thinking, which is in accordance with the central executive capacity theory 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Williams, 2006) that more executive capacity 
becomes available after distraction manipulation for retrieving specific AMs to 
facilitate the SPS performance. Taking these results together, culture seems to 
interact with depression in different ways to influence their cognitive processing 
for the ruminators and distracters. The British people responded differentially to 
rumination and distraction manipulation whereas these manipulations have a less 
discriminating effect in the Taiwanese sample. 
 
To sum up, the results concerning the association between SPS performance 
and AM retrieval during SPS from the second cross-cultural study (Study 4) in 
this thesis demonstrated a mixed picture. This association was influenced by the 
effect of rumination (where self-focused attention is involved) interacting with 
depression. As the different subcomponents of self-focused attention (e.g., 
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self-focused versus analytical; processed-focused versus state-oriented) mediate 
the function of the working selves, a further breakdown investigation would be 
helpful to clarify how culture would influence these associations. A comparison of 
the baseline level of self-focused tendency would be specifically needed to 
address the association between SPS performance and AM retrieval during SPS in 
different cultures. 
 
7.2.4 The Role of Distraction Played in Depressed People 
 
In view of the finding that the depressed distracters produced more effective 
solutions to hypothetical problem situations after the manipulation, their responses 
were compared with those produced by nondepressed participants to investigate 
the possible mechanism of how distraction enhances SPS performance in 
depressed people. These examples appear in Appendix 7. 
 
Firstly the responses from Scenario 2: Suppose that your friends tease you for 
not socializing enough then what you would do to make your friends respect your 
choice were compared. Both responses received the same effectiveness rating. An 
effective solution is defined as a strategy to solve the social problem so that a 
positive outcome is maximized while minimizing possible negative outcomes 
(Marx et al., 1992). Responses to this scenario from both the non-depressed 
control participant and the depressed distracter included key relevant steps such as 
explaining the reasons for not socializing much, trying to going out with friends 
more often. However, the response of the nondepressed participant also contained 
some self-reflections such as ‘Am I reasonable?’ ‘Too much work to do?’ There 
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was also evidence of analytical thinking in the response such as ‘Ask myself why 
I’m not socializing enough, if they are right’.  
 
The responses of a depressed distracter and a non-depressed control were also 
compared in another scenario, friends moving to a new neighborhood (see 
Examples C and D in Appendix 7). Again, as in the previous scenario, both 
participants received the same effectiveness rating. This rating was obtained 
because both responses included equally useful strategies such as ‘to know more 
friends after moving to a new neighbourhood’, ‘introduce oneself to neighbours 
and people at work’, ‘join societies’, and ‘have a house warming party and invite 
everyone around’. However, closer inspection of the responses also revealed some 
subtle differences. The nondepressed participant showed a more self-assertive 
attitude in his/her response through comments such as ‘Continue with whatever 
hobbies you had where you used to live’, ‘Have a few quiet weeks setting in’. This 
same level of confidence was not apparent in the response of the depressed 
distracter. 
 
Previous research has indicated that depressed people who have experienced a 
distraction manipulation would demonstrate improved SPS performance 
(Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Lyubomirsky et al., 1999). However, 
little is known about the similarities and differences of the quality of responses 
produced by the depressed distracters and their non-depressed controls. The 
examples above provided some evidence for the similarities as well as some 
preliminary speculations for differences between these two groups. Analytic 
thinking and self-assertiveness may be unique features in nondepressed people. In 
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contrast, even when the effectiveness of SPS responses was improved in the 
depressed participants by the distraction manipulation, they seemed to lack those 
features, which may be protective factors to keep people from becoming 
depressed. This conclusion is tentative as it is based on analysis of only a few 
examples. More work should be done to confirm this pattern.  
 
Another issue that needs to be addressed is how the responses to solutions 
differed between the depressed ruminators and depressed distracters. Responses to 
the problem having a big row with your partner were therefore examined in one 
depressed ruminator and one depressed distracter (see Examples E and F in 
Appendix 7). Both SPS responses mentioned the steps like ‘think it through’ or 
‘talk it through and compromise’. However, the depressed distracter also 
described steps such as ‘walk the dog’ or ‘visit a friend’; such steps would 
encourage the respondent to take their mind off the current problem for a while. In 
contrast the depressed ruminator mentioned the dysfunctional strategies of 
avoiding the situation and having an emotional reaction to it. It seems that the 
distraction manipulation successfully improved current sad mood and helped the 
participant to identify activities that would facilitate distraction. Again this 
speculation is based on only a limited data sample and requires further 
investigation before firm conclusions can be drawn. 
 
In conclusion, there has been no research directly examining the similarity and 
differences of the solutions to MEPS scenarios produced by the depressed 
distracters versus the non-depressed controls. Our analyses demonstrated that after 
a distraction manipulation, the SPS effectiveness was improved in the depressed 
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participants.  When comparing the solutions of a depressed distracter versus a 
depressed ruminator, the depressed distracter not only provided a more effective 
solution than the depressed ruminator but also included distracting activities in 
their solutions. In contrast, the depressed ruminator gave an emotional and an 
avoidant response. However, the distraction manipulation did not facilitate the 
self-assertiveness or analytic thinking in the two depressed participants. These 
factors might be enduring features that protect people from depression. More 
work is needed to investigate how distraction helps to improve SPS performance 
in depressed people as well as how these factors (e.g., self-assertiveness and 
analytic thinking) contribute to effective SPS performance. These conclusions are 
tentative and need further examination in future work. 
 
 
 
7.3 Limitations  
 
There are several limitations need noting, with respect to methodological 
issues and interpretations of results in these studies. 
 
7.3.1 Baseline Level of Rumination and Effect of Rumination on the AMT 
Performance 
 
One of the caveats of this thesis is that the baseline level of ruminative 
tendency across two cultures has not been investigated yet. Moreover, the 
influence of thinking style (rumination versus distraction) on AM retrieval on the 
AMT cueing task in the Taiwanese depressed and the nondepressed groups needs 
to be clarified. It is indicated that AM is a function of the self-system: the way 
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individuals memorize their experiences would be determined by their self-systems. 
Moreover, the working self is shaped through the interaction between self and the 
external environment. Thus the self-system is determined by the social norm and 
collective consciousness where one has lived. Therefore, it can be hypothesized 
that individuals from different cultures possess different working selves. 
According to previous research, the Westerners are more self-focused than the 
Easterners. The meaning of the selfhood for the Easterners is linked to social 
relationship. It is reasonable to assume that the baseline of self-focused ruminative 
tendency would be different between people from different cultures. However, the 
baseline level of ruminative tendency between these two cultures has never been 
taken in any previous studies. Furthermore, no study has investigated how 
rumination (i.e., self-focus attention) would influence the AM retrieval (e.g., AM 
retrievals on the AMT) in the Eastern sample. Therefore, more research is needed 
to clarify the association between rumination and AM retrievals across these two 
cultures. 
 
7.3.2 Mood Severity Index (the BDI) and AM Retrieval on the AMT  
 
In Study 3 of this thesis, AM retrieval on the AMT cueing task was 
consistently found to be associated with the mood severity measured by the BDI 
in both British participants and Taiwanese participants across the two 
cross-cultural studies. However, when the participants from these two countries 
were divided into nondepressed group and depressed group, more divergent 
findings emerged. There were no longer significant correlations between the BDI 
scores and the types of AM retrieval (in terms of specific and categoric) on the 
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AMT cueing task in most of the groups. For example, in the first cross-cultural 
study, there was only a significant negative correlation between specific AM 
retrieval and the BDI score in the British nondepressed group and a significant 
negative correlation between categoric AM retrieval and the BDI score in the 
Taiwanese depressed group. With respect to the second cross-cultural study, there 
was only a significant negative correlation between specific AM retrieval and the 
BDI score in the British nondepressed group. The results demonstrated that, in the 
clinically depressed group, there is little evidence suggesting that the mood 
severity (i.e., the BDI score) is associated with AM retrieval on the AMT cueing 
task. 
 
These findings coincided with one of the methodological limitations proposed 
by Williams et al. (2006). The authors argued that a diagnosis of depression is 
associated with overgeneral AM retrievals. However, there is no clear evidence, 
which suggests that mood severity is correlated with the degree of overgenerality 
of AM retrieval (see Williams, et al., 2006 for a review). In an attempt to clarify 
this issue, some of the BDI characteristics will be discussed in the following 
section. 
 
One of the most important functions of the BDI is to allocate participants into 
different groups according to their depressed status because of its well-known 
validity of differentiating nondepressed and depressed groups (Richter, Werner, 
Heerlein, Kraus, & Sauer, 1998). Moreover, the BDI scores also represent the 
severity of depressed mood. In this case, an association between mood severity 
(measured by the BDI) and AM retrieval on the AMT cueing task was expected.  
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One speculation for this undiscovered association is due to the nature of the 
BDI. The BDI is a self-report mood-rating inventory, which measures the 
cognitive, affective and psychomotor aspects of the individual. Richter et al. 
(1998) have indicated that the advantages of the BDI are of high internal 
consistency, high content validity, validity in differentiating nondepressed and 
depressed groups, and it is sensitive to changes and international propagation. But 
it also has some disadvantages, such as instability of score over short time 
intervals and so on. Moreover, the items of the BDI were based on the subjective 
presentation, thus it could be affected by other variables such as self-report bias 
and social desirability (Clark, Crewdson, & Purdon, 1998; Hunt, Auriemma, & 
Cashaw, 2003; Richter et al., 1998; Scafidi, Field, Prodromidis, & Abrams, 1999). 
Previous research also suggested that the BDI score could also be influenced by 
other factors such as defensiveness and denial (Scafidi et al., 1999). 
 
Another possible way to address this issue is derived from the argument of 
trait versus state. The BDI is designed to measure the severity of the current mood 
state, thus it would be regarded as measuring a state variable. However, 
depression is a clinical diagnosis in which a certain number of criteria need to be 
met over six months for individual to be diagnosed as Major Depressive Disorder 
according to DSM-IV. Furthermore, as previous research has suggested, 
overgeneral AM retrieval is an enduring cognitive deficit that can also be found in 
remitted depressed patients (Brittlebank et al., 1993; Mackinger et al., 2000; 
Williams & Dritschel, 1988; see Section 1.2.2.4 for a review). The overgeneral 
AM retrieval style is categorized as a trait marker, though some evidence 
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suggested that it could be improved through MBCT (Williams et al., 2000). 
 
It is worth noting that the significant correlations observed in the 
nondepressed groups should be treated with caution. Although the BDI scores of 
participants in the nondepressed groups range from 0 to 5, it does not necessarily 
imply an existing clinical significance. That is, an individual with a BDI score 1 
may not be clinically significantly different from an individual with a BDI score 
4. 
 
Future work needs to employ a more objective (e. g., clinician-rated mood 
measurements) and a more sensitive mood-rating inventory to examine this 
potential association between mood severity and AM retrieval on the AMT. 
 
7.3.3 Limitations associated with the MEPS 
 
The MEPS procedure has been widely used in investigating SPS. It yielded 
consistent findings of association between the poor quality of MEPS solutions and 
mental disturbance in both suicidal and depressed patients (Evan et al., 1992; 
Goddard et al., 1996, 1997, 2001; Marx et al., 1992; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002). 
However, there are still some methodological issues with respect to the validity of 
the MEPS procedures (see Section 1.4.2.1). For example, D’Zurilla and 
Maydeu-Olivares (1995) have argued that the MEPS is an instrument to test the 
imaginative solutions to the hypothetical problem situations rather than really 
measuring the problem-solving implementation process. In addition, the MEPS 
also consists of unrealistic problem situations such as killing a former SS trooper 
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or stealing a diamond. The administration of a personalized SPS task would help 
to increase the ecological validity of the MEPS. An example of such a task would 
be the request to participants that they list the greatest social problems they are 
currently facing and then give the solutions (see Lyubomirsky et al., 1999 for an 
example). 
 
There are also other SPS measures that assess the process measure aspect of 
SPS (D’Zurilla et al., 2004). D’Zurilla et al. (2004) suggested the Social 
Problem-Solving Inventory for Adolescents (SPSI-A; Frauenknecht & Black, 
1995, 2003), the Problem-Focused Style of Coping (PF-SOC; Heppner, Cook, 
Wright, & Johnson, 1995), and the Perceived Modes of processing 
Inventory-rational Processing (RP) scale (Burns & D’Zurilla, 1999). However, the 
present process measures of SPS encounter a difficulty in that most of them lack 
empirical support for the constructive validity.  
 
7.4 Directions for Future Research 
 
This thesis is the first to look at how thinking style (rumination versus 
distraction) influence SPS performance as well as AM retrieval during SPS in 
clinically depressed people. It also demonstrates some preliminary cross-cultural 
implications with respect to AM retrieval strategies on the AMT cueing task as 
well as the influence of thinking style in SPS and AM retrieval during SPS. 
According to the findings from the studies, some interesting thoughts about future 
directions in line with the findings as well as the current research interest will be 
outlined in the following sections. 
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As mentioned in the Section 7.3.2, the effect of thinking style on AM retrieval 
on the AMT has never been examined cross-culturally in any previous research. A 
full picture of these interrelationships between AM retrieval (an instructed AM 
retrieval), SPS, and AM retrieval during SPS (a spontaneous AM retrieval) cannot 
be established until this result is collected. Furthermore, research has indicated 
that individuals from a Western culture are more self-focused than individuals 
from an Eastern culture (Wang, 2001). Thus it can be concluded that people from 
different cultures have a different degree of self-focused ruminative tendency. 
However, the difference in the self-focused tendency between different cultures 
has not been systematically examined yet. It needs to be established by using 
self-report measurements, such as the Response Style Questionnaire (the RSQ; 
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), which is designed to measure the tendency to 
ruminate, or the Rumination on Sadness Scale (the RSS; Conway et al., 2000), 
which is designed to assess the ruminative response specifically related to sadness 
and distress. These questionnaires are helpful in providing more evidence in this 
research area with respect to the tendency to ruminate in a stressful situation and 
its association with other interested cognitive variables such as AM retrieval and 
SPS. Then the effect of trait versus state rumination could be clarified. 
 
Recent studies on rumination have made further attempts to examine the 
influence of rumination in terms of different subcomponents, such as self-focus 
versus analytic, experiential self-focus versus analytical self-focus, and concrete 
self-focus versus abstract self-focus (see Chapter 1 for a review). These different 
components of rumination may interact with culture to serve different functions in 
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cognitive processing. For example, Watkins and Teasdale (2001) first looked at 
effect for high versus low self-focus and analytic thinking in depression. The 
results demonstrated that analytic thinking style influenced AM retrieval whereas 
self-focus influenced depressed mood independently. Other subsequent studies, 
which continued to examine adaptive and maladaptive function of rumination, 
also yielded consistent support in this area. That is, different modes of 
self-focused rumination have distinctive influences in depressed people, either on 
their AM retrieval or on their SPS ability (Watkins, 2004; Watkins & Baracaia, 
2002; Watkins & Mould, 2005; Watkins & Teasdale, 2004). For example, 
experiential self-focus manipulation and concrete self-focus manipulation were 
found to facilitate the specific AM retrieval and to enhance SPS performance in 
depressed people. In contrast, analytical self-focus manipulation and abstract 
self-focus manipulation were found to be associated with overgeneral AM style or 
deficient SPS performance.  
 
It is worth looking at how these two distinct modes of self-focus would 
interact with depression to influence different AM tasks such as AMT or AM 
retrieval during SPS, which differ in the degree of task demands. Firstly, taking a 
comparison between the two AM tasks, the AMT cueing task requires less 
cognitive resource; whereas AM retrieval during SPS requires more cognitive load. 
Secondly, previous research suggested that Westerners have more self-focused 
statements in their AM recollections than the Easterners (Wang, 2001). Moreover, 
other research indicated that Easterners in contrast, tend to make reflections on 
their past mistakes (i.e., think about the causes and consequences of their actions) 
(Wang & Conway, 2004). It would be worth examining how these two different 
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styles (self-focused and analytical/reflective thinking) correspond to the different 
modes of self-focus and analytic thinking cross-culturally. However, these 
descriptions need to be well-defined and to be further examined in the same study 
to establish the association between the tendency to focus on different aspects of 
the self and other cognitive performance.  
 
These two different characteristics are found to be associated with the 
maladaptive rumination subcomponents (i.e., self-focus and analytical). However, 
no research has been done to clarify how these two culture-specific phenomena 
would contribute to depression. Furthermore, as has been demonstrated in our 
results, Taiwanese participants and British participants respond differently on the 
AMT cueing task. However, we do not know whether this discrepancy is due to 
the distinctive response to emotional materials or the general encode and retrieval 
pattern in Taiwanese people. Barnard et al. (2006) have employed a different 
manipulation to induce an analytic self-rumination without exacerbating negative 
mood (see Barnard et al., 2006, pp. 332-333). Barnard et al. (2006) argued that the 
mode of analytical rumination can be manipulated by asking the participants to 
reflect and generate self-related information focusing on a narrow self-rated theme. 
In this way participants are manipulated to focus their attention on one self-related 
theme repeatedly at a propositional level without going into a schematic level, in 
which the self-related information can be more elaborated through the thinking 
from instance to instance. This new approach may be helpful to cross-cultural 
investigations simply examining the direct effect of self-focus on AM retrieval on 
the AMT and partialling out the indirect effect that is induced by negative mood.  
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Depression is characterized by low mood, lack of motivation, and impaired 
cognitive functioning in various aspects such as memory, attention, judgment and 
problem solving. Hertel (1994) has proposed that one of the reasons for the 
impaired memory in depression was decreased initiative capacity. That is, 
depressed people failed to allocate their attentional resources when even the 
attentional resource is sufficient. This difficulty was regarded as due to lack of 
initiative. Moreover, one of the MEPS measures, relevant means, is an indication 
of the ability to generate possible steps from the problem scenario to the happy 
ending. However, very little evidence has directly examined whether the cause of 
inability to generate relevant means in depressed people is exclusively due to the 
impairment of initiative. Future work needs to be done to clarify this issue. 
 
The results from the correlational analysis between the type of AM retrieval 
during SPS and SPS performance provided preliminary evidence that the tendency 
to retrieve a specific AM as a problem-solving strategy is strongly associated with 
the ability to generate relevant means on the MEPS in depressed ruminators and 
distracters from both cultures. This finding opens an avenue to future studies in 
investigating the association between the specific AM retrieval as a strategy to 
SPS and the ability to generate relevant solutions to social problems. It would also 
be of interest to investigate how central executive capacity would influence this 
process. 
 
7.5 Final Conclusions 
 
In conclusion, this thesis provides evidence that ruminative thinking 
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negatively influences SPS and AM retrieval during SPS in a clinically depressed 
sample. Moreover, a successful SPS is associated with the types of AM retrieval 
involved in SPS process. Specific AMs during SPS are beneficial to SPS 
performance whereas categoric AMs are detrimental to SPS performance. With 
respect to the cross-cultural issue, AM retrieval on the AMT cueing task can also 
be influenced by cultures. Both pan-culture similarities and cross-cultural 
differences are demonstrated with respect to AM retrieval and SPS performance.  
i 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 Beck Depression Inventory 
 
Instructions 
This questionnaire is designed to allow you to indicate how you have 
been feeling during the last week (Including today). For each of the 21 
items please circle the number next to the statement that best represents 
how you have been feeling. 
 
1. 0 
1 
2 
 
3 
I do not feel sad. 
I feel sad. 
I am sad all the time and I can’t snap out 
of it. 
I am so sad and unhappy that I can’t stand 
it. 
 
7. 0 
1 
2 
3 
 
I don’t feel disappointed in myself. 
I am disappointed in myself. 
I am disgusted with myself. 
I hate myself. 
2. 0 
 
1 
2 
 
3 
 
I am not particularly discouraged about 
the future. 
I feel discouraged about the future. 
I feel that I have nothing to look forward 
to. 
I feel that the future is hopeless and 
things cannot improve. 
 
8. 0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
I don’t feel that I am any worse than 
anybody else. 
I am critical of myself for my 
mistakes and weaknesses. 
I blame myself all the time for all 
my faults. 
I blame myself for everything bad 
that happens. 
 
3. 0 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
I do not feel like a failure. 
I feel that I have failed more than the 
average person. 
As I look back on my life, all I can see is 
a lot of failures. 
I feel I am a complete failure as a person. 
 
9. 0 
 
1 
 
2 
3 
 
I don’t have thoughts of killing 
myself. 
I have thoughts of killing myself, 
but I would not carry them out. 
I would like to kill myself. 
I would kill myself if I had the 
chance. 
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4. 0 
 
1 
2 
 
3 
 
I get as much satisfaction out of things as 
I used to. 
I don’t enjoy things the way I used to. 
I don’t get real satisfaction out of 
anything anymore. 
I am discouraged or bored with 
everything. 
 
10. 
 
 
 
 
 
11. 
0 
1 
2 
3 
 
 
0 
 
I don’t cry any more than usual. 
I cry more now than I used to. 
I cry all the time now. 
I used to be able to cry, but now I 
can’t cry even though I want to. 
 
I am no more irritated by things than 
I ever am. 
5. 0 
1 
2 
3 
I don’t feel particularly guilty. 
I feel guilty a good part of the time. 
I feel quite guilty most of the time 
I feel guilty all of the time 
 
 1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
I am slightly more irritated by things 
now than usual. 
I am quite annoyed or irritated a 
good deal of the time. 
I feel irritated all the time now. 
6. 0 
1 
2 
3 
 
I don’t feel that I am being punished. 
I feel that I may be punished. 
I expect to be punished. 
I feel that I am punished. 
12. 0 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
I have not lost interest in people. 
I am less interested in people than I 
used to be. 
I have lost most of my interest in 
other people. 
I have lost all of my interest in other 
people. 
 
13. 0 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
I make decisions as well as I ever could. 
I put off making decisions more than I 
used to. 
I have greater difficulty in making 
decisions than before. 
I can’t make decisions at all anymore. 
18. 0 
 
1 
2 
3 
 
My appetite is no worse than usual. 
My appetite is not as good as it used 
to be. 
My appetite is much worse now. 
I have no appetite at all anymore. 
14. 0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
I don’t feel that I look any worse than I 
used to. 
I am worried that I am looking old or 
unattractive. 
I feel that there are permanent changes in 
my appearance that make me look 
unattractive. 
I believe that I look ugly.  
19. 0 
 
1 
2 
3 
 
I haven’t lost much weight, if any, 
recently. 
I have lost more than five pounds. 
I have lost more than ten pounds. 
I have lost more than fifteen pounds.  
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15. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16. 
 
0 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
0 
1 
2 
 
3 
 
I can work about as well as before. 
It takes me extra effort to get started at 
doing something. 
I have to push myself very hard to do 
anything. 
I can’t do any work at all. 
 
I can sleep as well as usual. 
I don’t sleep as well as I used to. 
I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and 
find it hard to get back to sleep. 
I wake up several hours earlier than I 
used to and cannot get back to sleep. 
 
20. 0 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
3 
 
I am no more worried about my 
health than usual. 
I am more worried about physical 
problems such as aches and pains, or 
upset stomach, or constipation. 
I am very worried about physical 
problems and it’s hard to think of 
much else. 
I am so worried about my physical 
problems that I cannot think about 
anything else. 
17. 0 
1 
2 
3 
 
I don’t get more tired than usual. 
I get tired more easily than I used to. 
I get tired from doing almost anything. 
I am too tired to do anything. 
21. 0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
I have not noticed any recent change 
in my interest in sex. 
I am less interested in sex than I 
used to be. 
I am much less interested in sex 
now. 
I have lost interest in sex 
completely. 
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Appendix 2 Self-reported Mood Questionnaires 
 
Instructions 
Please rate how you feel right now on this 9-pointed scale by circling the number, 
which best represents your feelings at this moment. 
 
 
For now, I am feeling: 
 
Cheerful    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    Not cheerful 
 
 Confused    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    Not confused 
 
Sad     1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    Not sad 
 
Creative     1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    Not creative 
 
Unhappy    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    Not unhappy 
 
 Shy    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    Not shy 
 
Elated    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    Not elated 
 
Curious    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    Not curious 
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Appendix 3 The AMT Cueing Task 
Instructions 
“Next, you are going to be presented some words, one at a time. Please retrieve a 
specific memory AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE in response to each cue word. A 
specific memory is an event recalled which refers to one particular day, e.g., to the 
cue word leisure—“playing squash last Friday night” is a specific memory to it. 
For example, to the cue word lucky, what memory is coming to your mind?” (The 
prompt “Can you think of a particular time?” is going to be used for ambiguous 
response.) 
 
Happy 
 
Sorry 
 
Safe 
 
Angry 
 
Interested 
 
Clumsy 
 
Successful 
 
Hurt 
 
Surprised  
 
Lonely 
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Appendix 3 Rumination Manipulation 
Instructions 
For the next few minutes, try your best to focus your attention on each of the 
ideas on the following pages. 
Read each item slowly and silently to yourself. As you read the items, use your 
imagination and concentration to focus your mind on each of the ideas. Spend a few 
moments visualizing and concentrating on each item. 
Please continue until the experimenter returns. 
 
 
Think about : 
the physical sensations you feel in your body 
 
Think about : 
your character and who you strive to be 
 
Think about : 
the degree of clarity in your thinking right now 
 
Think about : 
why you react the way you do 
 
Think about : 
the way you feel inside 
 
Think about : 
the possible consequences of your current mental state 
 
Think about : 
how similar or different you are relative to other people 
 
Think about : 
what it would be like if your present feelings lasted 
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Think about : 
why things turn out the way they do 
 
Think about : 
trying to understand your feeling 
 
Think about : 
how awake or tired you feel now 
 
Think about : 
the amount of tension in your muscles 
 
Think about : 
whether you are fulfilled 
 
Think about : 
your physical appearance 
 
Think about: 
whether you feel stressed right now 
 
Think about : 
the long-term goals you have set 
 
Think about : 
the amount of certainty you feel 
 
Think about : 
your present feelings of fatigue or energy 
 
Think about : 
possible explanations for your physical sensations 
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Think about : 
how hopeful or hopeless you are feeling 
 
Think about : 
the level of motivation you feel right now 
 
Think about : 
the degree of helplessness you feel 
 
Think about : 
the degree of calmness or restlessness you feel 
 
Think about: 
The possible consequences of the way you feel 
 
Think about : 
what your feelings might mean 
 
Think about : 
how sad or happy you are feeling 
 
Think about : 
the expectations your family has for you 
 
Think about : 
why your body feels this way 
 
Think about : 
why you get this way sometimes 
 
Think about : 
how passive or active you feel  
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Think about : 
what people notice about your personality 
 
Think about : 
how optimistic or pessimistic you feel about the future 
 
Think about : 
how weak or strong your body feels right now 
 
Think about : 
the degree of relaxation or agitation you feel 
 
Think about : 
the kind of person you think you should be  
 
Think about : 
the degree of control you feel right now 
 
Think about : 
what would happen if your current physical state lasted 
 
Think about : 
sitting down and analyzing your personality 
 
Think about : 
why you turned out this way 
 
Think about : 
the things that are most important in your life 
 
Think about : 
how quick or slow your thinking is right now 
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Think about : 
the degree of decisiveness you feel 
 
Think about : 
trying to understand who you are 
 
Think about : 
how you feel about your friendships 
 
Think about : 
whether you have accomplished a lot so far 
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Appendix 4 Distraction Manipulation 
 
Instructions 
For the next few minutes, try your best to focus your attention on each of the 
ideas on the following pages. 
Read each item slowly and silently to yourself. As you read the items, use your 
imagination and concentration to focus your mind on each of the ideas. Spend a few 
moments visualizing and concentrating on each item. 
Please continue until the experimenter returns. 
 
 
Think about : 
and imagine a boat slowly crossing the Atlantic 
 
Think about : 
the layout of a typical classroom 
 
Think about : 
the shape of a large black umbrella 
 
Think about : 
the movement of an electric fan on a warm day 
 
Think about : 
raindrops sliding down a window pane 
 
Think about : 
a double-decker bus driving down a street 
 
Think about : 
and picture a full moon on a clear night 
 
Think about : 
clouds forming in the sky 
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Think about : 
the layout of the local shopping centre 
 
Think about : 
and imagine a plane flying overhead 
 
Think about : 
fire darting round a log in a fire-place 
 
Think about : 
and concentrate on the expression on the face of the Mona Lisa 
 
Think about : 
the car park at a large supermarket 
 
Think about : 
two birds sitting on a tree branch 
 
Think about : 
the shadow of a stop sign 
 
Think about : 
the layout of the post office 
 
Think about : 
the structure of a high-rise office building 
 
Think about : 
and picture the Eiffel Tower 
 
Think about : 
and imagine a lorryload of apples 
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Think about : 
the pattern on an Oriental rug 
 
Think about : 
the “man in the moon” 
 
Think about : 
the shape of the continent of Africa 
 
Think about : 
a band playing outside 
 
Think about : 
a group of polar bears fishing in a stream 
 
Think about : 
the shape of Sydney Opera House 
 
Think about : 
the shape of Great Britain 
 
Think about : 
the way Stonehenge looks at sunset 
 
Think about : 
the outlines of the House of Parliament 
 
Think about : 
a train stopped at a station 
 
Think about : 
a lone cactus in the desert 
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Think about : 
the shape of the country of Italy 
 
Think about : 
a row of shampoo bottles on display 
 
Think about : 
a petrol station on a major road 
 
Think about : 
the fuzz on the shell of coconut 
 
Think about : 
the queens’ head on a stamp 
 
Think about : 
a band playing the National Anthem 
 
Think about : 
the shape of a cello 
 
Think about : 
the birthmark on Gorbachev’s head 
 
Think about : 
the shape of the Unites States of America 
 
Think about : 
the baggage claim area at the airport 
 
Think about : 
the size of the Statue of Liberty 
 
 
xlix  
Think about : 
the shape of a cricket bat 
 
Think about : 
a freshly painted door 
 
Think about : 
the shiny surface on a trumpet 
 
Think about : 
a kettle coming to boil 
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Appendix 5 Means-Ends Problem-Solving Procedures 
Instructions 
We are often challenged by different kinds of social problems in our daily life. 
Following are some hypothetical problem situations; please list the steps you could 
take to reach the happy ending, given the problem situation. 
 
Situation 1.: You are being treated unfairly by one of your teachers. 
(In clinically depressed sample, “boss” replaced “teachers”.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the End: You get on with your teacher again. 
(In clinically depressed sample, “boss” replaced “teachers”.) 
 
Please write down any thoughts or images that crossed your mind whilst trying 
to solve the problem. 
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Situation 2.: Your friends tease you for not socializing enough. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the End: They respect your choice. 
 
 
Please write down any thoughts or images that crossed your mind whilst trying to 
solve the problem. 
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Situation 3.: You move to a new neighbourhood, don’t know anybody. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the End: You make lots of friends. 
 
 
Please write down any thoughts or images that crossed your mind whilst trying to 
solve the problem. 
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Situation 4.: You have a major row with your parents. 
(In clinically depressed sample, “partners” replaced “parents”.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the End: You get on with your parents again. 
(In clinically depressed sample, “partners” replaced “parents”.) 
 
 
Please write down any thoughts or images that crossed your mind whilst trying to 
solve the problem. 
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Appendix 6 Cover Story 
 
Please picture in your mind the following scenes. 
 
A. The colors of the forest in autumn 
 
Please rate the vividness of the images. 
not vivid at all      1    2    3    4    5    6    7     extremely vivid 
 
 
B. The colors of the seashore in summer 
 
Please rate the vividness of the images. 
not vivid at all      1    2    3    4    5    6    7      extremely vivid 
 
 
 
Please try to recall the most impressive dream that you had recently. 
(Please answer briefly.) 
 
Can you recall it very clearly or it is only a vague impression at this moment? 
 
 
What does the dream mean to you?” 
 
 
How often do you have dreams?  
 
 
Can you easily recall your dreams, or they are forgotten very soon when you wake 
up?  
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Appendix 7 Examples of MEPS strategies 
 
Example A: 
Here is a response for scenario 2 by a nondepressed participant, friends tease 
you for not socializing enough: 
Ask myself why I’m not socializing enough, if they are right. 
Am I being reasonable? Too much work to do? Not enough money? Fallen out 
with a friend? Ill? 
Explain reasons to friends, and make steps to go out a bit more. 
 
Example B: 
Here is another response for the same scenario by a depressed distracter, friends 
tease you for not socializing enough: 
I would explain to them the reasons why I stay in a lot. 
I would also go out with them a little more often to let them see I have more fun at 
home, while also making an effort to socialize. 
 
Example C: 
Here is a response for scenario 3 from a depressed distracter, moving to a new 
neighbourhood: 
Make an effort: go knocking on your neighbour’s doors and introduce yourself, 
and appear very friendly and cheerful. 
Invite neighbours round for coffee, to get to know them better. 
Perhaps even have a barbecue or party and invite them all around. 
Join societies, perhaps through the church or take part in sporting activities. 
Get yourself involved in the community through these groups. 
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Example D: 
Here is a response for the same scenario by a nondepressed participant: 
Have a few quite weeks setting in, making yourself at home and at the same time 
find out what opportunities exist the area (wide area) for socializing. 
Continue with whatever hobbies you had where you used to live. 
Get to know the people you work with. 
Take up something you’ve always wanted to do, get to know others who do it. 
Invite everyone from the work, and the people in your neighbours to your newly 
decorated house for the house warming, have a nice time. 
 
Example E: 
Here is a response for scenario 4 by a depressed ruminator, having a big row 
with a partner: 
I’d cry. 
I’d probably avoid him for a bit and think things through for a while. 
I’d talk things through with him, be nice to him.  
I’d apologize if necessary. 
We would reach a compromise. 
 
Example F: 
Here is a response for the same scenario by a depressed distracter: 
Have quiet time to clear thoughts and let things cool down. 
Walk the dog, visit a friend etc. 
Talk to him about why I think I am right, why he think he is right. 
Come to mutual understanding. 
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Appendix 8 The scattergram of the correlations for Table 5.3 
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